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ABSTRACT 
 
In dealing with contested regimes, international aid donors must decide whether to suspend 
or continue to provide development assistance to a regime considered illegitimate. Since 
the 1990s a general consensus has existed that conventional sanctions are largely 
ineffective and essentially violate human rights. Responding to this realisation, targeted or 
‘smart’ sanctions emerged with the aim of minimising the impacts of sanctions on civilians, 
while still targeting the ruling elite. This thesis investigates smart sanctions utilised in a 
Pacific Island country: Fiji. Following the coups of 1987, 2000 and 2006 three of Fiji’s 
major aid donors, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union, imposed various levels 
of smart sanctions including targeted travel bans and sanctioning their aid programmes. In 
particular, the donors focused on redirecting funding through non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in Fiji.  
 
Within the sanctions literature a particular gap exists regarding assessment of the impacts 
on local NGOs. What research does exists has shown that in several cases in Africa, Asia 
and South America when donors have chosen to channel aid through civil society in 
response to lagging political reforms, this has at times done more harm than good for local 
NGOs. Since the imposition of smart sanctions in Fiji there has been no evaluation of how 
rechanneling aid through NGOs has changed the local development landscape. This 
research evaluates both the explicit and implicit impacts that smart sanctions imposed on 
Fiji have had on local NGOs. 
 
Key words: smart sanctions; Fiji; aid; civil society 
 
 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
A very big vinaka vakalevu to all NGOs and participants interviewed in Fiji and New 
Zealand for sharing your thoughts and experiences. Without you, none of this research 
would have been possible. 
 
To my thesis supervisor, John Overton, thank you for insisting that my work at every stage 
was ‘Great stuff’. You have been a constant inspiration and source of positive energy 
throughout the last two years. Vinaka! 
 
Particular thanks go to Professor Vijay Naidu and Asenaca Manuca at the University of the 
South Pacific, in Suva, for graciously welcoming me, providing a space from which to 
work and an academic community to belong to while away from home. Also to Kylie 
Anderson, for providing eight kilos worth of your own research, which was particularly 
invaluable as well as heavy.  
 
To the Siwatibau Family, for introducing me to Fiji and welcoming me into their home.  
 
To my Mom and Dad, for sending me countless care packages. To Dad and Lynda for your 
constant words of encouragement and levity. Special thanks go to my Mom who was my 
inspiration to continue studying. Every time I thought it was too hard, I thought of how 
much harder it must have been for you and was proud to have such an amazing woman in 
my life. Thanks Mom! To the rest of my family, in particular Jennifer, who reminded me to 
keep things in perspective by insisting that I could write my thesis in the car on a road trip. 
 
To my friends both near and far, for always appearing interested in my thesis, even if you 
weren’t. In particular, thanks to Hannah Mackintosh and Shabnam Dastgheib for your 
amazing editing skills.  
 
A very special thanks to the ‘Deve Girls’. Without each of you the last two years would 
only have been about school. Particular thanks go to Laura Barrett for being my research 
and travel companion and for planting your coconut tree next to mine. 
 
Finally, my warmest thanks go to Sean, who has been a constant source of support, critique 
and encouragement. Thank you for making me go to school in the morning, understanding 
when I needed to stay late at night and doing more than your fair share of the laundry. 
Coming home to you made it all a little easier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To everyone, Vinaka Vakalevu and Loloma Levu. 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... ii 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... vi 
ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. vii 
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES .............................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Sanctions, Aid and Fiji .............................................................................................. 2 
1.3 Including Civil Society in the Sanctions Debate ....................................................... 3 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives ................................................................................... 4 
1.5 Chapter Outline ......................................................................................................... 5 
CHAPTER TWO - RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................... 7 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Philosophical Approach to Research ......................................................................... 7 
2.2.1 Critical Realism .................................................................................................. 8 
2.2.2 Positionality ........................................................................................................ 9 
2.3 Methodology ........................................................................................................... 10 
2.3.1 Mixed-method ................................................................................................... 11 
2.3.2 Case study ......................................................................................................... 12 
2.3.3 Talanoa .............................................................................................................. 12 
2.4 Choice of Setting and Participants .......................................................................... 13 
2.5 Research Methods ................................................................................................... 15 
2.5.1 Primary and Secondary Research ..................................................................... 15 
2.5.2 Semi-Structured Interviews .............................................................................. 15 
2.6 Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................. 16 
2.6.1 Victoria University of Wellington Code of Ethics ........................................... 17 
2.6.2 Research Permit ................................................................................................ 17 
2.6.3 Potential Harm and Confidentiality .................................................................. 18 
2.7 Limitations............................................................................................................... 19 
2.7.1 Time Constraints and Participant Accessibility ................................................ 19 
2.7.2 Research Fatigue ............................................................................................... 19 
2.8 Summary ................................................................................................................. 20 
CHAPTER THREE - AID, CIVIL SOCIETY AND SANCTIONS ............................................. 21 
3.2 The Aid Landscape, 1980 - 2000 ............................................................................ 22 
3.2.1 The Growing Influence of Neoliberalism ......................................................... 22 
3.2.2 From the New Policy Agenda to the Good Governance Agenda ..................... 25 
3.3 The New Era of Aid: 2000 - Present ....................................................................... 28 
3.3.1 Theoretical Influences in the 21st Century ........................................................ 29 
3.3.2 Emerging Policies and Principles ..................................................................... 30 
3.3.3 The Principle of Partnership ............................................................................. 32 
3.3.4 The Role of Civil Society in the New Aid Regime .......................................... 34 
 iv 
3.4 Conditionality, Sanctions… and NGOs?................................................................. 36 
3.4.1 History ............................................................................................................... 36 
3.4.2 Justifications: Answering the Call to “Do Something” .................................... 38 
3.4.3 Implications: Sanctions and Civil Society ........................................................ 40 
3.5 Summary ................................................................................................................. 42 
CHAPTER FOUR - THE HISTORY OF AID AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FIJI .............................. 44 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 44 
4.2 Fiji’s Aid History..................................................................................................... 44 
4.2.1 The Colonial State and Independence ............................................................... 45 
4.2.2 Neoliberal Reform in Post-Coup Fiji ................................................................ 46 
4.2.3 The Influence of the Good Governance and Security Agendas ........................ 47 
4.2.4 Fiji’s Traditional and Non-Traditional Donors ................................................. 49 
 4.2.4.1    Traditional donors ................................................................................... 49 
 4.2.4.2    Non-traditional donors ............................................................................ 42 
4.3 The Development of Fiji’s Civil Society ................................................................ 53 
4.3.1 History of Fiji’s NGO Community ................................................................... 53 
4.3.2 The 2006 Coup – Dividing a Community ......................................................... 54 
4.3.3 NGOs and Donors: Strengthening Partnerships? .............................................. 55 
4.4 Summary ................................................................................................................. 57 
CHAPTER FIVE - SANCTIONS IN FIJI ........................................................................... 59 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 59 
5.2 1987: The Coup(s) to Preserve Fijian Paramountcy ............................................... 59 
5.2.1 International Reactions ..................................................................................... 60 
5.3 2000: Fiji’s Civilian Coup ....................................................................................... 61 
5.3.1 International Reactions ..................................................................................... 62 
5.4 2006: The Coup to Restore Democracy? ................................................................ 65 
5.4.1 International Reactions ..................................................................................... 66 
5.5 Recent Developments .............................................................................................. 69 
5.6 Summary ................................................................................................................. 70 
CHAPTER SIX - PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDING TO NGOS IN FIJI  .................................... 72 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 72 
6.2 How do the donors fund NGOs in Fiji? .................................................................. 72 
6.2.1 AusAID’s support to Fiji’s NGOs .................................................................... 73 
6.2.2 New Zealand’s Commitment to Reorientation ................................................. 76 
6.2.3 The European Union’s Focus on Democracy and Human Rights .................... 79 
6.3 Perceived Impacts of Sanctioned Aid on Fiji’s NGOs ............................................ 83 
6.3.1 Thoughts from the Advantaged ........................................................................ 84 
6.3.2 Thoughts from the Disadvantaged .................................................................... 86 
6.3.3 Seeking an Alternative ...................................................................................... 89 
6.4 Summary ................................................................................................................. 92 
CHAPTER SEVEN - THE (IN)EFFICACY OF TARGETED SANCTIONS IN FIJI ...................... 93 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 93 
7.2 Unexpected Targets of Travel Bans ........................................................................ 94 
7.2.1 Travel Ban Case Studies ................................................................................... 95 
 7.2.1.1   Case I .................................................................................................. 83 
 v 
 7.2.1.2   Case II ................................................................................................. 83 
 7.2.1.3   Case III ................................................................................................ 83 
 7.2.1.4   Case IV ................................................................................................ 84 
 7.2.1.5   Case V ................................................................................................. 85 
 7.2.1.6   Retaliating with travel bans ................................................................ 85 
7.3 Perceptions on the (In)Efficacy of Targeted Sanctions in Fiji .............................. 100 
7.3.1 Donor Perceptions ........................................................................................... 101 
7.3.2 NGO Perceptions ............................................................................................ 102 
7.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 104 
CHAPTER EIGHT - THE IMPLICIT IMPACTS OF SANCTIONS ON RELATIONSHIPS ............ 106 
8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 106 
8.2 Relationships between NGOs and Donors ............................................................ 106 
8.2.1 Lacking Donor Capacity ................................................................................. 107 
8.2.2 Donor Selectivity ............................................................................................ 108 
8.2.3 Visible Power Dynamics ................................................................................. 110 
8.3 Relationships between NGOs and Government of Fiji ......................................... 111 
8.3.1 Restrictions on Partnering with the Government of Fiji ................................. 112 
8.3.2 Rising Government Suspicions ....................................................................... 113 
8.3.3 Re-building Relationships ............................................................................... 115 
8.4 Relationships Amongst NGOs .............................................................................. 117 
8.4.1 Local NGO (Dis)Unity ................................................................................... 117 
8.4.2 The Benefits of Overseas NGO Partners ........................................................ 118 
8.4.3 The Importance of Inter-Personal Relationships ............................................ 120 
8.5 Summary ............................................................................................................... 122 
CHAPTER NINE - CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................. 123 
9.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 123 
9.2 Limitations and Further Research Possibilities ..................................................... 124 
9.3 A Review of the Impacts of Sanctions on NGOs in Fiji ....................................... 125 
9.4 Why Include NGOs in the Sanctions Debates? ..................................................... 127 
9.5 Final Remarks........................................................................................................ 128 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 130 
 
APPENDIX I – FIGURES AND TABLES ....................................................................... 141 
APPENDIX II – ETHICS FORMS ................................................................................. 149 
NGO Participant Information Sheet ............................................................................... 149 
Donor Agency Participant Information Sheet ................................................................ 150 
Participant Information Sheet ......................................................................................... 151 
Consent to Participation in Research .............................................................................. 152 
 
 
 vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1   Total Number of NGOs, Worldwide by Year ................................................... 24 
Figure 3.2   Proportion of ODA Channelled through NGOs (per cent) ............................... 24 
Figure 4.1   ODA to Fiji, All Commitments (current US$ millions), 1970-2009 ................ 45 
Figure 4.2   Sources of ODA: Top 10 Donors (average for the last 5 years), as of 2011 .... 50 
Figure 4.3   Aid Figures by Donors, 1996-2001 ................................................................... 52 
Figure 4.4   Pre- and Post-1987 Coup Channels for Donor Funding ................................... 56 
Figure 5.1   Australia ODA to Fiji, 1999-2010 .................................................................... 68 
Figure 5.2   NZ ODA to Fiji, 1999-2010 .............................................................................. 69 
Figure 6.1   Australian Assistance Provided to CSOs/NGOs in Fiji, 1992-2010 ................. 75 
Figure 6.2   NZ ODA Direct to Fijian NGOs, 2001-2010 .................................................... 78 
Figure 6.3   European Development Fund Disbursements to Fiji, 1975-Present ................. 81 
Figure A.1  ODA/GNI in 2009 ........................................................................................... 141 
Figure A.2  ODA to Fiji, all commitments (current US$ millions), 1970-2009 ................ 142 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1   List of Interview Participants ............................................................................. 14 
Table A.1  Total Bilateral Aid to Fiji (current US$ millions), 1960-2009 ......................... 143 
Table A.2  Aid by Donors (F$ millions), 1996-2010 ......................................................... 144 
Table A.3  US Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) Fiji, CY2004-2009 .... 145 
Table A.4  Aggregate View of Australian ODA through Fijian NGOs, 1992-2004 .......... 146 
Table A.5  Total NZ ODA to Fiji, Amount and Percentages to Fijian NGOs, 2001-2010 147 
Table A.6  Sanctions Measures and Mechanisms by Country ........................................... 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
ACRONYMS 
 
ACP Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
ACSSP Australian Civil Society Support Program 
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Union  
AFTERA Australia-Fiji Trade and Economic Agreement  
AMSP EU Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol  
ANCP AusAID-NGO Cooperation Program 
AusAID Australian International Development Assistance Bureau 
AusNGO Australian NGO 
AVI Australian Volunteers International 
CA Cooperation Agreement 
CCF Citizen's Constitutional Forum 
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
CSS New Zealand Civil Society Strategy 
CSS Civil Society Strategy 
DAP Direct Aid Program 
DFAT Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
DfID United Kingdom Department for International Development 
EC European Commission 
ECSIEP European Centre on Pacific of Pacific Issues  
EDF European Development Fund 
EIDHR European Institute for Democracy and Human Rights 
EU European Union 
FLP Fiji Labour Party 
FMF Fiji Military Forces 
FTUC Fiji Trade Union Congress 
FWCC Fiji Women's Crisis Centre 
FWRM Fiji Women's Rights Movement 
GBS General Budget Support 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GEF Global Environment Fund 
GNI Gross National Income 
HAF Humanitarian Action Fund 
HOMF New Zealand Head of Mission Fund 
HRF Humanitarian Response Fund 
IFI International Financial Institution 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
JAR European Commission-Fiji Joint Annual Reports  
JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
KOHA-PICD Kaihono hei Oranga Hapori o te Ao – Partnerships for International 
Community Development  
LNGO Local NGO 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
MFAT New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 viii 
NFP National Federation Party 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations 
NZAID New Zealand Agency for International Development 
NZAP New Zealand Aid Programme 
NZHC New Zealand High Commission 
NZNGO New Zealand Non-Governmental Organisation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PER Public Emergency Regulations 
PIF Pacific Island Forum 
PIFS Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
RNGO Regional NGO 
SAP Structural Adjustment Programmes 
SAS Small Activities Scheme 
SDF Sustainable Development Fund 
SDL Soqosoqo Duavata Lewe Ni Vanua Party 
SVT Soqosoqo Vakavulewa Ni Taukei Party  
SWAp Sector Wide Approach 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Fund 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund  
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USP University of the South Pacific 
YWCA Young Women’s Christian Association 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Scholarship on sanctions has always been informed by the IR [international 
relations] literature, which tended to focus on how large and aggregated 
constructs—‘states’ and ‘societies’—related to one another, and which was 
relatively uninterested in examining how international processes and actions 
made themselves felt on specific individuals or groups within those societies. 
 
                     Buck, et al., 1998, p.  73 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In January 2009 I began a month-long internship with a non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) in Fiji. At the time I knew very little about Fiji, other than it was beautiful holiday 
destination in the South Pacific. I spent the months leading up to my departure reading 
about Fiji’s culture, its colonial history, its diverse ethnic populations and its more recent 
political instability. I was both shocked and intrigued to learn that Fiji was currently under 
the rule of a military dictator. 
 
When I arrived in Fiji, I did not see soldiers with guns or roadblocks in the streets. Instead I 
found a civil society community severely divided between those willing to engage with an 
interim government, and those refusing to acknowledge an illegitimate regime. More 
importantly, though, I met a number of people trying to understand and confront Fiji’s 
tumultuous past while aiming to move beyond its culture of coups. It was only later, when I 
returned to New Zealand, that I learned two of my colleagues at the NGO had been 
subjected to travel bans by Australia and New Zealand, which had been imposed among a 
package of sanctions measures after the 2006 coup. The travel bans that had affected my 
former colleagues had been imposed based on familial relations, and the fact that they were 
travelling on behalf of the NGO made little difference. I did not understand how or why a 
government could justify the extension of their sanctions to the level of civil society 
organisations, whether intentional or not. 
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1.2 Sanctions, Aid and Fiji 
 
Sanctions are one of the oldest tools of economic statecraft, reaching back as far as 432 
B.C. to the Megarian Decree, which barred Megarian merchants from Athenian markets. 
The Decree essentially established the world’s first recorded trade embargo (Hufbauer, 
Schott, Elliot, & Oegg, 2007, p. 9). Over time, the motives for imposing sanctions have 
evolved. Throughout the 19th century, sanctions were used as a strategic tool of European 
expansionism. They later became a common tool of foreign policy, offering a “middle 
ground between diplomatic and paramilitary/military action” (Eland, 1995, p. 30). During 
the Cold War, however, sanctions were increasingly used to influence political ideology 
and regime change throughout the Third World. With the Cold War over, the objectives of 
sanctions in the late 20th and early 21st centuries have shifted once again, with an 
overwhelming emphasis on promoting “respect for human rights and democratic elections” 
(Hufbauer, et al., 2007).  
 
As motivations for imposing sanctions have evolved, so too have the mechanisms of 
imposing sanctions. The 1990s saw two key realisations emerge within the sanctions 
debate. Firstly, on average conventional sanctions have been ineffective at producing 
credible, long term reform (Crawford, 1997; Daoudi & Dajani, 1983; Doxey, 1987; Hansen 
& Borchgrevink, 2006; Nossal, 1989; Pape, 1997). Secondly, despite the frequently 
claimed objectives of upholding human rights, sanctions have in fact throughout history 
targeted innocent populations (Galtung, 1967; Shagabutdinova & Berejikian, 2007; 
Tomasevski, 1997; Weiss, Cortright, Lopez, & Minear, 1997). This has led to what Nossal 
refers to as a ‘policy paradox’: “despite the overwhelming evidence that sanctions simply 
do not `work' as their enthusiasts claim, they nonetheless continue to be a favored 
instrument for global governance responding to behavior deemed wrongful in international 
politics” (Nossal, 1999, p. 131). This recognition that sanctions are ineffective and violation 
human rights prompted demands for sanctions to become smarter and more targeted. 
‘Smart’ sanctions aim to be more selective in what and whom they target. For example, 
smart sanctions tend to include: restrictions on the financial assets of ruling and military 
elites; restrictions on the industries from which they are likely to benefit; and travel and/or 
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visa restrictions for those directly responsible for conflicts and their immediate family. 
Another form of smart sanctions has included suspending development assistance to a 
recipient country. This is a particularly controversial form of sanctions. Sanctioning aid can 
range from total suspension of all aid by all donors (usually not including humanitarian 
aid), the suspension of any new project aid, a reduction in aid allocations or disbursements, 
as well as political statements, threats and other non-aid measures (such as arms 
embargoes) (Crawford, 2001). Like comprehensive sanctions, the objective is to pressure 
the government to reform, although in a more targeted fashion.  
 
Since gaining independence from Britain in 1970, Fiji has experienced four coups d’état: 
twice in 1987, once in 2000 and once in 2006. Responding to the democratic crises in Fiji, 
several international donors suspended or heavily restricted their development assistance to 
the island nation. In particular, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union (EU) have 
unilaterally imposed a number of targeted smart sanctions1. In the wake of the 2006 coup, 
both Australia and New Zealand, two of Fiji’s nearest and most important trade and aid 
partners, scaled back their aid programmes, severing several development programmes that 
partner with Fiji’s Government. Both countries have also imposed travel restrictions on 
Government and military personnel as well as their immediate family members. The EU, 
Fiji’s second largest donor (after Australia), suspended its development assistance to Fiji, 
placing more than F$400 million in aid to Fiji at risk (Grubel, 2007). As a result of their 
suspended relationships with the Government, each donor has announced their separate 
intentions to increase their work with and through civil society actors in Fiji. 
 
1.3 Including Civil Society in the Sanctions Debate 
 
When dealing with contested regimes, international aid donors tread a fine line. They must 
decide whether to suspend aid and run the risk of negatively affecting the most vulnerable 
populations, or continue the provision of development assistance and risk the appearance of 
                                                 
1 The United States has also imposed sanctions on Fiji’s development assistance in the past. US sanctions, 
however, are relatively minimal compared to those of Australia, New Zealand and the EU and are thus not 
included in the focus of this research. 
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supporting an illegitimate regime. However, a third alternative involves donors working 
around the state by funding development through civil society rather than directly 
supporting government development initiatives. In this way, the favouring of civil society 
is a direct attempt by international donors to use foreign policy to limit the role of the 
contested regime.  
 
Recent shifts in the dominant development paradigm have seen donors refocusing their 
efforts once again on government institutions. Waving the banner of ‘aid effectiveness’, 
and underpinned by a number of new principles and modalities of aid delivery, developing 
country governments have regained their place as the more efficient and preferred partner 
for sustainable development that has been consistently challenged the rising influence of 
neoliberal thinking since the 1980s. This shift in development thinking and practice has 
particular implications for civil society. Whereas in the past, civil society organisations 
(CSOs), in particular NGOs, were heralded as having a comparative advantage over the 
state, seen as a “preferred channel for service provision, in deliberate substitution of the 
state” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b, p. 2), the current dominant development paradigm 
prescribes a less central role for civil society, viewing them as more of a complementary or 
‘alternative’ channel for development assistance (Leader & Colenso, 2005). Their role as 
‘alternative’ service providers is particularly exacerbated in the case of fragile or failing 
states (Dowst, 2009; Riddell, 2007). Despite this acknowledgement of the important role 
NGOs play in times of state instability, little research exists evaluating the impacts 
sanctions have on local NGOs. Where such research does exist, it has pointed to NGOs 
being inadvertently and detrimentally affected by sanctions. 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the very small body of literature that includes NGOs and 
civil society in the debate about the impacts and efficacy of sanctions. By examining the 
ways sanctions imposed by Australia, New Zealand and the European Union have affected 
the financial, operational and relational capacities of NGOs in Fiji, it aims to identify a 
subcategory of sanctions theory that is often ignored but warrants further consideration.  
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In order to achieve the above-mentioned aim, the following objectives frame this research: 
 
1. To examine which aspects of sanctions have had the greatest impacts on Fijian 
NGOs;  
2. To analyse how donor funding to Fijian NGOs has been affected by sanctions; 
3. To investigate Fijian NGOs’ experiences of donors’ ‘reorientation’ of support to 
civil society in Fiji; 
4. To explore the impacts sanctions have on relationships between Fijian NGOs and 
their donors, the Government of Fiji and other local and international NGOs; 
5. To acknowledge the unidentified and unforeseen affects of smart sanctions, as 
perceived by Fijian NGOs; 
6. And to understand how donors shape the role of local NGOs in fragile and failing 
environments. 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter Two introduces the research design for the thesis. It situates the research within a 
critical realist framework and explains how talanoa, an indigenous Fijian research 
methodology, has influenced the philosophical approach and methodology chosen. Chapter 
Two also provides a discussion on ethical considerations, challenges and limitations of the 
fieldwork.  
 
Chapter Three provides an overview of the relevant literature. It begins by examining how 
the aid landscape has evolved since the 1980s, focusing particularly on the changing role of 
civil society in development. It then introduces sanctions within a framework of political 
conditionality. It concludes by highlighting the implications of redirecting development aid 
through civil society in fragile environments.  
 
Chapters Four and Five provide the context from which Fiji as a research site can be 
analysed. Chapter Four provides details of Fiji’s history as an aid recipient. Using this 
background, the chapter then discusses the origins and evolution of Fiji’s dynamic and 
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active civil society community. Chapter Five provides an overview of Fiji’s coup history 
and the subsequent reactions from the international community.  
 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight present the results and discussions of interviews with a 
number of Fijian NGOs, donor agencies and other key informants from Fiji’s civil society 
and development sector. Chapter Six addresses the impacts sanctions have had on overall 
donor funding to Fiji. It also gives anecdotal evidence that the impacts on NGO funding 
have been experienced in an uneven manner. Chapter Seven details some of the most direct 
impacts of sanctions that Fijian NGOs have experienced. It also offers a number of 
opinions of those from Fiji’s development sector on the efficacy of the sanctions in 
achieving their initial objectives. Chapter Eight is the final results chapter. It presents a 
number of discussions from different NGOs on the more indirect impacts of sanctions. It 
details the ways in which sanctions have affected relationships between Fijian NGOs and 
their donors, the Government of Fiji and other local and international NGOs. 
 
Chapter Nine reviews the results presented in Chapters Six through Eight. It address some 
of the limitations identified following the fieldwork and analysis and offer suggestions for 
further research. This chapter concludes by tying together the research findings with the 
earlier literature reviewed and discusses the significance of the research findings for donors 
and NGOs in Fiji, as well as the wider debate on sanctions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design. It begins with a discussion of the 
conceptual frameworks that have shaped the research process. The methodology adopted 
and methods used to conduct the research are discussed as well as reasons for selecting Fiji 
as a location. Finally, the chapter concludes with a consideration of relevant ethical issues 
and limitations experienced during time in the field.  
2.2 Philosophical Approach to Research 
 
An essential step in undertaking research includes the preliminary declaration of not only 
what findings the researcher wants to uncover, but also how the researcher intends to 
uncover these findings. The ‘what’ is a statement to the reader about the researcher’s 
ontological understanding of truth: What is the most fundamental truth for the research? 
The ‘how’ clarifies the researcher’s epistemological approach: How does the researcher 
intend to gain knowledge about this truth? The ontological and epistemological positions of 
the researcher, as Mikkelson (2005) notes, frame the overarching aim of the research, what 
questions are asked, the manner in which they are asked and how the results are analysed.  
 
This research is couched in two precursory understandings. First, reality is both objective 
and subjective. There is a real world, however, it is perceived and shaped by people’s 
individual experiences. This research seeks to uncover the perceptions of the research 
participants as well as the wider community they represent. Second, knowledge is limited. 
What each participant can possibly know is finite and based on his or her own individual 
experiences. NGOs and donors may communicate with each other regarding their separate 
experiences, but they rarely will (or should) speak for the other. In recognising my initial 
standpoints, I acknowledge that critical realism offers the most appropriate conceptual 
framework for this research. 
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2.2.1 Critical Realism 
 
Critical realism has its roots in both critical theory and realism. It is often viewed as a “third 
stream” between purely objective and purely subjective conceptual frameworks (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 13). Critical realism emerged during the postpositivist movement of the 
1970s that introduced a “wholesale rejection of the central tenets of positivism” (Trochim, 
2006). Influenced by the work of realist philosophers such as Roy Bhaskar and Rom Harré, 
critical realism accepts the existence of a ‘real world’, external from our own human 
perceptions and understandings, which as Sayer (1993, p. 322) notes, is “the minimum 
criterion for realism.” However, critical realists diverge from positivists in that they believe 
that one’s knowledge of the real world is “socially conditioned and subject to challenge and 
reinterpretation” (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 24).  
 
To understand how reality is conditioned and interpreted, the researcher is tasked with 
investigating and analysing “non-explicit processes and relations” (Murray & Overton, 
2003, p. 21). This often includes the analysis of individual perceptions and language, as 
critical realism holds that neither offers a neutral or objective view of reality. “Linguistic 
descriptions,” according to Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 310), “are not simply about the 
world but serve to construct it.” This emphasis on the constructive nature of reality reflects 
an overlap with the principles of constructivism (also called constructionism). 
Constructivists, however, disagree with the positivist concept of universal truth, believing 
rather that understanding of the social world is socially constructed (Mikkelson, 2005, p. 
184). Regardless of their understanding of reality, both critical realists and constructivists 
agree once again in refuting the “myth” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 29) of pure 
objectivity in research. 
 
Beyond the understanding of a constructed external reality, critical realism also builds on 
critical theory, which emphasises the importance of uncovering underlying power dynamics 
at work and communicating them to people so that they are able to respond. In critical 
realist research, the research questions are “critical of the existing situation,” and the “data 
collected deal with power structures, power relationships, and their development” 
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(Mikkelson, 2005, pp. 135-136). Here the overriding aim is “social emancipation” (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005, p. 198), to “empower human beings” (Creswell, 2003, p. 10), and in 
general to “improve society” (Murray & Overton, 2003, p. 21). 
 
Based on this definition of critical realism, I acknowledge that sanctions as real foreign 
policy decisions have tangible impacts, although individuals and communities will 
experience them differently. While Fiji’s sanctions have included a number of explicit 
measures, in labelling a country as a ‘target’ for sanctions, a specific rhetoric is employed 
to problematise discursively the target and justify the measures of the sender. This 
mechanism of ‘linguistic description’ serves to construct a particular reality (the ‘failed 
state’, the ‘rogue state’) that establishes a rationale for, and warrants, action.  
2.2.2 Positionality 
 
When undertaking cross-cultural research, it is imperative that the researcher reflects on 
their positionality: who they are, why they are conducting the research and how both of 
these factors can affect the research. Discerning one’s positionality involves a level of 
reflexivity that traditional research methods have long ignored. More recently, however, the 
influences of feminist and indigenous research methodologies, like critical realism, have 
challenged the “fiction” (A. Pratt, 1995, p. 68) of objective neutrality within research. Both 
feminist and indigenous research recognise not only the existence of, but also the need to 
establish, personal relationships with research participants. For England (1994, pp. 81-82), 
this recognition problematises the “observational distance” between researcher and 
researched that is inherent in traditional methodologies, freeing the researcher to treat 
participants “like people and not as mere mines of information.” Relationships, Nabobo-
Baba (2006, p. 24) notes, take particular precedence among the protocols of Fijian research. 
This cultural significant attached to relationships demands that the researcher critically 
assesses his or her right to conduct the research as well as acknowledge his or her 
responsibility to be accountable to the participants. 
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As a vulagi2, I was an outsider, both in Fiji and within the Fiji NGO community. As a 
young, Western, female researcher, I acknowledge that I entered into this research with my 
own values and beliefs on the subject of sanctions, the role of civil society and the history 
of Fiji. My personal connections to Fiji and its NGO community I do not believe to be a 
hindrance and I agree with England (1994, p. 87) who argues that research is “intensely 
personal” and that the “positionality and biography of the researcher plays a central role in 
the research process.” I have aimed to fairly and accurately represent the concerns and 
opinions of the participants and where possible, I have quoted participants at length, rather 
than using their comments as ‘sound bites’ and hope this has enabled the context of their 
perceptions to overshadow my own opinions.  
 
A particularly important issue when considering one’s positionality is the “marked power 
inequality” that can exist between the researcher and the participant, particularly when 
working with vulnerable or marginalised groups (Binns, 2002). Cross-cultural research is 
particularly fraught with imbalanced power dynamics. In this research the participants 
represented a number of different ethnic backgrounds, including iTaukei3, Indo-Fijian, 
other Pacific Islander as well as a number of expatriates. Additionally, they represented a 
number of professional positions, working for NGOs, donor agencies and as independent 
development practitioners. All were highly literate, proficient in English, likely possessed 
tertiary level education and had significant experience in the Pacific development sector. 
Based on these factors, I often felt the relative power imbalance was tipped in the 
participants’ favour. Echoing England’s (1994, p. 82) comments on the research stance of 
“supplication”, I recognised early on that my research was completely dependent “on the 
research subject to provide insight into the subtle nuances that structure and shape everyday 
lives” and that their knowledge was “greater than that of the researcher.” 
2.3 Methodology  
 
Just as the researcher’s own philosophical stance and positionality shape the aims of the 
research, the methodology adopted has considerable influence over which methods are 
                                                 
2 Vulagi is the Fijian word for ‘stranger’ or ‘guest’, used to describe all non-indigenous Fijians. 
3 iTaukei is the Fijian word for the indigenous settlers of Fiji. 
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chosen and how those methods are used (Silverman, 2010, p. 121). For years, 
methodological advocates have waged war over the most appropriate research paradigm. 
Purists on both sides have argued that qualitative and quantitative methods of research are 
incompatible, focusing primarily on the differences between the separate schools of 
thought. This approach, however, fails to recognise the importance and usefulness of both 
methodologies (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). While methodology does indeed tend to 
prescribe a list of likely methods for the researcher, as Howe (in Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004, p. 15) notes, “this linkage between research paradigm and research method is neither 
sacrosanct nor necessary.” Researchers should be free to choose the methods that they 
believe create the most vibrant and holistic picture of their research.  
2.3.1 Mixed-method 
 
To the detriment of the novice researcher, critical realism is a “methodologically 
handicapped philosophy” (Yeung, 1997, p. 56), with no recognisable standard set of 
methods. Due to the absence of a consensus on how to conduct critical realist research, 
however, many scholars advocate for a mixed-methodological approach, allowing 
researchers to match the methods to the research, rather than the other way around. 
Hammersley (in Yeung, 1997, p. 56) agrees, stating that researchers “ought often to depend 
on the purposes and circumstances of the research, rather than being derived from 
methodological or philosophical commitments.” In this way, the selection of methods 
within critical realist research is heavily context specific.  
 
This emphasis on context specificity is especially appropriate when conducting research on 
development issues. Combining qualitative and quantitative research methods in 
development research is increasingly expected as the traditional perceptions of quantitative 
data as ‘hard’ or ‘objective’ information and qualitative data as ‘soft’ or ‘subjective’ 
information are challenged (Brockington & Sullivan, 2003, p. 71). Rather than relying 
strictly on either quantitative or qualitative methods, as Mikkelson (2005, p. 141) notes, 
“the best development research often combines features of each.”  
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Taking these arguments into consideration, this research has adopted a mixed methods 
approach. The primary aim of this research is to explore how local NGOs have experienced 
the impacts of sanctions in Fiji. To do this required asking questions about how these 
organisations had been directly (e.g. financially) as well as indirectly (e.g. perceived 
changes in relationships) impacted. In order to ask these questions, both qualitative as well 
as quantitative methods were necessary to analyse the situation at both a macro and micro 
level. Quantitative data shows the actual change in financial flows (macro), while 
qualitative research provided the participants the opportunity to voice their perceptions of 
the impacts, as they have experienced them (micro). 
 
2.3.2 Case study 
 
Conducting a case study is not a methodological decision, but rather one “defined by 
interest in an individual case” (Stake, cited in Holliday, 2007, p. 17). This case study 
originating from my own personal interest in Fiji’s NGO community, can, however, be 
used as Denscombe (1998, p. 30) notes, “to illuminate the general by looking at the 
particular.” In line with the critical realist approach to uncover implicit processes and 
relationships, case studies involve a single case being examined in order to provide an “in-
depth account of the events, relationships, experiences or processes occurring in that 
particular instance” (Denscombe, 1998, p. 32). As in critical research, the focus of a case 
study is not to identify the outcomes, per se, but to identify how and why certain outcomes 
have occurred. 
 
2.3.3 Talanoa 
 
In light of the need to be sensitive when conducting research outside of my own culture and 
country, the concept of talanoa research methodology is particularly influential. Talanoa is 
a Fijian phrase, which refers to “a conversation, a talk, an exchange of ideas or thinking, 
whether formal or informal” (Vaioleti, 2006, p. 23). Literally translated, talanoa means, 
“talking about nothing in particular,” emphasising the absence of a “rigid framework” 
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(Vaioleti, 2006, p. 23). As a semi-structured approach to conducting research, talanoa aims 
to accommodate a “deep, interpersonal relationship, the kind of relationship on the basis of 
which most Pacific activities are carried out” (Morrison, et al. in Otsuka, 2006, p. 3).  
 
Not all facets of talanoa were applicable to my research; however, knowledge of talanoa 
enlightened me on the importance of personal relationships in Pacific and specifically 
Fijian cultures. In talanoa, according to Otsuka (2006, p. 4), the researcher and participant 
share “time, interest, and information, but also emotions”. In one interview in particular, the 
participant was comfortable enough to tell me about a family member currently undergoing 
treatment for cancer. Often both the participant and I would forget entirely that the 
dictaphone was recording many of the generic and un-related comments. In this sense, 
many interviews moved beyond just a structured interview, becoming a conversation.  
2.4 Choice of Setting and Participants 
 
The selection of Fiji as a research location was made for reasons of both familiarity and 
proximity. As mentioned earlier, I was intrigued by the fact that employees working for a 
local NGO were being affected by sanctions intended to target the military elite and, more 
importantly, the perpetrators of the 2006 coup – neither of which represented these NGO 
staff members. It is thus important to reiterate that my association with local Fijian NGOs 
has influenced my own positionality. Secondly, Fiji is the only country in the Pacific region 
currently under sanctions 
 
In total, 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from Fiji-based 
NGOs, donor agencies, governments as well as key informants familiar with Fiji’s NGO 
and development sectors. The 19 NGOs interviewed were identified based on whether they 
were either currently receiving or have in the recent past received funding from AusAID, 
NZAID or the EU. The NGOs consisted of both local and regional, advocacy and service 
providing organisations, with various sectoral focuses, including education, governance, 
health, human rights, social justice and women’s rights.  
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Table 2.1 – List of Interview Participants 
 
Code 
Number Type of Organisation Position Location 
Interview1 Local NGO (LNGO)  Programme Manager Fiji 
Interview2 LNGO Executive Director Fiji 
Interview3 LNGO Chief Executive Officer Fiji 
Interview4* LNGO Director Fiji 
Interview5 LNGO Executive Director Fiji 
Interview6 LNGO Executive Director Fiji 
Interview7 LNGO Human Resources Manager/Program 
Assistant  
Fiji 
Interview8 LNGO Executive Officer Fiji 
Interview9 LNGO Senior Programme Coordinator Fiji 
Interview10 LNGO Programme Officer Fiji 
Interview11 LNGO Coordinator Fiji 
Interview12 LNGO Director Fiji 
Interview13 Regional NGO 
(RNGO) 
Board Member Fiji 
Interview14 LNGO Office Manager Fiji 
Interview15 RNGO Senior Trainer Fiji 
Interview16 LNGO Chief Executive Officer Fiji 
Interview17 LNGO NGO Representative Fiji 
Interview18 LNGO Executive Officer Fiji 
Interview19 LNGO Creative Director Fiji 
Interview20 Donor NZAID representative Fiji 
Interview21 Donor NZAID representative NZ 
Interview22 Donor AusAID representative Fiji 
Interview23 Donor European Delegation representative Fiji 
Interview24 Donor JICA representative Fiji 
Interview25 Government 
Institution 
NZ MFAT representative NZ 
Interview26 Government 
Institution 
Australian DFAT representative NZ 
Interview27 Key Informant Development Practitioner NZ 
Interview28 Key Informant Development Practitioner NZ 
Interview29 Key Informant Development Practitioner Fiji 
Interview30 Key Informant Former NZ Diplomat NZ 
* Due to time constraints, NGO answered questions and shared thoughts via email. 
 
In addition to the NGOs, interviews were conducted with representatives from four donor 
agencies, including AusAID, NZAID, the Delegation of the EU, and the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), as well as representatives from the Australian 
and New Zealand governments’ Foreign Affairs departments. Table 2.1 below provides a 
list of the participants and their interview code. 
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2.5 Research Methods  
 
A mixture of both primary and secondary research was undertaken in the course of the 
research.  
2.5.1 Primary and Secondary Research 
 
As previously discussed, 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted over a period of six 
weeks in June and July 2010, both within and outside of Suva. Seven interviews were 
conducted later after returning to New Zealand. In a few cases face-to-face interviews were 
not possible due to time constraints. In these cases, interviews were conducted once over 
the phone and once through email correspondence. In general, participants appeared to be 
extremely busy, and a considerable effort was made to fit into their schedules as much as 
possible. For many NGOs, the end of June is the mid-year report season, so efforts were 
made to schedule interviews either before or after the last weeks of June. Despite the fact 
that many of these organisations are overworked and understaffed, most of them made time 
to speak with me.  
 
To contextualise the primary research, both quantitative and qualitative secondary research 
was undertaken, consisting of two components. The first component involved a review of 
relevant literature, focusing particularly on the changing aid landscape, the progressive use 
of sanctions and the shifting role ascribed to civil society in development. The second 
component consisted of an analysis of donor country aid policy documents and data to gain 
a more full understanding of two areas of interest: how, when and why these governments 
apply sanctions; and how these donors view civil society and engage with them as conduit 
for their development funding. Additionally, government press statements and newspaper 
articles from the international and Fijian press were reviewed for additional contextual 
information. 
2.5.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
As the main aim of the research was to gain an understanding of the perceptions of the 
NGO community, individual semi-structured interviews were selected as the main method 
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of conducting qualitative primary research. According to Pratt and Loizos (1992, p. 30), the 
one-off interview provides a “snapshot” or “an image of reality and define[s] certain social 
facts at a given point in time.” Critical realist researchers, Sayer (in A. Pratt, 1995, p. 68) 
suggests, should opt for “less formal, less standardized and more interactive kinds of 
interviews.” 
 
In addition to being a methodologically appropriate tool of critical realist research, semi-
structured interviews are also culturally appropriate for conducting research in Fiji. As Pratt 
(1995) points out in regards to critical realist research, the relationship established in an 
open interview setting differs greatly from that of a questionnaire. Questionnaires focused 
specifically on what is said can impose the researcher’s notions of social significance, and 
be closed to other relevant nuances. Echoing Pratt’s concerns, Otsuka (2006, p. 11) notes, 
in the “Fijian cultural value system, the written survey or questionnaire, which does not 
involve interpersonal relationships, is not a culturally appropriate research tool.” In semi-
structured interviews it is important to pay attention not only to what is said, but also how it 
is said (A. Pratt, 1995). The researcher is able to note, for example, when a participant 
declines answering a question for feelings of discomfort rather than lack of knowledge – an 
important reaction not possible to make in a questionnaire. In this sense, semi-structured 
interviews were the most appropriate method for conducting primary research. 
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
Conducting research with human participants is laden with ethical issues. Conducting 
research in a developing country with people of a different culture only adds to the ethical 
complexity. In the past, research in the Pacific (and in developing countries in general) has 
often been undertaken with little ethical consideration for the research participants 
(Vaioleti, 2006; Wesley-Smith, 1995). Both Victoria University and the Government of Fiji 
require students engaging in primary research with human participants to gain approval, 
allowing the researcher to address ethical considerations. 
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2.6.1 Victoria University of Wellington Code of Ethics 
 
As Victoria University of Wellington requires all students conducting research with human 
participants to comply with its code of ethics, students have to consider the ethical 
implications of their research. In accordance with these requirements, each participant was 
provided with a ‘participant information’ form and a ‘consent to participate’ form (see 
Appendix II) prior to the start of the interview. These forms explained to the participant 
who I was, what I was researching and the reasons I was interested in interviewing them. 
By signing the consent form, participants acknowledged that they had been provided with 
information on the research and were willingly to take part. Beyond ethics committee 
requirements, three particular ethical issues that arose during my fieldwork are detailed 
further.  
2.6.2 Research Permit 
 
Fiji requires visiting researchers to apply for and obtain a research permit. The permit costs 
the researcher F$650 (approximately NZ$470) and any information on acquiring one is 
hard to find. Few government employees know anything about the permit. The researcher 
thus faces an ethical dilemma: in light of the difficulty in acquiring a permit, should the 
researcher still obtain one? As a sovereign nation, Fiji has the right to require visiting 
researchers to ask permission to conduct research on its citizens. This is especially pertinent 
in the Pacific, where years of inappropriate and damaging research have left many people 
wary of researchers (L. T. Smith, 2006). For Fiji specifically, a further question arises 
whether or not the researcher should be obliged to seek permission from, and thus 
recognise the legitimacy of, a military-led government that obtained its power through 
illegal means. When asking for advice, for a number of academics the questions of 
legitimacy and risk of being denied entry was justification enough not to apply for a 
research permit, and several recommended that I enter Fiji as a tourist instead.  
 
In the end I chose to file the application, pay the fee and cross my fingers. Fortunately, I 
was informed by the Immigration Department prior to departure that I could enter Fiji as 
long as my application was pending and this is what I did. Four weeks into my six-week 
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stay in Fiji I was relieved to receive my formal research visa. Knowing that I had followed 
the ethical (and legal) requirements made conducting interviews easier, both morally and 
practically. While I personally encountered no problems throughout my stay, a fellow 
researcher was denied an interview with a key informant until she had officially received 
her research permit. 
2.6.3 Potential Harm and Confidentiality 
 
Prior to entering the field I was aware that the topic I had chosen to research had the 
potential to be very sensitive. I knew, for example, that at least one potential participant had 
been detained and assaulted by the military following the 2006 coup. Taking this into 
consideration, considerable efforts were made to ensure the confidentiality of all interview 
participants, particularly those representing NGOs.  
 
During the interviews, a few organisations were concerned specifically with who would 
have access to their comments, both the Government as well as the donors. Initially 
participants were given the option to have their name or the name of the NGO omitted, 
substituted by a pseudonym. However, after visiting the Ministry of Finance in search of 
Fiji’s own statistics on international development assistance, the Ministry expressed interest 
in the results of the research and asked if I would share them upon completion. In response 
to these developments, halfway through my time in the field I made the choice to withhold 
all names of participants as well as the names of the NGOs interviewed. I felt this would 
not only ensure confidentiality and thereby minimise any potential harm to participants but 
it will enable me to share the information identify with as many interested parties as 
possible. 
 
In order to keep the identity of the participants and NGOs confidential, in the place of their 
names, all participants have been assigned an interview code. As many of the NGOs are 
easily distinguishable by their descriptive features, few details are provided on the sectoral 
focus and location of the organisations. Additionally, I have randomly assigned the 
interview participant’s gender to help further disguise their identity. Although the donor 
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agencies and governments are named, the identities of the participants are not disclosed and 
their gender has also been randomly assigned to maintain their confidentially as well.  
2.7 Limitations 
 
In addition to the aforementioned ethical issues, I experienced a number of other limitations 
while conducting field research. Financial constraints limited the time in the field to six 
weeks; however, I believe this was an adequate amount of time. Two other key limitations 
are summarised below. 
2.7.1 Time Constraints and Participant Accessibility 
 
Time constraints on the part of the participants were often problematic. During the six 
weeks of fieldwork many of the participants were travelling either within or outside of Fiji 
for work related reasons. As mentioned previously, June through July is a particularly busy 
period for many organisations submitting mid-year reports to their donors. There were at 
least seven other NGOs that I tried to interview that either did not have the time or the 
interest in taking part in the research. This leads me to my final point about limitations 
experienced during my time in the field. 
2.7.2 Research Fatigue 
 
Sixteen years ago Wesley-Smith (1995, p. 115) wrote that, “Pacific Islanders are among the 
most studied people on earth.” During my fieldwork it became obvious that two NGOs 
approached have felt the effects of research fatigue. While the director of one NGO was 
kind enough to provide responses to a limited number of questions via email, she informed 
me that they gained little from speaking with researchers. A second NGO did not return 
phone calls or emails and my concerns of research fatigue were substantiated upon 
discussing this with academics at the University of the South Pacific (USP). As USP 
students have been increasingly encouraged to conduct research on the local civil society, 
some NGOs have felt inundated by the number of students requesting their time, but 
gaining little from this exchange (Naidu, personal communication on 16 July, 2010). 
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2.8 Summary 
 
As this chapter has shown, this research is situated within a critical realist framework and 
further influenced by talanoa research methodology. Both emphasise a flexible approach to 
conducting research that values the relationships built through the exchanging of 
information. Utilising semi-structured interviews to map the perceptions and experiences of 
NGOs against a background of donor policy statements and data, this research aims to 
critically assess the “non-explicit processes and relations” (Murray & Overton, 2003, p. 21) 
inherent within a sanctions regime.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
AID, CIVIL SOCIETY AND SANCTIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
There are three key areas of literature that require further understanding in order to address 
the objectives outlined in Chapter One. Firstly, a discussion of the shifting aid landscape 
since 1980 is provided. This is done to understand how this shift in development theory and 
practice has shaped the role of civil society from an active to a more passive partner for 
development. Secondly, the current trend towards defining a set of best practices in aid 
delivery is reviewed. This movement has seen the expansion of a partnership discourse 
throughout development theory and practice, further reifying the state’s role as a central 
partner for development and relegating civil society actors to the role of consultant or 
advocate for marginalised populations. Thirdly, the evolution of aid conditionality and 
sanctions is mapped in relation to the evolving development paradigms. This framework of 
conditionality and aid sanctions is used to analyse the engagement with civil society actors, 
particularly NGOs, as a more credible alternative channel in fragile environments.  
 
It is critical to address each of these three areas of literature, as there is little evidence to 
suggest they have previously been brought together. Here, this triad of literature is used to 
lay the foundation for assessing the power donors have to shape the role of NGOs in fragile 
or failing environments. Throughout the “rise and fall” (Agg, 2006, p. 21) of civil society, 
NGOs have remained the ‘alternative’, and thus relatively marginal, partners in 
development. Despite being equally impacted by wider foreign policy decisions, the 
impacts of sanctions policies on NGOs specifically are rarely analysed. Whereas the debate 
on sanctions has traditionally been relegated to international relations or political science 
scholarship (Buck, et al., 1998), this research seeks to view sanctions through an aid and 
development lens, focusing on their impacts on local civil society organisations. 
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3.2 The Aid Landscape, 1980 - 2000 
 
[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas. 
   President Harry Truman, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1949 
 
 
With these few words the field of international development emerged as a project for 
developed countries to ensure global peace and security. Throughout the remainder of the 
20th century, and now into the 21st, the approaches to, and models of, development have 
continuously evolved with the shifting trends in global economic, political and social 
theories. As Dengbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pederson (2003, p. 39) note, development 
thinking has witnessed “pendulum-like swings”, moving back and forth between embracing 
the state and the market as the central actor for development. This review focuses 
specifically on the shifting development paradigms that have occurred since the 1980s and 
into the 21st century, and how they have shaped the role of the state and civil society as 
central actors for development.     
3.2.1 The Growing Influence of Neoliberalism  
 
The 1980s were marked by a global “swing to the right” (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-
Pedersen, 2003), which saw international political and economic theory embrace the basic 
tenets of neoliberalism. With a number of developing countries heavily indebted, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to focus their efforts on stabilising 
the markets within developing countries. This mentality introduced a number of neoliberal 
policy reforms including liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation, which as a package 
were known as ‘structural adjustment’. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
dominated the approach to development throughout the 1980s, and has continued to 
influence development policy since.  
 
The IMF and World Bank, together referred to as ‘Washington Consensus’, heralded SAPs 
as the solution to the problem of development. Advocates of structural adjustment believed 
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that “poor countries are poor mainly because of mismanagement” (Pieterse, 2001, p. 41) 
and with the proper economic reforms, development could be attained. Rather than 
recreating the Keynsian welfare state of the 1950s and 1960s, under structural adjustment 
developing country governments were expected to ‘roll back the state’, creating an 
environment that would nurture economic growth. Eventually, it was believed, the benefits 
of this growth would ‘trickle down’ to the poor.  
 
For the first time in history, neoliberal economic reforms challenged the central role of the 
state. Whereas the ‘basic needs’ focus of development during the 1970s had secured the 
state as a key actor in development, by the 1980s “the state came to be associated with 
development problems, ranging from low economic growth to continued and sometimes 
even increasing poverty” (de Haan, 2009, p. 75). Rather development during this period 
focused on regulating the markets of developing countries, minimising the role of the state 
severely. As structural adjustment reforms were imposed on developing countries, the share 
of the national budgets of these countries for public and social services dwindled. Coupled 
with the lack of state sponsored safety nets, the continued inefficacy of developing state 
governments to address humanitarian crises throughout the developing world induced a 
budding faith in non-profit, charitable, and humanitarian relief organisations as more 
effective agents of development for the most poor and marginalised populations (Browne, 
2006). 
 
During the 1980s, while donors began to reduce the amount of official development 
assistance (ODA) to recipient governments, the proportion of ODA channelled through 
NGOs became one of the only categories of ODA to increase (Gibbon, 1993). Facing 
serious gaps in government provided social services, and a rising interest in non-
government channels, the number of NGOs across the globe mushroomed4, as Figure 3.1 
shows. At the same time the share of donor assistance provided to NGOs began to increase, 
as shown in Figure 3.2 (Agg, 2006; Hall & Howell, 2010). In particular, between 1975 and 
1985, as Edwards and Hulme (1996a, p. 962) point out, the proportion of donor funding 
channelled through NGOs rose dramatically from 0.7% to 3.6%. 
                                                 
4 For further detail on this phenomenon see Agg, 2006; Fisher, 1998; or Stewart, 1997. 
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Figure 3.1 – Total number of NGOs worldwide by year 
 
 
Source: Agg, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Proportion of ODA channelled through NGOs (per cent) 
 
Source: Agg, 2006 
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Whereas neoliberalism espoused a largely diminished role of the public sector, it 
systematically framed civil society as the ‘antidote’ (Van Rooy, 2000) to the problems 
associated with the state. Increasingly, NGOs were framed as a more efficient, accountable, 
legitimate and alternative mechanism for delivering aid to the poorest communities. By the 
mid 1990s, as Agg (Agg, 2006, p. 3) points out, 40-50% of education services and 35% of 
health services in Kenya alone were being provided by NGOs. For Agg (2006), the spike in 
NGO activity was directly linked to the devastating impacts that structural adjustment had 
on state provision of social services. 
 
As a result, neoliberal reforms had a disastrous impact on the ability of the state to provide 
essential social services. However, they created the environment that allowed NGOs to 
become significant actors in international aid and development. Historically, voluntary 
organisations had played a minimal and solely charitable role in development. During the 
1980s, though, NGOs entered a new phase in their existence. In addition to increasing both 
in overall numbers and areas of focus, they gained significant credence as providers of 
social services, solidifying the need to channel large portions of the growing donor aid 
budgets outside of the state. While it could be argued that the policies of the 1980s initially 
trapped NGOs in the role of social service provider, disabling them from challenging the 
global hegemonic ideology of market-led globalisation, this period nonetheless opened the 
door for NGOs for the first time to enter the wider debate on development.  
3.2.2 From the New Policy Agenda to the Good Governance Agenda 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, during the early 1990s 
donors were finally free to shape their aid programmes on principles other than geopolitical 
concerns (Crawford, 2001). This shift in focus ushered in a ‘New Policy Agenda’, which 
attributed the failings of structural adjustment in the 1980s to a “crisis of governance” 
(Robinson, 1994, p. 36). This new development thinking did not, however, dismiss 
structural adjustment in its entirety. Instead donors introduced a range of new governance 
related reforms, such as the establishment of multiple political parties, slimmed 
bureaucracies, increased transparency and accountability, respect for human rights, the 
advancement of women in society, increased support for civic action and the reduction of 
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military expenditures (Fowler, 1998, p.138) in addition to the structural adjustment reforms 
which remained a requirement for continued aid funding.  
 
For the first time since the 1970s, development initiatives emphasised the importance of 
investing in public and social sectors, in particular health and education. It was believed 
that with the right governance reforms in place, poverty could finally be eradicated. 
Accompanying the focus on reforming governments was a particular emphasis on 
democratisation and human rights. However, if history was an indication of the 
commitment of Western governments to human rights, there was reason to be sceptical. 
Throughout the Cold War, Western powers had reacted unevenly to human rights violations 
globally, condemning those of its opponents while ignoring those of its allies (Beetham and 
Boyle, cited in Crawford, 2001). In fact, with its steady support to authoritarian dictators 
throughout Latin America, the US had played a significant role in the subversion of 
democracy. Despite the growing emphasis on a strong and democratic state for 
development success, NGOs maintained a relatively similar role as “efficient service 
providers” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996a, p. 970) as they had throughout the 1980s.  
 
In the 1990s new trends towards people-centred, poverty-focused aid re-introduced a focus 
on the state within the development debate. Previously, the state had been seen as 
“complementary” to the market (de Haan, 2009, p. 80), but by the late 1990s and into the 
early 2000s the transition to embracing the state as the central actor for delivering effective 
aid was complete. With the emergence of a new ‘Post-Washington Consensus’, even the 
World Bank (1998, p. 2) recognised that “a good policy environment” was required for aid 
to be delivered effectively. Donors quickly welcomed the new agenda for aid that promoted 
political reforms and ‘good governance’.  
 
The new policies and practices of the good governance agenda introduced a new 
vocabulary into donor aid programmes, which donors claimed would significantly alter the 
way development would be practiced. In actuality, however, the changes remained mostly 
rhetorical (de Haan & Everest-Phillips, 2007). The technocratic solutions proffered up by 
the New Policy Agenda and further expanded during the good governance agenda received 
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heavy criticism for being a generic, one-size-fits-all approach to reforming developing 
governments. Aid continued to be conditional on specific donor requirements, with a 
renewed focus on the process of democratisation. Developing countries continued to have 
little to no say on the direction of their economic or political development. Similar to the 
structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s, “good governance reforms were rarely context 
specific, lacked knowledge of local needs and conditions, and, thus, their results were 
‘disastrous’” (de Haan & Everest-Phillips, 2007, p. 1). Donors issued a long and 
impractical list of the reforms they believed would produce a ‘good’ government (2009). 
The reforms, de Haan (2009, pp. 82-83) notes, included, although were not limited to, 
“participation, accountability, predictability of government action, transparency, free 
information flow, rule of law, legitimacy, constitutionality, socio-political pluralism, 
decentralisation, market-oriented policies, as well as concern for socioeconomic equity and 
poverty.”  
 
While attitudes towards civil society throughout the 1990s remained largely unchanged, by 
the turn of the century their role had been significantly modified. During the 1980s the 
emphasis on the ability of NGOs to ‘do it cheaper, better, faster’ (Stewart, 1997) and to 
have a comparative advantage in aid delivery over the state (Klees, 2001) “succeeded in 
marginalizing the state” (Chadnhoke, cited in Van Rooy, 2000, p. 25). In the late 1990s and 
early 21st century, however, the rhetoric of the good governance agenda saw NGOs take a 
back seat to developing country governments. Donors began to focus more of their aid on 
building institutional capacity through larger government and sector wide programmes, and 
less on providing NGOs with funding to provide social services.  
 
The shift resulted in a push towards NGO engagement in advocacy work, a direct result of 
the dominant development thinking at the time, which presumed a direct correlation 
between civil society and democracy. A “vibrant” civil society community, donors 
believed, served as a proxy for a thriving democracy (Haley, 2008; Ottaway & Carothers, 
2000; Roy, 2008) as it would be able to hold accountable the democratic governments that 
donors had helped to build and strengthen.  
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Yet despite widespread belief among donors of the democratising role of NGOs, many 
governments (both developed and developing) continued to view the involvement of NGOs 
at the policy table with either ignorance or suspicion. According to Clark, Friedman and 
Hochstetler (1998), NGOs have long been marginalised from international forums and 
conferences. This changed only slightly in the 1990s when NGOs began to receive 
increasing recognition in conference proceedings and in policy documents. Despite the 
renewed acknowledgement of their importance, NGOs were rarely invited to assist in 
writing policy, but were nonetheless expected to implement the outcomes prescribed by 
other international development actors. 
 
Regardless of the increasing attention at the international level, criticism of the assumed 
comparative advantage of NGOs existed (Agg, 2006; Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-
Pedersen, 2003; Edwards & Hulme, 1996a; Tvedt, 2006). In particular, critics questioned 
the efficiency, legitimacy and accountability of NGOs given the significant changes to aid 
and development since the 1980s “golden age” of the NGO that initially legitimated the 
growth of the non-government sector. With funding to NGOs increasing rapidly, many 
NGOs quickly became dependent on donor funding. For example, in their 1996 study of 
European NGOs, Edwards and Hulme (1996a, p. 962) found that between 18 to 52 per cent 
of UK NGO budgets came from official donors, and as much as 50 to 90 per cent for 
Scandinavian NGOs. Edwards and Hulme (1996a) argued that if NGO dependency on 
official donors continued to rise, the direction of accountability (upwards or downwards) 
was doomed to suffer, which would inherently affect the legitimacy and sustainability and 
ultimately their connections to the beneficiary communities.  
3.3 The New Era of Aid: 2000 - Present 
 
Many of the current principles and instruments of aid delivery have continued to build on 
the basic tenets of the previous development paradigms. However, through a number of 
international forums, donors and recipients have committed themselves to a range of new 
principles. This new face of aid aims to establish a set of best practices for aid delivery. 
Increasingly, donors have become preoccupied with defining frameworks, managing for 
results and quantifying inputs and indicators. Additionally, donors introduced new funding 
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mechanisms, aiming to put the new principles of effective aid delivery into action. These 
new modalities of aid, which emphasise the need for a strong central government, are 
having a significant effect on the perceived role of NGOs. 
3.3.1 Theoretical Influences in the 21st Century 
 
On the surface, the beginning of the 21st century appeared to embark on a new direction for 
development thinking. Whereas previously development assistance was narrowly focused 
on achieving economic growth and a stable policy environment, development theory 
appeared to broaden its horizons toward the end of the 1990s. A new emphasis on the 
‘human face’ of development saw the arrival of what was meant to be a more holistic, long 
term, pro-poor, context specific, results-based approach to development (de Haan, 2009, 
pp. 136-137).  
 
Two important shifts have directly influenced development thinking in the 21st century, 
spurring renewed interest in the role attributed to the state in development practice. Firstly, 
the emergence of a neostructural discourse in Latin America has again recognised the 
important role the state plays in development. Neostructuralism, according to Leiva (2008, 
p. 3), is the “first counterdiscourse to confront neoliberal dogmatism.” Advocates of 
neostructuralism recognised the importance of market forces, but unlike neoliberal 
advocates, argued that “political and institutional intervention … were essential for 
generating the synergy, coordination, and social harmony indispensible for fluid and speedy 
integration into the globalization process” (Leiva, 2008, p. 3). Influenced by neostructural 
thinking, current development ideology emphasises a “mixed model of state direction and 
market accumulation” coupled with a “concern for inequality, welfare and the 
environment” (Murray & Overton, forthcoming). The new era of aid triumphs the 
participatory nature of democracy, which ensures increased “public-private sector 
partnerships” and “state-civil society alliances” (Leiva, 2008, p. 11). Under these 
principles, the state holds a central role in establishing both a robust and competitive 
economy, as well as encouraging democratic participation.  
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Secondly, the ‘securitisation’ of development has further aided a re-emphasis on the state as 
a central actor in effective aid delivery (Duffield, 2001; Petrík, 2008). In the wake of 9/11, 
large donors including the US and Japan have channelled an increasing proportion of their 
aid budgets towards security, rather than poverty eradication (Agg, 2006, p. 9). This focus 
on security within aid and development prioritises strengthening state institutions. This is 
particularly pertinent in fragile or failing states that “imperil international peace and 
security, posing enormous challenges to current models of development cooperation” 
(2007, p. 532). While this focus prioritises the provision of assistance to central 
governments, civil society retains a key role. As Agg (2006, p. 9) highlights, in focusing on 
strengthening governments, donors recognise the role NGOs can play to “help generate the 
demand for democracy and better governance.” Together, both neostructuralism and the 
securitisation of development re-emphasise the central role of the state in development 
while still maintaining space for civil society. However, this role is meant to complement 
the state and promote democratic principles; NGOs with a focus outside this narrow role 
are likely to face increased difficulties in garnering donor support.  
3.3.2 Emerging Policies and Principles 
 
With the emergence of new development theories, donors have been forced to re-evaluate 
the policies and practices of past development approaches. Through a series of international 
campaigns, forums and meetings, the global development community has endeavoured to 
establish new principles of development and design new modalities of aid delivery. By 
analysing these principles and methods of aid delivery, it is clear to see that the state is 
reaffirmed as the central actor for development.  
  
Through campaigns like the Jubilee Campaign of 2000, which pushed for developing 
country debt cancellation, and the Make Poverty History campaign of 2005, which 
advocated for an increase in ODA commitments from donor countries, poverty has 
remained an important focus of development assistance into the 21st century. At the United 
Nations (UN) Millennium Summit in 2000, 189 countries agreed on a set of eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that target “poverty, health, education and other 
human development indicators” (Glennie, 2008, p. 18). Both the MDGs and the Monterrey 
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Consensus, issued following the 2000 UN International Conference on Financing for 
Development, have re-committed donors to the long time goal of increasing ODA to 0.7% 
of their gross national income (GNI).  
 
Despite the renewed promise, few donors have reached the 0.7% target (see Figure A.1 in 
Appendix I), although their annual budgets continue to increase. Accompanying the 
increased ODA, however, donors have become particularly concerned with measuring the 
effectiveness of their aid. Quick to shift the focus of donors away from a system that only 
measures inputs, James Wolfensohn of the World Bank stressed the importance of country-
led and owned development, while measuring the effectiveness of aid based on results 
rather than donor inputs (de Haan, 2009).  
 
Beginning in 2003, a series of high-level forums hosted by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) on aid effectiveness began a process of establishing 
a number of “good practice standards or principles” (OECD, 2003) for donors and ‘partner 
countries’ (developing countries). The first forum in 2003, produced the Rome Declaration 
on Harmonisation which committed donors and aid recipients to cooperate, collaborate and 
coordinate their efforts to promote “harmonised approaches” to aid delivery (OECD, 2003). 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, issued following the second forum in 2005, 
produced a list of the five principles of effective aid delivery: “ownership”, “alignment”, 
“harmonisation”, “managing for results” and “mutual accountability” (OECD, 2005). The 
Paris Declaration further specified how both donors and recipient countries were expected 
to commit to and achieve the Paris principles. At the third forum in 2008, the Accra Agenda 
for Action recognised the continued need for “strengthening country ownership”, “building 
more effective and inclusive partnerships” and “delivering and accounting for development 
results” (OECD, 2008a).  
 
Alongside the new principles for effective aid delivery, the aid modalities of the new aid 
regime focused intently on placing developing country governments in the driver’s seat of 
their own development. Donor focus has transitioned from a focus on innumerable small-
scale projects to fewer, longer and broader sector-wide programmes coordinated through 
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developing country governments. In particular, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP), 
sector-wide approaches (SWAp) and general budget support (GBS) each emphasise the 
centrality of developing country governments in effective aid delivery (de Haan & Everest-
Phillips, 2007). Although intended to involve a wide range of stakeholders, PRSPs required 
the recipient government to design and produce a poverty reduction strategy that ultimately 
the donor needed to approve in order for the recipient to receive debt relief. SWAps and 
GBS took the concept of the donor-government partnership even further, with donors 
providing support to either a single sector (SWAp) or across sectors (GBS), relying on 
recipient “government leadership” and “government procedures” (de Haan & Everest-
Phillips, 2007, p. 4).  
3.3.3 The Principle of Partnership 
 
One of the defining trends of the new aid regime has been the growing emphasis placed on 
building “partnerships” and “relationships” for development. Both multilateral and bilateral 
donors have readily adopted the rhetoric of partnerships into their policies and principles. In 
some ways, partnership has become the most popular buzzword in the development 
lexicon. For example, Raffer (in Laakso, Kivimäki, & Seppänen, 2007, p. 118) notes that in 
the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, the treaty between the European Union and 78 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries, ‘partnership’ is mentioned in the 100 articles more 
frequently than ‘gender’ or ‘sustainability’. The growing emphasis placed on the 
relationship between donors and recipient communities and governments represents a 
significant shift in development practice. 
 
Since the 1990s, particular emphasis has been placed on building partnerships in an attempt 
to make aid more effective or more critically, to legitimise continued donor intervention in 
developing countries (Crawford, 2003). Recognising the inadequacy of externally imposed 
development practices that lack local context, donors have sought to encourage local 
ownership and accountability by building relationships with local counterparts. Despite the 
emphasis on mutual responsibilities and benefits, donor-recipient partnerships are 
irrefutably unequal (Laakso, et al., 2007) as they involve essentially a one-way exchange of 
financial resources. Rather than viewing the partnerships as a means to achieving 
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development goals, partnerships have often become a box to be ticked (Overton & Storey, 
2004). This approach to relationship building, however, fails to confront the inherent 
asymmetrical power balance involved in donor-recipient relationships.  
 
The power accorded donors has allowed them to define who their ‘partners’ are, focusing 
particularly on government ministries and NGOs. Donors often exclude individuals and 
communities outside their narrow definition of a ‘partner’ (Overton & Storey, 2004) and 
the documents guiding current development practice fail to provide a more nuanced 
description. Both the Rome and Paris Declarations make only limited mention of civil 
society outside highlighting the importance of encouraging and engaging civil society. The 
focus on civil society actors increased slightly with the Accra Agenda for Action, which 
devoted a small section specifically to emphasising the complementarity of civil society to 
government and the private sector. Despite this inclusion in high-level policy documents, 
there are doubts about the sincerity of the increasing focus on partnerships. For Overton 
and Storey (2004, p. 41), donor efforts to build and sustain relationships have been done in 
a “utilitarian and self-legitimising way that reinforces the donor-recipient model and 
inequalities therein”. Rather than addressing the failures of past development approaches, 
as Klees (2001, p. 114) insists, “the only thing that seems different about today’s policies 
from those of the past two decades is that they are wrapped in the holistic, participatory, 
partnership language.” 
 
Despite its ubiquity, the focus on ‘partnerships’, it would seem, has not provided the 
solution to the difficulties of unequal relationships. As de Haan (2009, p. 145) points out, 
“there is no magic bullet to solve the challenges of relationships between donors and 
recipients.” While much progress has been made in promoting recipient countries’ 
participation and involvement in development, more work is needed to level the playing 
field. A common suggestion, or ‘partnership commitment’, has been to engage local 
communities, civil society and grassroots organisations in development consultations and 
process. While the new aid regime is largely built on and legitimised by recognising the 
need to facilitate partnerships, which place recipient country governments in the ‘driver 
seat’, the role of civil society in development is often left vague and undefined. The 
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following section analyses how the shifts discussed in this section have affected the role 
assigned to civil society ‘partners’ in development. 
3.3.4 The Role of Civil Society in the New Aid Regime 
 
Under the new aid regime, shifts in development thinking and practice can be seen to have 
altered the role ascribed to NGOs both in policy and in practice. In particular, the basic 
principles of the good governance agenda continue to influence donor engagement with 
developing countries, which emphasise strengthening the capacity and policy environments 
of democratic governance institutions in developing countries as the best means of ensuring 
the effectiveness of aid. Although this has seemingly cemented a connection between civil 
society and democratisation, further bolstered by the security agenda, the role of NGOs in 
development remains inherently an alternative to the state.  
 
Despite this recognition that NGOs play a critical role in development, debate exists 
whether current principles and mechanisms of aid delivery are in fact significantly 
marginalising the role of NGOs (Agg, 2006; Overton, 2010; Wallace, Bornstein, & 
Chapman, 2007). Current donor policies that move to replace incoherent, short-term project 
aid, which tends to favour NGOs, with broader and more long term sector-wide support, 
Agg (2006, p. 10) notes, is evidence that “NGOs have now fallen from favour.” Yet, Agg’s 
(2006, p. 21) research shows that regardless of both the UK and the Netherlands issuing 
policy statements espousing a move towards direct bilateral ODA and criticising NGO 
project based aid, both countries have continued to increase their allocations of aid to 
NGOs. Despite the increasing allocations, she returns to her original conclusion, noting that 
the “haphazard” pattern of annual donor funding to NGOs over time is likely to affect “the 
sustainability of the programmes NGOs run” (Agg, 2006, p. 21). The unpredictable nature 
of donor funding to NGOs is a reminder of the inherent power imbalance between donors 
and NGOs. 
 
As donors have shifted their support for service provision back to recipient governments, 
the role ascribed to NGOs by donors has continued to shift towards advocacy work as well 
as holding governments accountable for the effective use of aid funds (Wallace, et al., 
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2007, p. 20). The wide spread shift to advocacy work, however, sheds light on the fact that 
NGOs have become increasingly dependent on donor funding. For example, Hughes’ 
(2002) research in Bolivia and Uganda shows that a number of NGOs there have shifted 
away from implementing projects and providing services as the primary focus of their 
work. In Uganda in particular, she highlights the active role donors have played in pushing 
NGOs into advocacy work by “making advocacy a part of their agenda and in so doing 
legitimising and co-opting a process that, it was felt, should be initiated from the grassroots, 
or at least by CS [civil society] actors” (A. Hughes, 2002, p. 7). This shift in NGO activities 
following a shift in the dominant donor focus highlights the power donors possess to 
determine NGO activity by altering their own priorities. In order to continue to capture 
donor funding, it is clear that NGOs have to remain up-to-date with the priorities, trends 
and attitudes of donors.  
 
The overall emphasis of the new aid agenda has been largely a focus on working through 
and strengthening government institutions in aid recipient countries. Despite donor’s 
resolve to build partnerships with recipient governments, there are times when donors 
refuse to work with recipient government. As Riddell (2007, p. 7) points out, “there are 
situations – especially in fragile states – in which funding agencies work solely with non-
governmental organisations.” In fragile or failed states, working through both international 
and local NGOs is seen as the most appropriate alternative option “where the state is not in 
a position to fully play its development role” (OECD, 2009, p. 27). In a report produced for 
the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID), Leader and Colenso (2005, p. 
12) outline the conventional approach to aid in fragile states: 
Poorly governed countries should not only receive less money, they should 
receive more of it as project aid, it should come with a shorter time 
commitment, should be focused on a narrower set of activities, and much of it 
should be distributed through NGOs [author’s emphasis].  
 
The recognition that increasing amounts of aid should be channelled through NGOs in 
times of state fragility presents, however, particular problems for these organisations, which 
are suddenly expected to possess the capacity and knowledge to support humanitarian 
intervention or be prepared to voice concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of an 
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authoritarian or illegitimate regime. The following section explores the consequences when 
donors suspend normal aid relations and redirect aid funding through NGOs. 
3.4 Conditionality, SanctionsA and NGOs? 
 
The role of NGOs is most visibly politicised during times of suspended or sanctioned 
bilateral relations as NGOs become an alternative channel to recipient governments for aid 
(Leader & Colenso, 2005). This final section explores the history, justifications for and 
implications of applying aid conditionality, and subsequently sanctions, in order to gain a 
more full understanding of how donors both perceive and have the power to shape the role 
of NGOs in international development. 
3.4.1 History 
 
Among the many coercive aspects of development practice, conditioning the provision of 
aid on donor defined economic and political conditionalities is perhaps the most blatant. 
The previously discussed shifts in development theory and practice have been made 
possible through the use of conditionality. Conditioning aid has enabled donors to 
essentially shape or “overhaul” (Glennie, 2008, p. 36) the entire economic and social 
environments of developing countries. Although aid has always been conditional 
(Selbervik, 1999, p. 13), a particularly concerning trend in aid has extended conditionalities 
to “systemic elements, including the very system of government, the legal system and the 
administrative system” (Stokke, 1995, p. 34).  
 
Nelson and Eglinton (1992, p. 9) define conditionality as “offering a benefit if and only if 
the receiver takes specific actions that the donor desires (or refrains from taking actions of 
which the donor disapproves).” Conditions can be applied either ex-ante or ex-post; this 
means they can be applied either as a prerequisite for commencing an aid relationship (ex-
ante) or recipients and donors can enter into the aid relationship knowing that should the 
recipient not meet the conditions, the relationship can be suspended or severed (ex-post). 
Conditionality can also be positive or negative. Positive conditionality involves rewarding 
recipients when the conditions are met. Conversely, negative conditionality involves 
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punishing recipients when they fail to meet the conditions. Suspending or sanctioning 
future or promised aid to a recipient country is an example of negative, ex-post 
conditionality.  
 
Conditionality has been a widespread practice in aid. According to Selbervik (1999, p. 5), it 
was one of the most important and era-defining aid policy instruments of the 1980s and 
1990s. As Browne (2006, p. 45) notes, the sheer number of conditions applied by donors to 
aid disbursements rose substantially from fewer than ten in the 1970s, to over 100 
conditions in some countries in the 1990s. At the same time, the number of cases of 
sanctions, a form of negative conditionality, rose as well. In 1990, and most recently 
updated in 2007, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot and later Oegg (1990; 2007) produced a 
comprehensive review of sanctions cases that have occurred since 1914. Whereas the 1990 
edition noted 115 cases of sanctions over a 74-year period, the 2007 edition noted an 
increase of 59 cases in the 16 years between 1990 and 2006 (Hufbauer, et al., 1990; 
Hufbauer, et al., 2007). By the end of the 20th century sanctions were so prevalent that the 
1990s had become widely known as the ‘Sanctions Decade’ (Cortright & Lopez, 2000; UN, 
2000).  
 
Conditionalities reflect the wider shifts in development theory and practice over time. Until 
the 1990s, ‘first generation’ conditionality focused primarily on economic and structural 
adjustment reforms. Beginning in the 1990s, however, a ‘second generation’ of 
conditionality, influenced by the emerging focus on good governance, saw donors placing a 
progressive number of political conditions on their aid programmes. Whereas conditionality 
during the 1980s was largely based on economic reforms, sanctions during the same period 
were already focused largely on foreign policy goals. A number of the cases during this 
time included the restoration of democracy5 and the improvement of human rights6 as 
primary objectives, prior to the introduction of the new donor policies of the early 1990s. 
Despite the more recent focus on political conditionality, many of the policies introduced 
                                                 
5 Turkey, 1981-86; Haiti, 1987-90; Fiji, 1987-01; Sudan, 1989- (Hufbauer, et al., 2007) 
6 Chile, 1975-90; Uruguay, 1976-81; Paraguay, 1977-81; Guatemala, 1977-2005; Argentina, 1977-83; El 
Salvador, 1977-81; Brazil, 1977-84; Ethiopia, 1977-92; Bolivia, 1979-82; Suriname, 1982-91;Romania, 1983-
89; Turkey, 1986-99; Haiti, 1987-90; Burma (Myanmar), 1988- ; China, 1989- ; Sudan, 1989- (Hufbauer, et 
al., 2007) 
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through economic conditionality during the 1980s have remained (Crawford, 2001). 
Glennie (2008) points to examples in Africa of economic conditionality continuing well 
into the late 1990s. In Zambia, several donors withheld aid until the country had agreed to 
introduce privatisation measures. Additionally, the World Bank made the disbursement of 
75 per cent of its loans in Africa conditional on the inclusion of user fees systems in 
African countries (Glennie, 2008, pp. 41-43).  
3.4.2 Justifications: Answering the Call to “Do Something” 
 
As the use of conditionality and sanctions has become much more frequent, it is clear that 
they are inextricably linked: by making the provision of aid contingent on donor prescribed 
conditions, when recipient countries fail to meet them, conditionality provides donors with 
the legitimacy and justification for suspending or sanctioning aid.  
  
When recipient countries fail to meet donor conditions or act in a manner deemed 
inappropriate by the international community, donors are faced with the need to “do 
something” (Hufbauer, et al., 2007; Lopez, 2008; Weiss, et al., 1997) or, in the very least, 
be seen to be ‘doing something’. In such situations, sanctions have traditionally been seen 
as a more humane alternative to war. Conventional sanctions theory is founded on what 
Galtung (1967) has called a “naïve” theory of sanctions. This basic “pain-gain formula” of 
sanctions assumes that “hardships inflicted on the civil population of a targeted state will 
lead to grassroots political pressure on that state’s leaders to change their behavior” 
(Tostensen & Bull, 2002, p. 375). As Santiso (2003, p. 167) highlights, for many donors, in 
the face of violations of the rule of law “negative measures and aid sanctions tend to be the 
only available recourse, until the regime credibly re-commits itself to pursue the 
democratization route.”  
 
Despite this faith in sanctions as a constructive means of ‘doing something’, there is little 
consensus that sanctions are an effective tool of international diplomacy and in fact the 
frequency with which sanctions are deployed greatly outnumbers the cases considered 
successful (M. S. Smith, 2004; Wallensteen, 2000). One of the most widely cited reviews 
espousing the efficacy and success of sanctions noted that, at most, sanctions have been 
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“partially successful” a mere 34 per cent of the time (Hufbauer, et al., 2007). Pape, 
however, challenges these findings. His re-calculations of Hufbauer, et al.’s findings show 
that sanctions have been successful less than five per cent of the time (Pape, 1997, p. 106). 
Despite a number of recent examples of sanctions from which to choose, as Smith (2004) 
points out, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa remain common examples of the 
success and efficacy of sanctions, ignoring a number of important contextual factors that 
enabled the effective use of sanctions in these countries.  
 
Rather than debating the efficacy of sanctions, some authors have begun proclaiming that 
sanctions have increasingly become a tool for ‘sending a message’. Alternatively, some 
scholars have argued that the success of sanctions should not be based on the changes they 
are able to effect. Drezner (1999, p. 12), for example, claims that, fundamentally, 
“sanctions are symbols; their effectiveness is a secondary concern.” Although not 
necessarily in agreement with Drezner, Crawford, too, argues that sanctions have been 
imposed in some cases symbolically rather than with the intention of acting as a serious 
threat. He cites, for example, the sanctions imposed on China following the Tiananmen 
Square massacre as being merely a “token gesture” and “implemented in order to be seen to 
be taking some action to appease domestic constituencies” (Crawford, 1997, p. 91). This is 
particularly true for “non-great” or “middle powers” (Nossal, 1991, 1994). According to 
Nossal (1991, p. 1), the “generic” nature of conventional sanctions theory presumes that 
“all types of states – large and small, powerful and weak, rich and poor, from the metropole 
and the periphery – have been prone to embrace sanctions.” In fact, small and middle 
powers are less likely to embrace forceful forms of sanctions. Instead, it has been argued 
that they are more likely to see sanctions as “an attractive policy response, not with any 
expectation that the measures will by themselves or even in concert with others move the 
wrong-doing to ‘right’ behaviour” (Nossal, 1991, p. 8). 
 
This view of the primarily symbolic nature of sanctions, however, fails to appreciate the 
disastrous impacts sanctions have had on innocent domestic populations. With the eventual 
realisation of both the inefficacy and devastating impacts of conventional sanctions, 
international demand for donors to develop “better targeted and more humane sanctions” 
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(Van Brabant, 1999, p. 36) has spurred a growing faith in ‘smart sanctions’. Theoretically, 
smart sanctions are more targeted and more selective than conventional sanctions 
(Hufbauer, et al., 2007; Tostensen & Bull, 2002). They tend to involve financial sanctions, 
travel restrictions and targeted commodity and arms embargoes (Lopez, 2008; Tostensen & 
Bull, 2002). In practice, however, they still remain a relatively blunt tool. As Lopez (2008, 
p. 8) points out, “even these so-called ‘smart sanctions’ have a track record of hurting 
innocent populations.” He points specifically to financial sanctions imposed in Iran as well 
as “half-hearted enforcement” in Sudan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe as examples of the 
inefficacy of sanctions considered to be smarter than conventional sanctions. 
3.4.3 Implications: Sanctions and Civil Society  
 
Sanctions literature has invariably had two primary areas of focus. The first area is the 
(in)efficacy of sanctions, which has been briefly covered in the previous section. The 
second area of focus includes the impacts of sanctions. The former has remained relatively 
overshadowed by the latter in large part because it is extremely difficult to distinguish 
between the impacts of sanctions and the other destructive factors involved in sanctions 
cases (Doxey, 1987; Winkler, 1999). In fact, as Doxey (1987) notes, the impacts of 
sanctions can at times be “intangible” and thus have less obvious immediate implications. 
Yet, despite these difficulties, there has been some focus on the impacts on vulnerable 
populations, particularly following the revelations of negative impacts of sanctions on 
vulnerable populations7. 
 
One aspect of sanctions literature, which has received little to no coverage, has been the 
impact of sanctions on the NGO communities within targeted countries. NGOs, like 
civilians, are essentially non-targets, assumed to lie outside the explicit scope of sanctions. 
In fact, under sanctions regimes, NGOs receive renewed interest from donors. According to 
Sorenson (1993), “in the case of authoritarian regimes, such assistance is best channelled 
through NGOs.” While donors have placed large amounts of resources into strengthening 
state institutions, faced with state failure, donors often prefer to channel development 
assistance through non-government channels (Dowst, 2009; Leader & Colenso, 2005; 
                                                 
7 Buck et al. (1998) provide a detailed analysis on the gendered impacts of sanctions. 
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OECD, 2008b). This reengagement with civil society as primary development partners, 
however, often fails to take into consideration the potentially negative effects of sanctions 
on NGOs.  
 
Outside of announcing that NGOs offer the most appropriate alternative channel for 
development assistance when sanctions are applied, little research exists detailing the 
impacts of sanctions on NGOs. In their discussion of the impacts of sanctions, Weiss et al. 
(1997, p. 27) acknowledge that “in addition to creating or exacerbating civilian pain, 
sanctions pose major challenges for humanitarian organizations.” They recognise that under 
a sanctions regime, NGOs “face a kind of double jeopardy” (Weiss, et al., 1997, p. 28), as 
both bilateral aid and private contributions to NGOs are affected. Their focus, however, is 
predominately on international humanitarian agencies rather than specifically local 
organisations.  
 
One of the few scholars to address the impacts of political conditionality on NGOs is Mark 
Robinson. Produced within a collection of 15 entries on aid and political conditionality, 
Robinson’s contribution is the only one covering the impacts explicitly on NGOs. “Donor 
decisions to suspend or terminate aid,” Robinson (1995, p. 362) writes, “can have profound 
effects on NGOs and the people with whom they work.” In particular, he provides 
examples of the ramifications of donor’s actions to suspend bilateral aid on local NGOs. 
Firstly, even when humanitarian aid is exempt, Robinson (1995) highlights how the poor 
are likely to be unfairly affected by reduced aid, pointing specifically to cases in Malawi, 
Haiti, Burma (Myanmar), the Sudan and Iraq. Secondly, he discusses donor ignorance to 
account for governments to retaliate against the NGO community after donors have 
announced their intentions to redirect bilateral aid through the alternative channel. 
Robinson (1995) uses Indonesia as an example of this, which reacting to the Dutch 
suspension of development assistance, introduced legislation banning NGOs from receiving 
overseas funding. Additionally, the Kenyan government introduced a new NGO 
Registration Act, in an attempt to deter donors from redirecting aid outside official 
channels. 
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As the practice of conditioning aid has become increasingly prevalent so, too, has the 
imposition of sanctions. Increasingly sanctions are focused on supporting democratisation, 
the rule of law and upholding human rights. Yet, historical evidence has shown that not 
only are sanctions on average unsuccessful, they specifically target innocent civilians. The 
realisation of the naïveté of sanctions saw a new class of sanctions created: smart sanctions. 
Although meant to be ‘smarter’, more targeted and less devastating, there is little evidence 
that points to their triumph over conventional sanctions. Despite NGOs being named a 
more appropriate channel for development assistance under a sanctions regime, little 
consideration exists for how the redirection of donor funding to NGOs affects relationships 
between NGOs and their partners.  
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a review of the relevant literature, focusing on the evolution of 
influential theories and practices of aid particularly since the 1980s, which still continue to 
significantly influence development thinking today. It provided further detail of the most 
recent trends in development, expanding particularly on the current role ascribed to NGOs 
in development. Finally, it introduced and analysed sanctions from a development 
perspective, focusing in particular on how the role of NGOs is further influenced by the 
deteriorating relationships between donors and recipients. 
 
Over time, donor development thinking has played a significant part in shaping the role 
ascribed to civil society. Since the “golden age” of the NGO, the role of civil society has 
shifted as newer trends in aid and development have embraced the state as a central partner 
in development. However, in cases of sanctions regimes, donor governments can be seen to 
actively re-engage with civil society and NGOs as the preferred development partners. 
Unfortunately, the resultant relationships with NGOs appear to be superficial and 
opportunistic, as donors utilise their geopolitical and financial power to sway their partners 
to embrace their own policy priorities. 
 
Within the wider study of development, little attention is given to how trends and shifts in 
development thinking have shaped the role of NGOs. Although many scholars admit that 
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strengthening and supporting NGOs is the best way to put a failing state back on track, 
there exists no contemporary discussion about how increased attention and funding during 
times marked by state fragility may affect NGOs financially and operationally, as well as 
how it may impact the relationships with their various development partners. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE HISTORY OF AID AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FIJI 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The following two chapters provide a contextual background for the research. This first 
chapter lays out the history of aid to Fiji. It follows the shifts in Fiji’s aid and development 
landscape, viewed against the background of the evolving global aid environment. The 
context within which Fiji’s NGOs have developed over time is linked to both the global 
shifts in the development paradigm and the turbulent political situation in Fiji, which is 
explored further in the following chapter.  
4.2 Fiji’s Aid History 
 
Fiji is one of the most economically advanced countries in the southwest Pacific (UNDP, 
2009). Nonetheless, Fiji has received significant, although variable, flows of aid both prior 
to and following its independence in 1970. Gounder (2001, p. 1010) estimates that between 
1968 and 1996 Fiji received over $608 million in aid. Figure 4.1 below provides an 
overview of the total ODA to Fiji between 1970 and 2009, which peaked in 1992 at 
US$54.3 million and has since fluctuated between US$30 - $50 million per year (see Figure 
A.2 in Appendix I for a more comprehensive breakdown). While not as heavily dependent 
on aid as other Pacific Island countries, aid has fluctuated between 2.4% and 5% of Fiji’s 
annual gross domestic product (GDP) (Gounder, 2001, p. 1010).  
 
In the past 50 years, aid to Fiji has come from a variety of donors. Most of Fiji’s aid has 
been from bilateral donors, particularly the United Kingdom prior to and shortly after 
decolonisation, as well as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, France and the United States. 
Multilateral donor agencies, in particular a number of UN agencies, have also played a 
significant role in supporting development initiatives in Fiji (OECD, 2010b). In recent 
years, however, Fiji has begun to establish relationships with new emerging donors, such as 
China, South Korea and countries in the Arab League. Although the Pacific as a region has 
received significantly less attention than regions such as Africa and Latin America with 
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regards to development, the influence of global trends in development thinking and practice 
can be seen throughout Fiji’s history of aid.  
 
Figure 4.1 – ODA to Fiji, all commitments (Current US$ millions), 1970 – 2009 
 
 
 Source: oecd.stats.org, 2011 
4.2.1 The Colonial State and Independence  
 
Development assistance in colonial Fiji was shaped largely by Britain’s focus on rural 
development as issues including the country’s small economy of scale and problems 
associated with land tenure, which plagued most Pacific Islands, impeded any attempt at 
large-scale industrialisation (Overton, 1999, p. 175). Rural development initiatives focused 
on promoting farming outside the traditional system, in particular cash cropping, as well as 
introducing new land tenure laws (Overton, 1999). Following independence in 1970, 
however, donors adopted a more state-centred approach to development, focusing on 
regional development projects that aimed to counter rising inequality.  
 
During the post-colonial era newly independent Pacific Island nations experienced a sudden 
influx in interest from western donors. Globally, aid became a geostrategic tool, given in 
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exchange for political and ideological loyalty, particularly from the United States and 
Europe. This trend in development assistance managed to reach the South Pacific where, as 
Finin and Wesley-Smith (2001, p. 10) point out, “annual per capita foreign aid expenditures 
were among the highest in the developing world.” During the 1970s and 1980s Fiji received 
its highest relative levels of aid8, which have yet to be surpassed (OECD, 2010a). For the 
most part, aid funds were used to prop up a large public sector and increase overall 
standards of living that local tax revenue would otherwise not have supported (Finin & 
Wesley-Smith, 2001, p. 11). Despite making significant progress in social welfare and 
living standards in Fiji, much of the way development was practised was soon to change, 
due both to shifting international trends and troubling domestic events. 
4.2.2 Neoliberal Reform in Post-Coup Fiji 
 
The state-centred approach to development continued to influence aid and development 
initiatives in Fiji throughout the early 1980s. In stark contrast to the high growth rates of 
the 1970s, the 1980s were marked by an overall decline in Fiji’s GDP, even reporting 
negative growth rates in some years, particularly following the 1987 coups (Gounder, 
2001). Facing rising rural inequality, a collapsing tourism industry, lagging returns from 
Fiji’s most important sector, sugar, as well as “heavy external debt, high domestic costs, 
slow growth in productivity and high interest rates” (Overton, 1999, p. 178), Fiji plunged 
into political and economic turmoil.  
 
A number of observations highlight that Fiji initially experienced a decrease in aid flows 
from its major donors following the coups in 1987 (Overton, 1999; Singh, 1994; Walsh, 
2010). According to the OECD, aid from Japan, New Zealand, the UK and the EU 
decreased, however, aid from Australia and France rose significantly (see Table A.1 in 
Appendix I). The immediate post-coup period created the space for new donors to emerge. 
According to Singh (1994), France and Japan seized the opportunity to bolster their 
                                                 
8 According to the OECD (2010a), annual averages of Fiji’s ODA between 1970-79 and 1980-89, adjusted to 
2007 prices and exchange rates, reached US$83 million. From 1990-99 it dropped to US$63 million, and 
again from 2000-08 to US$54 million.  
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relations with Fiji for politically strategic reasons9, while Korea and Taiwan also emerged 
shortly after 1987 as new, although, relatively small donors. This influx in attention from 
new geostrategic allies, Singh (1994) argues, pushed the traditional donors to quickly 
restore their own ties with Fiji, and thus by the early 1990s aid from Fiji’s major donors 
had reached, and in some cases surpassed, pre-coup levels.   
 
In addition to domestic factors influencing Fiji’s aid levels, the growing global embrace of 
neoliberal principles, as discussed in the previous chapter, began to infiltrate development 
thinking towards the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. With the Cold War coming to an 
end, the United States and Britain lost interest in Pacific Island countries as strategic allies. 
Aid commitments from non-traditional donors continued to grow, replacing the diminishing 
funds from traditional donors, and aid to the Pacific region remained generally the same 
(Finin & Wesley-Smith, 2001).  
 
In particular, international financial institutions (IFIs) began to play an increasing role in 
development. Assistance from these institutions, however, was largely accompanied by 
particular conditions placed on aid provision. Facing lagging economic growth, the Fiji 
Government was forced to accept a number of structural reforms, including export-
orientation, the privatisation of government owned assets, public sector cut-backs and 
foreign investment in manufacturing (Overton, 1999, p. 179) in exchange for loans to 
combat the crippled economy.  
4.2.3 The Influence of the Good Governance and Security Agendas 
 
Whereas structural adjustment reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s rapidly diminished 
the role of the state in development initiatives, the emergence of the good governance 
agenda in the mid 1990s created a newfound emphasis on the need to build the capacity of 
developing country governments. In the Pacific, despite the large sums of aid being 
provided, development remained relatively stagnant, a phenomenon widely known as the 
                                                 
9 Singh (1994, p.55) argues that following the 1987 coups, both Japan and France provided an increased 
amount of aid to Fiji in an attempt to “buy Fiji’s silence” in regards to France’s continued colonial rule in 
New Caledonia as well as its nuclear testing in the region, and Japan’s continued fishing operations and 
practice of dumping toxic waste into Pacific waters.  
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‘Pacific paradox’ (Wesley-Smith, 2007b).  In search of a logical explanation for why aid 
had “failed the Pacific” (H. Hughes, 2003), the primary impediment for sustained 
development in Pacific countries became “poor governance” (Henderson, 2003, p. 233). 
The good governance agenda made a distinct imprint on donors in Fiji. Both prior to and 
following the 2000 and 2006 coups, Fiji’s major donors have listed the priorities of their 
aid programmes as promoting good governance (AusAID, 1999; MFAT, 1999; NZAID, 
2005) and restoring democracy (European Commission, 2010a; Japan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2010) and as the Pacific’s only dictatorship, it is unlikely that Fiji’s major donors 
will significantly alter their focus on building the country’s governance structures any time 
soon. 
 
The coups of 2000 and 2006 occurred largely against a backdrop of regional instability, 
cementing Fiji’s place within the Arc of Instability10. With the growing international focus 
on terrorism and failed states post-9/11, even aid in the Pacific has followed Duffield’s 
(2001) path towards becoming increasingly obsessed with regional security. Australia, in 
particular, has been apt to prioritise security considerations within its foreign policies and 
aid programmes throughout the Pacific. For example, a 2003 Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute report released just prior to the launch of the Regional Assistance Mission of 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) initiative suggested that “such problems could ‘prove 
contagious to other countries in the region’” (in Wesley-Smith, 2007b). Hayward-Jones’ 
(2009) analysis of the ramification of continued political instability in Fiji follows a similar 
securitised logic. In addition to causing economic and social strife for Fiji itself, insecurity 
in Fiji is likely to reach far beyond its own shores, causing “regional fallout” as well as 
“reputational consequences for Australia’s political leadership” (Hayward-Jones, 2009, pp. 
5-6), a sentiment Hughes (2003, p. 26) also echoes. Despite the continued influence of 
historical and regional powers, recently Fiji has been looking increasingly to the newly 
emergent ‘non-traditional’ donors, which as Krause (2007, p. 1) notes, are only too happy 
to provide economic assistance “notably free of any preconditions.” 
                                                 
10 The Asia-Pacific ‘Arc of Instability’ commonly refers to parts of Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu and Fiji. For further discussion on Fiji’s role within 
the Arc, see Fry, 2000 and Duncan and Chand, 2002. 
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4.2.4 Fiji’s Traditional and Non-Traditional Donors 
 
Like the priorities and principles of aid, the number and prevalence of Fiji’ donors has 
altered over time. Aid to Fiji comes from a wide variety of both more traditional bilateral 
and multilateral donors, and increasingly, a number of emerging non-traditional donors.  
4.2.4.1 Traditional donors 
 
Fiji’s colonial power, the UK, was its primary source of aid until gaining independence in 
1970, although Fiji also received limited support from Australia and the US. After 
independence, the UK continued to provide significant amounts of funding, although 
increasingly other Pacific Commonwealth countries began providing a larger proportion of 
Fiji’s ODA, in particular Australia and New Zealand. The EU has provided varying levels 
of aid to Fiji since the mid 1970s. Although Japan is rarely referred to as a ‘traditional’ 
donor, it has provided Fiji with development assistance since 1972 and remains a 
significant donor (see Table A.1 in Appendix I). Additionally, over time multilateral 
agencies have also become regular contributors to Fiji’s total ODA. The United Nations 
Development Fund (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Global 
Environment Fund (GEF) on average are among Fiji’s top ten sources of aid in Fiji, even 
providing more funding than some of Fiji’s bilateral donors, as Figure 4.2 below shows.  
 
Following each of the coups, a number of Fiji’s traditional donors have both threatened to, 
and eventually did, decrease the amount of aid they were providing to Fiji, which is further 
discussed in Chapter Five. The gaps in funding from traditional donors following each of 
the coups, however, provided opportunities for new non-traditional donors to emerge and 
build their diplomatic relations with Fiji. 
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Figure 4.2 – Sources of ODA: Top 10 Donors (Average for last 5 years), 2011 
 
 
Source: www.aidflows.org, 2011 
4.2.4.2 Non-traditional donors 
 
While it is assumed that the bulk of Fiji’s ODA continues to be made up by its more 
traditional donors, the rise of aid from newly emerging non-traditional donors should not be 
discounted. In particular, a number of Asian countries have become significant donors to 
Fiji. In addition to Japan and Korea, the rising flow of aid from China over the last decade 
has been of concern for many scholars and countries (Pearlman, 2009; Wesley-Smith, 
2007a). Unfortunately, as China is not a member of the OECD, there is no centrally 
maintained or publicly available information on the amount of ODA China provides. Based 
on information from Fiji’s Ministry of Finance, aid from China has increased significantly, 
although it remains variable (see Figure 4.3 below and Table A.2 in Appendix I).  
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Another potential group of donors to emerge has been member states of the Arab League11. 
In recent years Fiji has made a number of public moves to strengthen its relationship with 
the group of Arab countries. In early 2010 Fiji announced it had initiated steps towards 
joining the Non-Aligned Movement (Fiji Ministry of Information, 2010) to which all Arab 
League countries belong. Later that same year, Fiji also attended the first Pacific Island-
Arab League Summit, which focused on furthering diplomatic and development ties 
between the two regions (New Delhi Chronicle, 2010). Following the Summit, the Prime 
Minister and commander of the Fiji Military Forces (FMF), Commodore Voreqe (Frank) 
Bainimarama, publicly declared Fiji’s intention to develop more formal relations with the 
region (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, 2010; Fiji Sun, 2010), and the Arab League 
announced it would open a regional office in Fiji later that year (Islands Business, 2010). 
With the announcement that it plans to reopen its US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) programme in Fiji, some have speculated that US reengagement is 
in direct response to the increasing influence of newly emerging non-democratic donors in 
the region (Perrottet, 2011). 
 
The evolution in development principles and practices globally has greatly influenced the 
growth of civil society organisations in the Pacific, although local context in Fiji has played 
a particularly significant role in shaping Fiji’s civil society. As the emphasis on state actors 
in development has shifted, coupled with the growing distrust of Fiji’s military regime, 
these forces have both enabled and nurtured the expansion of Fiji’s civil society over time. 
The following section details the history of Fiji’s civil society community, focusing 
specifically on the number of NGOs that have emerged over time, in response to both 
global and domestic changes. 
 
                                                 
11 Arab League member states include: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen.  
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Figure 4.3 – Aid by Donors, 1996-2010, F$ millions 
 
 
Source: Fiji Ministry of Finance and National Planning Supplement to the Budget Address: 1996 - 2010 
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4.3 The Development of Fiji’s Civil Society 
 
Fiji has a long and active history of “social activism” (Mohanty, 2008, p. v). In the last few 
decades the sheer number of NGOs in Fiji has grown rapidly and today there are more than 
650 civil society actors in Fiji (Mohanty, 2008, p. v). The following section pieces together 
the story of NGOs in Fiji – their history, the current constraints they face and the ways in 
which they engage with their various development partners. 
4.3.1 History of Fiji’s NGO Community 
 
Even prior to decolonisation, a number of organisations outside government institutions 
existed to address issues concerning, for example, education, orphans and disabled people 
(Mohanty, 2008). In Fiji, Christian churches, “the world’s oldest continuous NGOs” 
according to Yabaki (2007), have long played a significant role in the provision of basic 
services. Churches were widely involved in providing schools and hospitals, as well as later 
becoming involved in research and advocacy work and being particularly outspoken against 
nuclear testing in the Pacific (Yabaki, 2007).  
 
As early as the 1960s, organisations with a particular focus on women’s issues began to 
emerge. Cultural divisions inherent in the colonial experience largely influenced early 
women’s organisations in Fiji. Organisations like Soqosoqo Vakamarama (the Fijian 
women’s organisation), the Fiji Catholic Women’s League (primarily Fijian) and the Fiji 
Moslem Women’s League (Indo-Fijian) were founded on the aims of “serving the needs or 
promoting the interests of a membership defined on the basis of ethnicity” (George, 2009, 
p. 982). In 1961, however, the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) charted 
new territory in Fiji’s NGO community, challenging the pervasive ethnic and religious 
divisions. In addition to promoting the common interests of all women in Fiji, the YWCA 
also became a significant advocacy organisation, involving itself in both local and regional 
politics (George, 2009).   
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Despite facing a number of new difficulties during the 1980s, Tarte (2009, p. 413) suggests 
that civil society flourished, particularly in the years following the coups. The number of 
women’s organisations continued to grow, adopting more issue-specific approaches in their 
aims. For example, two prominent NGOs in Fiji, the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (FWCC) 
and its sister organisation, Fiji Women’s Rights Movement (FWRM), were established in 
1983 and 1986, respectively. Whereas FWCC focused its efforts on providing counselling 
services to victims of physical and sexual assault, FWRM was founded with the more 
specific aim to challenge legal barriers to women’s safety and lobby state institutions on 
behalf of women’s rights (FWRM, 2010). In the after math of the coup, a number of new 
rights-based organisations were established. According to Yabaki (2007), the Citizens 
Constitutional Forum (CCF), was founded in 1991 specifically to “address the negative 
impacts of the 1987 coup.”  
 
Throughout the 1990s and following the crisis of the 2000 coup, a number of new NGOs 
emerged that focused increasingly on issues such as social justice, human rights, conflict 
resolution and peace building, a clear response to the turbulent political events in Fiji’s 
recent history. Despite being a challenging time for civil society, the coups acted as a 
catalyst for the formation of new NGOs as well as the re-politicisation of a number of pre-
existing NGOs in Fiji; in essence, Fiji’s coups and its NGO community are inextricably 
linked.  
4.3.2 The 2006 Coup – Dividing a Community 
 
Following the 1987 and 2000 coups, Fiji’s NGO community operated largely as a force of 
unity, protesting together against the coups. After the 1987 coups, NGOs came together to 
organise events, protests, discussions, workshops and seminars (Yabaki, 2007). Throughout 
the 2000 crisis, Fiji’s NGO Coalition on Human Rights organised peaceful protests and 
candlelight vigils outside the government buildings where the members of Parliament were 
being held hostage. Together the NGOs lobbied the international community, their donors 
and overseas governments to pay attention to what was happening in Fiji. Through 
adversity in the aftermath of both the 1987 and 2000 coups the NGO community was 
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collectively strengthened. NGO reactions following the 2006 coup, however, were 
markedly different. 
 
The coups of 1987 and 2000, executed on the premise of preserving ethnic Fijian 
paramountcy, divided much of Fiji’s society along lines of ethnicity. However, they 
brought the NGO community together in opposition to the coup leaders. The impetus 
behind the 2006 coup was fundamentally different. Rather than unifying the community, a 
schism emerged between rights-based and social justice NGOs (Naidu, 2007b). Citing 
reports of the “detention, interrogation and the violation of human rights of vocal coup 
protestors” (Naidu, 2007b), rights-based organisations refused to engage with the interim 
military regime. Social justice organisations, while not condoning the military takeover, 
appeared sympathetic to the ends, if not the means, of the coup (Llewellyn-Fowler & 
Overton, 2010). Citing the incidence of corruption, pro-wealthy and racist policies, the 
increasing number of squatters, the lack of redress for expiring land leases and general 
mismanagement under the deposed democratic government, social justice organisations 
were less critical of the military takeover and thus have been more willing to engage with 
the interim Government.  
 
Despite the post-coup rift within Fiji’s NGOs, some social justice organisations, and more 
recently, a few rights-based organisations, have attempted to maintain a dialogue with the 
interim Government. In particular, several NGO representatives have been involved with 
the National Council for Building a Better Fiji, assisting in the formulation of a charter that 
outlines the government’s national plan for Fiji’s future, entitled Building a Better Fiji for 
All: A People’s Charter for Change and Progress (hereafter referred to as the Charter) (Lal, 
2009, p. 82), while others have joined various independent dialogue processes (discussed at 
further length in Chapter Eight).  
4.3.3 NGOs and Donors: Strengthening Partnerships?  
 
In addition to affecting the cohesion of the local NGO community, Fiji’s volatile political 
history has served to significantly shape the relationships NGOs have with their partners in 
development, including both donors and the Government of Fiji.  
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As in most developing countries, NGOs in Fiji have long relied on financial support from 
international donors. As Chapter Three discussed, globally the scale of funding to NGOs 
has been increasing. In Fiji, this has happened both in response to international trends as 
well as in response to local circumstances. According to Chand, Naidu and Khan (2010), 
the 1987 coups were the initial catalyst for this change in Fiji. As the state increasingly 
failed to control basic service provision in the wake of the coups, causing both local and 
international distrust in the government, donors moved increasingly to channelling their 
funding through NGOs rather than directly to the state (Chand, et al., 2010), as Figure 4.4 
below shows. In cutting ties with the Government, as Llewellyn-Fowler and Overton (2010, 
p. 833) point out, donors have increasingly looked to local civil society to be a “key ally, 
both in supporting development work and in providing an advocate for human rights 
against an illegitimate military regime.”   
 
Figure 4.4 Pre- and Post-1987 Coup Channels for Donor Funding 
 
Source: Chand, Naidu and Khan, 2010 
 
It should also be recognised that the strengthened relationships between local NGOs and 
donors have also been symptomatic of recent global development trends. In the last decade 
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in particular, many of Fiji’s traditional donors have developed specific funding programmes 
with the aim of fostering and maintaining long term relationships with local NGOs. 
Australia, the EU and New Zealand have each introduced funding schemes in Fiji 
specifically for supporting local NGOs, which are discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 
As the Government continues to embark on its policy to ‘look North’ for both diplomatic 
affinity and financial assistance, it is increasingly marginalising its more traditional donors. 
This is potentially a cause for concern for local NGOs, as both the aid modalities as well as 
the philosophical approach to development assistance of ‘Northern’ donors differs 
significantly from traditional donors. Donors like Japan, China, Korea and the Arab League 
view their partnerships with aid recipients as strictly bilateral and rarely, if ever, partner 
directly with local NGOs. Rather, aid is provided directly to the recipient government in the 
form of technical assistance, loans and infrastructure and construction projects (JICA, 
2009; Krause, 2007; ODA Korea, 2008). If these donors do provide assistance to local 
NGOs, as Japan has done on occasion, it is almost always in the form of volunteer 
assignments or technical assistance and, importantly, is at the request of the aid recipient 
government. As Fiji continues to bolster its relations with its newer development partners, 
it will be important to monitor how local NGOs, historically highly dependent on foreign 
assistance, are being affected.  
4.4 Summary 
 
The history of Fiji’s civil society community must be viewed against the background of 
both global and local conditions that have made the growth of NGOs favourable. 
Throughout Fiji’s history, the growth of civil society has been both necessitated and at 
times opportunistic. Initially NGOs were needed to provide social goods and services the 
government was either unable or unwilling to provide. By the end of the 20th century, 
greatly influenced by the creed of good governance as well as Fiji’s own bout with political 
insecurity, NGOs have increasingly been asked to take on the role of advocates for 
democratic principles and institutions. While Fiji’s civil society has a strong history, it is 
unclear how current events in Fiji will shape its NGOs in the future. 
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Although the political circumstances of the 1980s and 1990s created an enabling 
environment for NGOs, many aspects of the more recent political environment have 
challenged the cohesion and strength of Fiji’s NGO community as a whole. In particular, as 
the Government marginalises its more traditional donors, choosing instead to ‘look North’ 
to China and other newly emerging donors for development assistance, aid to Fiji’s local 
NGOs, traditionally provided by donors like Australia, New Zealand and the EU, is 
potentially at risk. Alternatively, in the wake of the most recent coup, and in light of the 
shift in global development thinking which views civil society as a significant partner in 
development, many of Fiji’s traditional donors have shifted the focus of their aid 
programmes considerably towards working with, for and through NGOs. Although the 
political situation may have provided a catalyst for donors to provide increasing amounts of 
ODA to local NGOs, the split response to the 2006 coup that occurred within Fiji’s NGO 
community has nonetheless seriously damaged the collective power of Fiji’s civil society. 
The following chapter provides a more detailed analysis of the political situation in Fiji 
over time, focusing in particular on the reactions from the international community. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SANCTIONS IN FIJI 
5.1 Introduction 
 
‘Coup Culture’ has become a phrase almost solely synonymous with Fiji, at times 
overshadowing the complexity of Fiji’s recent political history. Since gaining independence 
in 1970, Fiji has experienced four coup d’états12 and remains to this day under military rule. 
Over time, the international community has struggled to come to a consensus on an 
appropriate reaction. Among Fiji’s donors, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and 
the European Union have each responded to the crises in Fiji by imposing a range of 
sanctioning measures on the small island nation.  
 
This chapter outlines the recent political history in Fiji, focusing in particular on its history 
of coups and the subsequent reactions from the international community that have often 
involved the imposition of sanctions by some of its major donors. 
5.2 1987: The Coup(s) to Preserve Fijian Paramountcy 
 
Fiji experienced both of its first two coups in 1987. In the April elections of that year, the 
ethnic Fijian dominated Alliance Party, in power since independence, was defeated by a 
coalition formed by the Indian-dominated Fiji Labour Party (FLP) and National Federation 
Party (NFP), establishing Fiji’s first truly multi-ethnic government. The promise of “a more 
equitable and just society” (Naidu, 2007a, p. 28), however, was short lived. A month later, 
Lt Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, supported by a group of defeated Alliance Party members that 
had formed the ‘Taukei Movement’ after losing the election, staged the military takeover. 
Rabuka and his allies claimed the takeover was aimed at preserving indigenous Fijian 
political supremacy, which had been challenged by the election of the coalition 
government.  
 
                                                 
12 Naidu (2007) argues, however, that Fiji’s first ‘palace coup’ actually occurred in 1977, although the May 
1987 coup is generally recognised as Fiji’s first coup because it “was an overt military coup d’état by the 
Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF)” (p. 28). 
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Eventually negotiations between the deposed Prime Minister, Timoci Bavadra, and the 
former Alliance party Prime Minister, Sir Ratu Kamisese Mara, were brokered with the aim 
of creating a government of national unity. However, when Rabuka and his iTaukei 
supporters were not invited to the negotiations, Rabuka staged a second coup in September, 
this time abrogating the constitution and proclaiming Fiji a republic. Ratu Mara was 
reappointed as Prime Minister (McCraw, 2009).  
5.2.1 International Reactions 
   
The 1987 coups took the international community, and in particular Fiji’s donors, by 
surprise. Not only were they the first of Fiji’s coups, they were the first to occur in the 
South Pacific (McCraw, 2009). Shortly after the overthrow of the elected government 
deposed Vice-President Tupeni Baba made numerous requests to both Australia and New 
Zealand to impose “comprehensive trade and aid sanctions” (Fell, 1987, p. 27). Although 
both countries condemned the military takeover, Australia and New Zealand were adamant 
that neither trade nor economic sanctions would be sought (Fell, 1987; McCraw, 2009). 
Instead, Fiji’s donors found alternative ways to express their discontent. Almost 
immediately, Australia and New Zealand withdrew military support (Fell, 1987, p. 269; 
McCraw, 2009), the United States “eliminated” its aid to Fiji (The Deseret News, 1987; The 
Free Lance-Star, 1987) and New Zealand announced that its Fiji aid programme would “be 
drastically reduced” (New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1987).  
 
Despite their reluctance to impose trade sanctions, both Australia and New Zealand 
employed their economic power to protest Rabuka’s actions. Early reports indicated that 
unions in both Australia and New Zealand suspended or restricted air transport to Fiji as 
well as banned the handling of cargo bound for Fiji (Reed & Dunn, 1987).  After the 
second coup, Australian unions threatened to extend the bans on shipping and air transport, 
although they failed to eventuate (Fell, 1987). In addition to union action, the New Zealand 
government announced it would not renew its contract to buy Fiji sugar when it came up 
for renegotiation the following year, an agreement that made up seven per cent of Fiji’s 
sugar exports (Fell, 1987; New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1987). After further 
reducing its aid programme, New Zealand also recalled three of its diplomats from Suva 
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(McCraw, 2009) and announced it was cancelling “aid grants to the Government of Fiji for 
salary supplementation of New Zealanders under contract to the Fiji Public Service 
Commission” (New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1987).  
5.3 2000: Fiji’s Civilian Coup 
 
By early 1988, a relative level of normalcy had resumed in Fiji. Donors were quick to 
restore their suspended relations (New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1988), even if 
the government in place was essentially a “military government in a civilian cloak” 
(Sharpham, cited in McCraw, 2009, p. 272). Power quickly reverted to Fiji’s paramount 
chiefs who ushered in a number of affirmative action policies that favoured indigenous 
Fijians. In particular, a new constitution in 1990 severely excluded non-ethnic Fijians from 
a number of government positions13 and introduced a new voting system based on racially 
allocated electorates (Naidu, 2007a). These actions subsequently alienated Fiji’s substantial 
Indo-Fijian community, which in 1987 made up over half of Fiji’s total population (Ratuva, 
2002). The years preceding the coups were marked by large-scale emigration, including 
70,000 Indo-Fijians (Finin & Wesley-Smith, 2001, p. 14) and up to ten per cent of the total 
population between 1987 and 1999 (Naidu, 2007a, p. 29).  
 
Rabuka was formally elected Prime Minister in 1992 and served under his Soqosoqo 
Vakavulewa Ni Taukei Party (SVT) until 1999. The “one redeeming feature” of Rabuka’s 
leadership, in Naidu’s (2007a, p. 29) opinion, was his support for amending the racially 
biased constitution, finalised in 1997. Under the new constitution, elections held in 1999 
saw the Indian-dominated FLP party and first ever Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra 
Chaudry, elected. However, shortly after the election, Fiji experienced its third and most 
violent coup yet14.   
 
                                                 
13 The 1990 constitution reserved the following leadership roles for indigenous Fijians: President, Vice 
President, Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister for Home Affairs, Minister for Fijian Affairs, 
Minister for Lands, Chief Justice, Commander of the Fiji Military Forces, Commissioner of Police, Chairman 
of the Public Service Commission, and other senior government positions (Naidu, 2007, p. 29). 
14 In total, eight soldiers, two policemen and two rebels were killed during the 2000 coup and subsequent 
mutiny (Naidu, 2007, p. 30).  
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On 19 May 2000, George Speight, a civilian and failed businessman along with retired 
FMF Major Ilisoni Ligairi ambushed Parliament, taking Chaudry and the entire cabinet 
hostage. While holding cabinet members hostage, Speight, of both Fijian and European 
ancestry, claimed his actions echoed those of Rabuka in 1987, to restore Fijian political 
dominance. At the same time, gangs of Fijian youths stormed through Suva, “looting, 
burning and trashing shops” owned by Indo-Fijians and rural Indo-Fijian communities were 
subjected to increasing home invasions, theft and general harassment which the police did 
little to curb (Naidu, 2007a, p. 30).  
 
Responding to the hostage situation, Bainimarama, the then commander of the FMF, 
deposed the President, declared the constitution abrogated, and appointed an interim 
government led by former banker Lasenia Qarase as Prime Minister (Naidu, 2007a). By 
July, after more than 56 days of standoff, Bainimarama convinced Speight and his men to 
release the hostages and hand in their weapons. After the hostages were successfully 
released, Bainimarama ordered the arrest of Speight and his supporters for failing to return 
all of their arms, and Speight and the hostage takers were charged and convicted of treason.  
 
Qarase and his Soqosoqo Duavata Lewe Ni Vanua Party (SDL) won the 2001 general 
elections. Despite being democratically elected, Qarase’s government failed to restore 
democratic peace to Fiji. Qarase’s time in office was fraught with allegations of corruption 
and continued support for many of the ethno-nationalists responsible for the 2000 coup. 
Throughout his tenure, the incidence of “home invasions, violent robberies, muggings, 
other street level crimes and intimidation of Indo-Fijians and non-ethnic Fijians became 
commonplace” (Naidu, 2007a, p. 31). Nonetheless, Qarase remained in power until the 
2006 coup. 
5.3.1 International Reactions 
 
The international community was quick, although cautious in its reaction to the crisis 
unfolding in Suva. As in 1987, both Australia and New Zealand immediately ruled out the 
use of comprehensive economic or trade sanctions (Downer, 2000a; The Timaru Herald, 
2000). Rather, for the first time, both countries employed the use of ‘smart sanctions’ in 
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response to the political turmoil in Fiji. “Smart sanctions”, according to then Australian 
Prime Minister, Alexander Downer, would “target particular sections of the Fijian 
community without destroying the lives of tens of thousands of innocent people” (The 
Telegraph, 2000). New Zealand also recognised the need for a more targeted approach, 
highlighting that it did not want to “make the same mistake that was made in Iraq when 
innocent children and civilians ended up paying the highest price for sanctions, while the 
real culprits (Saddam Hussein) got off scott-free [sic]” (Robson, 2000). Instead, Fiji’s 
major donors utilised new alternative measures of punitive diplomacy. 
 
Throughout the occupation, Australia and New Zealand maintained that they would wait 
until the hostage situation was resolved before imposing any sanctions (H. Clark, 2000b; 
Downer, 2000b; Garran, 2000). Once the hostages were released in July, both countries 
announced their packages of sanctioning measures that included a reduction or suspension 
of aid (not including humanitarian assistance), the suspension of scholarships, defence 
cooperation, as well as ministerial visits to and from Fiji (H. Clark, 2000a; Downer, 2000a; 
Pasifik Nius, 2000). While the decision to ban Speight and his supporters from travelling to 
Australia and New Zealand was widely accepted, the decision to impose travel sanctions on 
a number of Fiji’s sporting teams (Bingham, 2000; Goff, 2000) was met with protest from 
sporting unions in Fiji (Fiji's Daily Post, 2000b; Prasad, 2001). Australia deviated slightly 
in its reactions from New Zealand, announcing that it would suspend the Australia-Fiji 
Trade and Economic Agreement (AFTERA) and introducing new visa requirements for all 
Fiji citizens wanting to travel to Australia (ABC News Online, 2000). 
 
The United States and the European Union (EU), too, followed in the footsteps of Australia 
and New Zealand. Although the United States suspended its aid programme, at US$21,000 
in 1998 (OECD, 2011), US aid to Fiji made up a relatively small proportion of Fiji’s total 
ODA (see Table A.1 in Appendix I). By late July, the EU had announced a number of 
targeted measures against Fiji, including calling for consultation under Articles 5 and 366a 
of the Lomé Convention, freezing aid from the EU, restricting the travel of Speight and his 
associates, cancelling assistance to Fiji’s government, naval visits and joint military 
exercises, as well as restricting licenses for arms or security equipment for export to Fiji 
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(ECSIEP, 2004b). However, in October at the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in 
Brussels, a draft resolution to impose economic sanctions on Fiji was rejected (Fiji's Daily 
Post, 2000a). It instead decided to continue all planned development projects during the run 
up to the 2001 elections, with conditions placed on the implementation of projects under 
the European Development Fund (EDF), as well as on the notification of the future EDF 
allocation. After regaining membership to the Commonwealth in 1997, Fiji was fully 
suspended15 following heavy lobbying from both Australia and New Zealand (H. Clark, 
2000b; Downer, 2000a).  
 
As in 1987, unions in Australia and New Zealand were again quick to respond to the 
unfolding crisis. At the request of the Suva-based Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC), the 
Australian Council of Trade Union (ACTU) and the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
(NZCTU) moved to impose bans on sea and air transport as well as postal service (ACTU, 
2000b; Mulrooney, 2000; Norington, 2000). However, in Fiji, garment workers and 
business owners alike began to protest the FTUC’s calls for sanctions (Brown, 2000; 
Nixon, 2000). In a statement by the Fiji Government, Qarase urged Australia and New 
Zealand to lift their sanctions, stating there had been a “massive loss of jobs” as well as a 
12.5 per cent reduction in public service salaries within the year (Fiji Ministry of 
Information, 2000a). Other reports noted that “almost all sectors of business [had] 
implemented pay cuts, some up to 60 per cent” (Fijilive, 2000). Finally, in late June the 
ACTU withdrew sanctions, but continued to encourage the Australian government to 
impose ‘smart sanctions’ until the hostages were released (ACTU, 2000a). 
 
Despite Fiji’s concern that sanctions would “serve to strengthen Fijian nationalism” and 
were a case of “large rich nations ganging together to impose their will on a small island 
state” (Fiji Ministry of Information, 2000b), sanctions imposed by Australia, New Zealand 
and the EU remained mostly in place until 2001. In October 2001, Australia announced that 
it would lift sanctions and resume military relations with Fiji following elections (New 
Straits Times, 2001). By December that same year, New Zealand had resumed full relations 
                                                 
15 Fiji’s membership in the Commonwealth lapsed in 1987 after Rabuka declared Fiji a republic and 
subsequently failed to re-apply for Commonwealth membership.  
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with Fiji, removing sporting sanctions, restrictions on ministerial contact, as well as 
sanctions relating to its development aid and military contacts (Goff, 2001). By the end of 
2001, the Commonwealth had readmitted Fiji (BBC, 2011). The restoration of normal 
relations with the US and the EU was much slower, resuming in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively (Deen, 2006; ECSIEP, 2004a; Laakso, et al., 2007). Unfortunately, political 
stability lasted only a few years as the actions of the democratically elected government in 
the wake of the 2000 coup soon began to mimic the corrupt and nationalist practices of the 
past. 
5.4 2006: The Coup to Restore Democracy? 
 
In 2005, tensions mounted between the Qarase-led government and Bainimarama. Among a 
number of bills16, Bainimarama objected in particular to the Reconciliation, Tolerance and 
Unity Bill, which would have given amnesty to the 2000 coup perpetrators (Naidu, 2007a, 
p. 32). Bainimarama accused the Qarase government of “corruption and institutionalising 
racism” (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 13) and Qarase retaliated by attempting to remove 
Bainimarama as commander of the military (Naidu, 2007a). In the August 2006 elections, 
Qarase won by only a slight margin and was sworn in for a second term. After a final 
attempt and failure to remove Bainimarama from his post, in December 2006 Bainimarama 
executed a military coup d’état, dismissing Qarase as the Prime Minister. Shortly 
afterwards, Ratu Josefa Iloilo was reinstated as the President, who appointed Bainimarama 
as the interim Prime Minister.   
 
In mid-2008 it was announced that elections planned for 2009 would be postponed until 
electoral reforms could be completed. In April of 2009, Fiji’s Appeal Court ruled that 
Bainimarama’s 2006 take over was unconstitutional (Matau, 2009). The following day, 
President Iloilo abrogated the 1997 constitution, appointed himself as head of state, set 
2014 as the deadline for elections and dismissed Fiji’s judiciary. The President then 
reappointed Bainimarama as the interim Prime Minister and announced that a new 
constitution would need to be drafted, with particular focus on reforming the current ethnic 
                                                 
16 The other bills included the Qoliqoli Bill and the Land Tribunal Bill. For further information on these bills 
and the controversy surrounding them, see Naidu, 2007. 
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based electoral system introduced in the 1997 constitution, prior to elections taking place in 
2014 (BBC, 2011). 
5.4.1 International Reactions 
 
The response from Fiji’s key bilateral and multilateral partners following the 2006 coup 
was “sharp and unequivocal” (Lal, 2009, p. 84). A number of Fiji’s donors reacted quickly, 
imposing a range of targeted sanctions. The response from Fiji’s nearest donors, Australia 
and New Zealand, was much more comprehensive, although the reactions of the US and 
EU were also significant. Australia implemented a number of sanctions under its 
Autonomous Sanctions Bill, including an arms embargo, the suspension of defence 
cooperation, restrictions on ministerial level contact with Fiji’s interim military 
government, as well as travel bans on government and military personnel (Australia 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010). New Zealand followed suit, placing bans 
on high-level political contact with the coup-installed regime and the military as well as 
travel bans on all members of the Fijian government, the military and their families. New 
Zealand also imposed fresh sanctions on sporting contacts in addition to suspending Fiji’s 
participation in the Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme and the Pacific Access Quota17 
(H. Clark, 2006).  
 
The US and the EU, two of Fiji’s other major donors, focused their sanctions specifically 
on their development assistance. As the US is required by law to suspend development 
assistance to any country in which a coup has been staged, it reacted immediately by 
suspending its aid to Fiji, which included at the time just under US$500,000 in military 
grants and approximately US$268,000 for international military education and training 
(Deen, 2006). Despite the suspension of development assistance, ODA from the US to Fiji, 
the bulk of which was provided largely through Peace Corps volunteers, dropped only 
slightly from US$1.338 million in 2006 to $1.208 in 2007 (USAID, 2010)  as Table A.3 (in 
Appendix I) shows.  
 
                                                 
17 The Pacific Access Category allows a particular annual quota of citizens from Kiribati, Samoa, Tuvalu and 
Tonga to be granted residence in New Zealand every year. 
 67 
Fiji’s multilateral donors were much more willing than Australia and New Zealand to 
engage in post-coup dialogue with Fiji (Fraenkel, 2009, p. 158). Rather than cutting off 
contact with the interim government, both the Commonwealth and the EU made sustained 
efforts to encourage a swift return to constitutional democracy. However, Fiji’s 
membership in the Commonwealth was once again suspended (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2009). The EU actively sought formal consultations, as stipulated under Article 96 of the 
2000 Cotonou Agreement, but by June 2007 it announced that more than F$400 million of 
its aid to Fiji would be either delayed or outright cancelled (Grubel, 2007). Although 
humanitarian aid and support to civil society organisations was untouched, following 
consultations in October between the EU and Fiji, the EU decided to make future assistance 
through the EDF contingent on Fiji upholding commitments agreed to during the 
consultation (Council of the European Union, 2007). Potentially the most devastating 
aspect of this suspension of assistance from the EU was the F$274 million worth of 
assistance to Fiji’s dilapidated sugar industry (Grubel, 2007). The EU grants were meant to 
assist Fiji as it transitioned away from the highly subsidised preferential prices in EU 
markets which would see Fiji sugar prices drop by 36% by 2009 (Pareti, 2007). Fiji’s 2007 
sugar allocations were subsequently cancelled, while the 2008, 2009 and 2010 allocations 
were also made conditional on Fiji following through with its commitments made at the 
October consultations (European Commission, 2007). Finally, Fiji was suspended from the 
Pacific Island Forum (PIF), and is now one of only two countries to face full suspension 
from the Commonwealth18 (Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2009). 
 
Australia and New Zealand also placed sanctions on their aid programmes to Fiji. 
According to the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AusAID), 
Australia “suspended assistance where the actions of the Regime render [its] programs 
ineffective or compromised” (AusAID, 2009), in particular including part of a law and 
justice sector programme (Fraenkel, 2009 p. 179). However, AusAID continued to fund 
programmes in the health and education sectors that partnered with Fiji’s government 
                                                 
18 In total, four countries have been suspended from the Commonwealth: Fiji, Pakistan, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe. Nigeria and Pakistan have since had the suspension lifted. Zimbabwe withdrew from the 
Commonwealth in 2003. Fiji is the only country that remains currently suspended.  
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Ministries, and as Figure 5.1 below shows, Australia’s ODA to Fiji rose from Aus$28.76 
million in 2005-06 to $29.28 in 2006-07, and for the most part has continued to climb.  
 
Figure 5.1 – Australian ODA to Fiji, 1999 - 2010 
 
 
Source: AusAID, personal communication, 2011 
 
New Zealand took a more hardline approach, putting a hold on all new development 
initiatives and discontinuing scholarships and traineeships for students and public sector 
workers (H. Clark, 2006). Between 2005 and 2006, aid from New Zealand to Fiji, although 
significantly less than aid from Australia, plummeted from approximately NZ$7.8 million 
in 2005-2006 to NZ$2.5 million in 2006-2007, as Figure 5.2 below shows. According to 
the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID19) (2009a), the 2006 coup 
and subsequent sanctions imposed have been a direct catalyst for the strengthening of New 
Zealand’s relations with civil society organisations in Fiji.   
 
 
 
                                                 
19 In 2009, the newly elected National-led Government absorbed the previously semi-autonomous NZAID 
into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and renamed it the New Zealand Aid Programme (NZAP). For 
the remainder of this thesis, however, New Zealand’s aid agency is referred to as NZAID. 
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Figure 5.2 – NZ ODA to Fiji, 1999 – 2010 
 
 
Source: NZAID Annual Reviews, 1999-2010 
 
5.5 Recent Developments 
 
In the four years that have followed the 2006 coup, tensions between Fiji, Australia and 
New Zealand have continued. As the three countries engaged in a diplomatic tit-for-tat, a 
string of Australian and New Zealand High Commissioners, and subsequently acting High 
Commissioners, were expelled20 (McCully, 2010; Sydney Morning Herald, 2010). In stark 
contrast to reactions following the coups of 1987 and 200021, Pacific Island countries joined 
the international community voicing their concern about the situation evolving in Fiji. In 
May 2009, the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) confirmed it had suspended Fiji 
from the 16-member body, which excludes Fiji from benefiting from any regional 
cooperation initiatives as well as financial and technical assistance (Pacific Island Forum 
Secretariat, 2009). With little headway made towards elections, by September 2010, Fiji 
was fully suspended from the Commonwealth, which excludes Fiji from all inter-
governmental Commonwealth meetings, sporting events and technical assistance programs 
                                                 
20 Fiji has expelled two New Zealand High Commissioners and an Acting High Commissioner as well as one 
Australian High Commissioner and an Acting High Commissioner.  
21 For further detail on the reaction of Pacific Islands to the 1987 and 2000 coups, see McCraw, 2009, p. 270. 
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(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2009). The only remaining assistance provided by the PIFS 
and the Commonwealth is targeted at the restoration of democracy. 
 
Relations between Fiji and both the EU and Australia remain at a relative stand still. The 
EU recently announced that it would extend sanctions once again until October 2011 
(Council of the European Union, 2011). In a March 2011 interview, Australia’s Foreign 
Minister and former Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, reiterated that Australia was “not yet in a 
position to recommend any change in policy” (Otago Daily Times, 2011). Despite the 
stalemate between Fiji and Australia and the EU, there have been emerging signs that Fiji’s 
relationships with New Zealand and the United States are beginning to thaw. In mid-2010, 
USAID announced plans to reopen its Suva office after a 15-year hiatus (Australia Network 
News, 2010; Hill, 2010; 2010). By early 2011, New Zealand also seemed to be considering 
a new approach towards Fiji, announcing that it was willing to relax some of the sanctions, 
in particular the travel bans, should Fiji provide “a firm commitment to elections in 2014” 
(Trevett, 2011). Despite using the Rugby World Cup as a carrot, it is clear New Zealand 
realises now that its travel bans, have failed to achieve their objective.  
5.6 Summary 
 
Throughout Fiji’s relatively short history as an independent nation state, it has experienced 
long periods of deep seated internal conflict which has caused political instability and 
provided a constant challenge to building consensus among Fiji’s diverse population. 
Outside Fiji’s borders, the international community, too, has struggled to come to a 
consensus on how to respond to Fiji’s repeated breach of democratic principles. Following 
each of Fiji’s coups, donors have responded consistently by imposing various forms of 
sanctions.  
 
Australia, New Zealand and the EU, in particular, have responded with a range of targeted 
measures intended to both intimidate and entice Fiji’s military government into holding 
elections as quickly as possible. However, despite the potentially devastating impacts of the 
sanctions, Fiji, and in particular Bainimarama, has remained adamant that before it is 
willing to hold elections in 2014, significant changes to Fiji’s constitution and national 
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mindset will need to be made. For many of the donors, however, 2014 - seven years after 
the latest coup - is too long to wait. Increasingly, Australia, New Zealand and the EU have 
been turning their focus towards working through and strengthening Fiji civil society 
community.  
 
In rhetoric, this sounds like an unintentional, yet positive outcome for Fiji’s NGOs. For 
Fiji’s donors, local NGOs are an alternative route, through which assistance can be 
channeled until the more formal bilateral channels can be reopened. This perception of 
NGOs as the alternative rather than primary route for development assistance, however, 
fails to take into account the difficulties, complications and power dynamics involved in 
donor-recipient partnerships, primarily with NGOs rather than a central government. 
Beyond declaring NGOs a more appropriate conduit for development assistance, there has 
been little discussion on how a sanctions regime, even a smart and targeted one, can affect 
an NGO community. The remainder of this thesis uses the voices of a variety of 
participants to provide a discussion on the impacts on Fiji’s local NGO community.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDING TO NGOS IN FIJI 
 
The sanctions have resulted in a shift in the focus of the bilateral programme 
from direct engagement with the Fiji interim government to an increased 
partnership with civil society organisations.      
                              NZAID, 2009a  
6.1 Introduction 
 
The following three chapters present findings, an analysis and discussion of this research. 
As the previous chapters have detailed, both global shifts in development thinking and 
practice and the local political context have significantly shaped Fiji’s NGO community. 
While contemporary development theory recognises the importance of a strong civil 
society, donors’ preference for civil society and NGOs in Fiji is directly linked to the 
imposition of sanctions, as the above quote from NZAID indicates.  
 
This first analysis chapter focuses on both the real and perceived impacts of sanctions 
imposed by Australia, New Zealand and the EU on the funding directed to NGOs in Fiji. 
These findings come from an array of sources, and aim to compare the rhetoric of increased 
partnership with reality, as experienced by the organisations themselves.  
6.2 How do the donors fund NGOs in Fiji? 
 
Australia, New Zealand and the EU have each embraced local NGOs as credible channels 
for development assistance in Fiji. Yet, their statistical reporting of aid disbursements to 
local and international NGOs lags significantly. While comprehensive statistical 
information on their NGO expenditures may not exist, donors produce a plethora of policy 
documents detailing both their commitment to and partnerships with NGOs. Australia, New 
Zealand and the EU each maintain varying records on their contributions to NGOs 
overseas, few of which are made publicly available unless specifically requested. Each 
donor supports NGOs in its own unique way and has developed distinctly different 
instruments through which NGOs can access donor funding.   
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6.2.1 AusAID’s Support to Fiji’s NGOs 
 
Although Australia has not developed an overarching policy strategy for engaging civil 
society actors, it is actively committed to supporting international and local (within 
recipient countries) NGOs. Approximately eight per cent of AusAID’s total ODA budget is 
channelled through Australian, international and local NGOs (AusAID, 2010a, p. 136). 
While AusAID states that NGOs “are often preferred partners in delivering development 
assistance” (AusAID, 2010a, p. 136), the emphasis in its focus guiding engagement with 
NGOs22 is to “supplement funding for Australian NGOs” for “development, relief and 
rehabilitation activities in developing countries” (AusAID, 2011). 
 
There are four primary avenues through which AusAID provides support to NGOs. The 
first two include the AusAID-NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP) and Cooperation 
Agreements (CAs), which provide funding to Australian NGOs either to implement their 
own programmes overseas or to deliver AusAID’s own country or sector programme 
activities. Local NGOs in aid recipient countries are not eligible for direct funding under 
the ANCP or CAs. Where funds are provided to local NGOs, an Australian partner NGO 
usually manages the funds on behalf of the local NGOs. The second and third avenues 
include the Direct Aid Program (DAP) and the Small Activities Scheme (SAS), which are 
smaller funding instruments through which local NGOs can access funding directly. Both 
the DAP and SAS are administered by the Australian Embassy or High Commission in the 
recipient country and are intended to be relatively small in scale and short in length 
(AusAID, 2010c). According to ANCP Annual Reports (1992-2004), there is also some 
funding provided to non-Australian NGOs through the Country Program.  
 
As previously mentioned, aid agencies rarely maintain comprehensive statistical records of 
aid disbursements to NGOs. AusAID has in the past provided detailed reporting on its aid 
expenditures to NGOs in the ANCP Annual Reports (1992-2004). Over time, however, the 
quality of and access to accurate information has declined significantly. From 1992 to 
                                                 
22 AusAID’s engagement with Australian and local NGOs is guided by a number of policy documents, 
including the Cooperation Agreement (CA) Policy, the ANCP Guiding Principles and the Pacific Regional 
Strategy.  
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1998, these records were multi-page documents, providing an extensive break down of 
AusAID’s expenditures by country, programme, NGO, and other schemes through which 
Australian, international and local NGOs accessed funding. By 1998, the reports became 
more streamlined but less comprehensive one-page reports. The ANCP reports ceased in 
2004, and there appears, unfortunately, to be little public reporting of AusAID’s NGO 
expenditures beyond the mention of total amounts within annual reports.  
 
One of AusAID’s main priorities in its Fiji aid programme is to “partner with civil society 
and regional organisations to support the people of Fiji” (AusAID, 2010b). Based on ANCP 
report statistics, Australia channelled more than Aus$11.7 million in aid through NGOs in 
Fiji between 1992 and 200423. Despite AusAID’s early meticulous reporting, a significant 
challenge exists in trying to further disaggregate funding going to non-Australian NGOs. At 
first glance, funding to non-Australian NGOs appears fairly significant, particularly through 
the DAP. It is presumed that funding to ‘local NGOs’ indicates assistance provided to 
Fijian based local or regional NGOs, although no definition of ‘local NGOs’ is provided. 
Funding allocated under the DAP, one of the few direct funding channels available to local 
NGOs, however, rarely lists to which non-Australian NGOs the funding is allocated. 
Rather, DAP funding per year is listed in total expenditure amounts24 with no information 
as to how many organisations the instrument has funded. ANCP data provides little 
clarification as to whether the ‘non-Australian NGOs’ are in fact local Fijian organisations, 
or whether they also include other non-Australian but also non-Fijian, international or 
regional NGOs. While some years of the ANCP reports specify individual local NGOs, for 
example the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre (1992-93), the Fiji Council of Social Services 
(1994-95), the Fiji Red Cross (1992-93) and the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (1995-
96), other years provide only a generalised allocation to ‘NGOs overseas’ or ‘various 
NGOs overseas’.  
 
                                                 
23 Table A.4 in Appendix I provides an aggregate view of funding provided to NGOs in Fiji, as reported in the 
ANCP annual reports from 1992 to 2004.  
24 With the exceptions of 1992/93 and 1998/99, which list no DAP expenditures for Fiji, and 1995/96, which 
in addition to a general total amount, includes a disbursement to an Australian NGO, the Sydney Adventist 
Hospital (ANCP Annual Reports, 1992-2004). 
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Upon request, AusAID provided current data on Australian assistance to CSOs and NGOs 
in Fiji. Figure 6.1 below combines information from both the ANCP annual reports and 
AusAID to show the flow of funding from AusAID to Fijian NGOs from 1992 to 2010. 
Between 1992 and 2004, funding to Fijian NGOs fluctuates significantly, dipping as low as 
Aus$2,954 in 1998/99, and later skyrocketing to Aus$1.98 million in 2002/03. Data 
provided by AusAID shows that between 2005 and 2009, Australian funding to Fijian 
NGOs has followed a stable incline, in particular jumping from approximately 
Aus$308,000 in 2005/06 to Aus$1.3 million in 2006/07 and continuing to grow rapidly 
until 2009/10. The decrease in 2009/10 is possibly due to a large five-year funding 
agreement with one NGO in particular coming to an end. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Australian assistance provided to CSOs/NGOs in Fiji, 1992 - 2010 
 
 
Source: ANCP Annual Reports, 1992-2004; AusAID, personal communication, 
2010 
 
According to an AusAID representative, financial assistance to NGOs in Fiji has been 
provided through the Australian Civil Society Support Program (ACSSP) since 2000, 
although data is only available dating back to 2005 (AusAID, personal communications, 
2011). In 2009, AusAID conducted a programme review of the ACSSP subsequently 
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deciding to redesign the programme. While the programme is being redesigned, the 
Australian High Commission (n.d.), “will not be accepting any funding requests till [sic] 
further notice.”  
 
Regardless of the absence of an overarching policy strategy guiding AusAID’s engagement 
with NGOs, there are several funding instruments that have provided a significant amount 
of aid to both Australian and non-Australian NGOs. As Figure 6.1 has shown, over time 
Australian support to NGOs in Fiji has been relatively inconsistent, although following the 
2006 coup a distinct rise in funding to NGOs is evident. Yet with the civil society 
programme on hold the level of commitment from AusAID to Fiji’s NGOs is unclear. 
6.2.2 New Zealand’s Commitment to Reorientation 
 
New Zealand’s aid budget is significantly smaller than Australia’s. Despite this fact, New 
Zealand provides proportionally more of its aid budget through civil society organisations 
than Australia. Whereas Australia provides approximately eight per cent of its ODA 
through NGOs, in 2008/09 the NZAID provided approximately 18 per cent of its funding 
(NZ$83.4 million) through New Zealand, international and local NGOs (NZAID, 2010b). 
The Strategic Policy Framework for Relations between NZAID and New Zealand NGOs 
outlines the guiding principles for New Zealand’s support for NGOs, both within and 
outside of New Zealand (NZAID, 2010b). The Pacific Strategy 2007-2015 (NZAID, 2007) 
also reiterates New Zealand’s commitment to supporting “the important contribution New 
Zealand non-government organisations and other civil society groups make to development 
in the Pacific.” 
 
Unlike AusAID, NZAID has never maintained detailed public records of its aid expenditure 
to NGOs. Data on New Zealand funding to NGOs is mostly found in NZAID’s Annual 
Reviews, which provide a glimpse of total NGO expenditure, achievements and priorities 
for each year. In 2009, the newly elected National government in New Zealand made a 
series of structural changes to NZAID25. Prior to these changes taking place, most funding 
                                                 
25 Banks, Murray, Overton and Scheyvens (2011) provide a detailed overview of the changes made to NZAID 
under the National Party government since 2008. 
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to New Zealand NGOs (NZNGOs) for projects in developing countries was provided 
through two contestable funding schemes, Kaihono hei Oranga Hapori o te Ao – 
Partnerships for International Community Development (KOHA-PICD), and the 
Humanitarian Action Fund (HAF)26. KOHA-PICD “recognise[d] the fact that NGOs are 
often able to work at a grassroots level with their partners” which it highlights is a “level of 
assistance that governments and donors are sometimes unable to provide directly” (NZAID, 
2009c). HAF also provided funding to NZNGOs partnering with organisations in a 
developing country in which emergency or disaster relief, rehabilitation or mitigation 
activities were required. Although neither KOHA-PICD nor HAF provided direct funding 
to non-New Zealand NGOs, many local NGOs received KOHA-PICD and HAF funds 
through their NZNGO partners.  
 
In Fiji, the political instability and the subsequent sanctions imposed on New Zealand aid 
have led directly to “a reorientation of support away from government to civil society” 
(NZAID, 2010a). The 2005-2010 NZAID/Fiji Country Programme Strategy emphasises the 
increasingly important role for NGOs in Fiji’s development. The report highlights that the 
reduced bilateral aid allocations following the 2000 coup were “directed towards civil 
society and NGO initiatives, particularly those in the governance/law and justice sectors” 
(2005, p. 24). In order to strengthen its ties with local NGOs in Fiji, NZAID designed a 
‘Civil Society Strategy (CSS)’ with the aim of developing “strategic partnerships with 
select NGOs” (NZAID, 2010a). However, among the changes made by the National-led 
government, the new civil society funding mechanism was “put on hold” (Interview 21, 29 
June, 2010) and at the time the fieldwork was conducted no new strategy had been 
established. 
 
Between 2001 and 2010, NZAID provided approximately NZ$8 million in aid directly to 
Fijian CSOs and NGOs. Both Table A.5 in Appendix I and Figure 6.2 below are based on a 
report provided by NZAID that shows both New Zealand’s total ODA budget to Fiji as well 
as the amount and proportion provided to Fijian NGOs. Although New Zealand’s funding 
                                                 
26 In 2010, the KOHA-PICD and HAF funds were replaced with the Sustainable Development Fund (SDF) 
and the Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF). At the time of writing no information was yet available on 
funding provided through the SDF. 
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to Fijian NGOs has increased since 2001, it has been inconsistent. It is clear, however, that 
in the aftermath of the 2006 coup, New Zealand funding to NGOs in Fiji more than 
doubled, making up approximately 45 per cent of all aid to Fiji in 2006/07.  
 
Figure 6.2 – NZ ODA Direct to Fijian NGOs, 2001-2010 
 
 
Source: NZAID, personal communication, 2010 
 
The report provided by NZAID provides a further breakdown of the various programmes 
through which Fijian NGOs have received New Zealand funding. In addition to receiving 
funding through their NZNGO partners (i.e. through KOHA or HAF), local NGOs in Fiji 
have also received funding both directly from NZAID as well as through a number of other 
funding programmes. The most consistent funding schemes have included the Te Kakano 
Fund and the Head of Mission Fund (HOMF). Funding through the Te Kakano Fund has 
been the most significant, totalling approximately NZ$2.3m between 2001 and 2010. The 
Te Kakano Fund, replaced in 2008 with a new civil society strategy framework, was “only 
for CSOs and community groups” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010)27. The HOMF involves 
small grants managed by NZAID and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) 
                                                 
27 It is important to note that following the election of a National led government in 2008, the new civil 
society funding mechanism was “put on hold” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010) and as of writing no new strategy 
had been established to replace the Te Kakano Fund or the 2008 civil society strategy framework. 
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through the local New Zealand post in Suva. Like AusAID’s DAP and SAS, funding 
through the HOMF was meant to be for “discrete development activities of a short 
duration” with a maximum allocation for individual projects of NZ$20,000-$25,000 
(NZAID, 2009b, p. 2). Over ten years, the HOMF has provided approximately 
NZ$134,000, ranging anywhere between NZ$1,000 to $39,000 annually, to local NGOs in 
Fiji (NZAID, personal communication, 2010).  
 
Despite New Zealand’s relatively small size, its commitment to working with and through 
NGOs is clear. This is reflected not only in the large proportion of its total ODA budget 
that is channelled through NGOs but also in the existence of specific policy documents 
guiding New Zealand’s engagement with civil society actors. While New Zealand’s own 
dedication to partnering with NGOs will have influenced its aid programme in Fiji, political 
instability has without a doubt been a significant factor in New Zealand’s push to redirect 
significant proportions of its aid programme to NGOs working in Fiji.  
6.2.3 The European Union’s Focus on Democracy and Human Rights  
 
The EU provides development assistance to 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries. The guiding principles for EU development cooperation in ACP countries are 
enshrined in the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, commonly referred to as the Cotonou 
Agreement (previously Lomé). The Cotonou Agreement makes multiple references to the 
importance of the involvement and participation of civil society in development. The EU 
has six major funding instruments for development assistance outside of Europe, of which 
“the European Development Fund is the main source of financing for EU assistance” to 
ACP countries (European Commission, 2010a, p. 40).  
 
Despite the EU’s repeated emphasis on the central role civil society plays in development, 
it provides even less information on the funding it provides to NGOs than Australia and 
New Zealand. The only public information providing a breakdown of EU funding to Fiji is 
found in the European Commission-Fiji Joint Annual Reports (JAR), of which reports for 
only 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2008 could be found. Although the 2005 JAR provides a 
comprehensive donor matrix of all donor activities in Fiji, as the 2007 JAR highlights, 
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“there is no tradition in Fiji to maintain a donor matrix.” This lack of information sharing, 
the report notes, “is a consequence of the missing overall donor coordination mechanism in 
the country” (European Commission & Republic of the Fiji Islands, 2008). 
 
The EU is both Fiji’s largest multilateral donor, as well as the second largest donor overall, 
as Figures 4.3 and 4.4 have shown. According to the European Commission (EC) (2007, p. 
70), since the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1975, the EU has allocated more than 
€230 million (a 2002 figure) to Fiji through the EDFs, budget funds and European 
Investment Bank contributions. While on average, aid to Fiji under the successive EDFs 
has risen since 1975, funding allocations under both the 8th (1995-2000) and 10th (2008-
2013) EDFs have declined. Following the 2000 coup, Fiji’s disbursement under the 8th EDF 
was delayed due to aid to Fiji being temporarily suspended (European Commission & 
Republic of the Fiji Islands, 2006, p. 2). Again, following the 2006 coup, the EU suspended 
Fiji’s allocation under the 10th EDF (European Commission, 2007). Figure 6.3 below 
illustrates both of these declines. According to a representative from the European 
Delegation office in Suva, unless Fiji holds elections prior to 2014, they will not access any 
of the 10th EDF funds (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010). 
 
Although the EU’s decision following the 2006 coup to suspend development assistance 
stipulated specifically that “humanitarian aid as well as direct support to civil society may 
continue” (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 17), the European Delegation 
representative offered a contradictory picture of EU aid to Fiji, noting that the suspension 
has indeed affected funding to local NGOs. The representative explained that there is “no 
new allocation for the country and we have no new development plan. That includes our 
support to civil society. When we suspend aid, we suspend it across the EDF” (Interview 
23, 13 July, 2010).  
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Figure 6.3 – European Development Fund Disbursements to Fiji, 1975 - 
Present 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2007; *Strampelli, 2002; **Interview 23, 13 July, 
2010 
 
While Fiji’s allocation under the EDF has been suspended, the EU has provided two other 
significant sources of development assistance in Fiji. The first has been the EU/ACP Sugar 
Protocol and Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol (AMSP) programme. The 
EU/ACP Sugar Protocol is an agreement, established in 1975, between the EU and ACP 
countries that secured fixed quantities of ACP sugar at preferential prices for an indefinite 
time period (Secretariat of the ACP, 2005). In 2009, the EU began to phase out the 
preferential prices and subsequently established the AMSP. The AMSP is part of the EU’s 
“action plan” to “help ACP countries adjust to [the] cut in price” and to assist “in 
restructuring their sugar industries” (European Commission, 2010a, p. 104). With the 
political impasse, however, Fiji’s sugar allocations for 2007 were suspended and the EU 
announced that the 2008, 2009, and 2010 allocations would depend on progress made 
toward instituting a legitimate government (Council of the European Union, 2007). In 2009 
alone, Fiji lost €32million in sugar funding (European Commission, 2010a). 
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A second important source of assistance was introduced in the aftermath of the 2000 coup. 
The EU has introduced the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) as an alternative funding mechanism that “works with and through civil society 
organisations in countries where there is no direct cooperation with the government” 
(European Commission, 2010b). As the EIDHR is an instrument that has been developed to 
support individuals or organisations promoting or defending democracy and human rights, 
specific restrictions are placed on the funding and reporting. According to the European 
Delegation representative:  
For the protection of those we are funding, particularly in many countries 
[where] they are known human rights defenders who suffer under the current 
situation, not saying that is the case in Fiji, but we are not allowed to publish 
who we are providing funds to, the amount we provide and the content of what 
we are supporting. We do not share that with anyone except our member states 
because they contribute to the budget. They are also under the same restrictions 
(Interview 23, 13 July, 2010). 
 
As all funding under the EDF and the AMSP has been suspended, the sole surviving 
funding instrument available in Fiji is the EIDHR. Unfortunately, because the EIDHR is 
subject to the above reporting restrictions, this complicates the analysis of NGO funding. 
While precise details of the Fiji EIDHR fund are not publicly available, some insight into 
the fund’s operation can be taken from the 2009 EIDHR Guidelines for the Fiji EIDHR 
Country Based Support Scheme (European Commission, 2009). The guidelines note that 
the primary recipients of the funding will be “based in Fiji, the Pacific Region or the 
European Union,” but also emphasise that “it is expected that the focus will be on Fiji-
based civil society organisations” (European Commission, 2009, p. 5). The 2009 allocation 
to Fiji under the EIDHR was €593,500 (European Commission, 2009, p. 5). According to a 
representative from the European Delegation in Suva, the funding has been approximately 
€600,000 annually (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010), which in general supports three or four 
NGOs that can apply for funding anywhere between €50,000 and €200,000 each (European 
Commission, 2009, p. 5). However, the 2003 JAR notes that when Fiji was identified as a 
suitable focus country for EIDHR funding, initially €1.3 million was allocated for 2002, 
with similar allocations for the following two years (European Commission & Republic of 
the Fiji Islands, 2005, p. 24).  
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The EU has a long history of providing development assistance to Fiji. As Fiji’s second 
largest donor, the suspension of EU aid following the 2000 and 2006 coups is likely to have 
been extremely devastating. As one EC report notes, “the total EU multilateral assistance to 
Fiji at stake as a result of the December 2006 coup amounts to some F$400 m[illion]” 
(European Commission, 2007, p. 70). Similar to Australia and New Zealand, the EU has 
responded by scaling back its aid programme while directing funding specifically to local 
NGOs. Due to the current suspension placed on the 10th EDF, and the restrictions placed on 
EIDHR funding, coupled with the vague and inconsistent data on EU funding to Fiji, a 
thorough analysis of the funding provided to Fijian NGOs is extremely difficult. 
 
Australia, New Zealand and the EU are each committed to supporting and working with 
and through NGOs to achieve their development objectives. For each of the donors, 
traditionally, support has been provided for their own domestic NGOs to conduct activities 
in developing countries, although this is changing. Increasingly the donors are developing 
funding mechanisms that specifically target local NGOs within recipient countries. Each of 
the donors have developed funding instruments precisely to strengthen, build the capacity 
and encourage NGOs to be involved in all aspects of development. Unfortunately, while 
donors espouse an increasing commitment to supporting NGOs’ involvement in the 
development process, none have developed comprehensive, quantitative, publicly available 
reports on their funding to NGOs. This lack of data makes it difficult for NGOs and the 
public to hold donors accountable to their own statements of increased support and begs the 
question of whether donor rhetoric reflects reality.  
6.3  Perceived Impacts of Sanctioned Aid on Fiji’s NGOs 
 
Statistics from Australia, New Zealand and the EU on aid disbursements to NGOs in Fiji 
provides a good starting point for analysing how the donors’ commitment to and 
engagement with civil society has developed. However, it is important to look not only at 
how much aid is going to NGOs in Fiji, but equally importantly I argue, how the NGOs 
perceive the levels of funding they have received over time, particularly following the 
imposition of aid sanctions.  
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Among the 30 participants interviewed, many were divided as to whether NGOs in Fiji 
have been advantaged or disadvantaged by the donors’ supposed reorientation towards civil 
society. Others, however, noted that the impacts of sanctions on Fijian NGOs are not so 
simply dichotomous. How NGOs have faired financially in the post-coup years, is a result 
of many factors – both global and local. A number of issues emerged in interviews with 
NGOs that surpassed the simple discussion of how much funding they had received from 
which donors. The NGOs talked less about dollar amounts and more about the many 
implications associated with the complicated funding processes and increased donor 
selectivity in their partnerships with local NGOs. The following section outlines the 
perceptions of several representatives from NGOs, donor agencies and key informants on 
how Fiji’s NGO community has experienced the impacts on their donor funding. 
6.3.1 Thoughts from the Advantaged 
 
When coups happen, it’s very good for us.    
         Interview 3, 12 July, 2010 
 
A number of NGOs believed, to varying degrees, that the most recent set of sanctions on 
Fiji’s aid programmes have been beneficial for them, while others noted that their impacts 
were minimal. For example, one NGO representative described how she had not “seen any 
NGO that has suffered from the sanctions” (Interview 13, 6 July, 2010). Several other 
NGOs were adamant that their organisation had in particular benefited, noting specific 
dates and examples of how they had benefited. As one NGO representative explained, 
“between 2006-2008 I think we benefitted a lot” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). The 
representative recounted how it was clear that AusAID’s suspension of funding to the law 
and justice sector, in particular, meant an increase in funding to a number of Fiji’s NGOs. 
The NGO representative explained: 
All that money that they were giving to the government institutions, they 
redirected it to NGOs so that meant that there was more funding for us. We 
were able to develop one project and one programme … We got funding 
through this fact that they had more money available (Interview 6, 5 July, 
2010).  
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Another NGO stated, “when coups happen, it’s very good for us” (Interview 3, 12 July, 
2010). For that NGO, in particular, since the 2006 coup, they have witnessed marked 
advantages, including increased funding to facilitate more projects. In the past, this same 
NGO had witnessed similar benefits in the aftermath of each of the previous coups. The 
NGO representative told me how in 1987, after donors withdrew funding to the 
Government, the NGO began to receive funding from USAID to act as a grant facilitator 
for other civil society organisations. Additionally, the NGO received increased funding 
from AusAID, which “they wanted to give and they didn’t want to give it to the 
Government” (Interview 3, 12 July, 2010). The funding from AusAID, the representative 
explained, continued until 2000 when Australia decided to begin administering aid to Fijian 
NGOs directly. More recently donors have approached the NGO with requests that they 
once again take on the role of grants facilitator. Interestingly, the NGO has said in order for 
this to happen they will want to renegotiate the terms of the agreement. Due to the current 
aid environment in Fiji, the NGO is able to utilise this newfound donor interest to shape the 
conditions for partnership. In this case, the power dynamics inherent in the donor-recipient 
relationship have potentially been skewed in favour of the NGO. For this NGO, in many 
ways “the coup was a blessing in disguise” (Interview 3, 12 July, 2010).  
 
At a time when many donors are scaling back their aid programmes in Fiji, some NGOs are 
experiencing surging interest from the donors. Rather than seeking out funding 
opportunities from donors, a few NGOs noted that donors have approached them. As one 
NGO told me, “AusAID is jumping up and down to give us core funding” (Interview 6, 5 
July, 2010). Another NGO described how they submitted a proposal to extend an existing 
three-year programme that was coming to an end. They told me that in the new agreement, 
AusAID chose to give them more money than they had asked for. This increase in funding, 
however, did come with strings attached, as AusAID would only provide the funding for 
one year initially, rather than commit to a three-year funding agreement as they had done in 
former agreements. Previously, the NGO was receiving approximately $60,000 each year, 
but as of 2010 they would receive $120,000 for one year (Interview 11, 24 June, 2010). 
This was, in the representative’s opinion, one example of a positive result of the coup. 
Finally, another NGO pointed to how the donors, in some respects, had become 
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increasingly lenient in their funding provision, unlike in the past when donors had been 
extremely strict with the funding application processes. The representative explained that 
after following the appropriate channels and procedures in applying for funding and being 
subsequently rejected, the NGO was then able to go “through the back door straight to 
AusAID” which then decided to fund the proposal for more money than they had requested 
in the original project proposal (Interview 1, 23 June, 2010).  
 
It is due to the current political situation that NGOs feel they are able to have more direct 
access to donor funding and therefore potentially more capacity to access funding. For 
several NGOs, despite the suspension or sanctions placed on donor aid commitments, their 
experiences have not been negative. In fact, some of the organisations have drawn a direct 
correlation between the reductions in bilateral funding agreements with increases in their 
own funding from the donors.  
6.3.2 Thoughts from the Disadvantaged 
 
I haven’t seen an influx or a removal of money. It’s more that relationships are 
all a bit strange.         
Interview 1, 15 June, 2010 
 
Conversely, a number of NGOs held opposing views on the beneficial qualities of the 
sanctions. While some NGOs felt that the responses from donors have varied, others 
believed that in fact, few local NGOs were benefitting from an increase in donor funding. 
As one NGO highlighted, increasing their funding to NGOs has not necessarily been a 
universal reaction from the three donors. In particular, funding from NZAID, according to 
one NGO representative, has been “in dribs and drabs in an ad hoc manner for projects and 
programmes” (Interview 3, 12 July, 2010). Another NGO made similar observations about 
the conflicting actions of the donors. According to the NGO representative, New Zealand 
had “cut back a lot on their CSO funding” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). She explained that 
whereas New Zealand’s Te Kakano Fund had provided specific funding for NGOs, 
increasingly NZAID was now partnering with only a few select NGOs in their focus on 
poverty and squatter settlements. 
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Another NGO, however, has experienced decreased funding from all three donors. A 
representative from that NGO listed a number of likely reasons for diminishing donor 
support. According to him, because of the organisation’s outspoken nature, which has 
included speaking out on regional trade agreements and climate change, he “expect[s] that 
we will be asked not to put in any future proposals” (Interview 19, 22 June, 2010). 
Additionally, he felt the involvement of one of the staff with the Charter, too, has been a 
source of contention between the NGO and the donors. He explained: 
[The Charter] is seen as being pro-government. Seen as being part of the 
government. Part of that whole blanket concept … Polarising everything just 
means that you don’t have the space to be creative or to have any form of 
dialogue or alternative. But when you take on something like that, you have to 
accept the responsibility that this is the impact it will have (Interview 19, 22 
June, 2010). 
 
Through their ability to hand select the NGOs that will receive funding, donors maintain a 
distinct power over the kinds of NGOs that exist in Fiji. This power is only further 
exacerbated in times of fragility when donors scale back their funding and practice 
increased selectivity, choosing to decrease their funding to organisations they perceive to 
be  ‘pro-government’.  
 
Another issue that surfaced in my discussions with the NGOs was the view that despite 
New Zealand’s claim to be reorienting their aid programme increasingly towards civil 
society (NZAID, 2010a), the increased funding was not necessarily targeting Fijian NGOs. 
One NGO representative shared with me her thoughts on who was receiving New 
Zealand’s reoriented funding:  
From the meetings we’ve had with NZAID representatives over the last 18 
months it is quite clear that all they are doing now is funding themselves to do 
work in the Pacific, especially in Fiji. You know, sending specialists to have 
meetings to do things. And we aren’t interested in that (Interview 19, 22 June, 
2010). 
 
A representative from a second NGO made similar observations about NZAID’s pattern of 
civil society funding. According to him: 
The impression that I am getting is, where previously funding used to be given 
directly to local NGOs, national or Pacific regional NGOs that work in the 
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Pacific, funding is either being cut or pulled and the money is now going to 
NGOs in New Zealand that work in the Pacific (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010).  
 
The issue of funding domestic NGOs over local organisations, however, was not exclusive 
to New Zealand. One NGO representative explained that the organisation was only 
informed about a significant amount of funding available from AusAID through one of 
their regional networks for a project similar to work in which the NGO was already 
involved. Rather than partnering with the local NGO, AusAID had given the funding to an 
Australian organisation. The representative explained that his organisation was further 
shocked to learn that the Australian organisation had entered Fiji without the appropriate 
work permits and wanted to establish a locally based organisation that would essentially 
identify particularly marginalised members of society, clearly showing their ignorance of 
the laws in Fiji (Interview 19, 22 June, 2010).  
 
While some NGOs had noted neither an increase nor a decrease in support to civil society, 
they, too, acknowledged the potentially damaging consequences of the donors’ reactions. 
As one NGO remarked, “I haven’t seen an influx or a removal of money. It’s more that 
relationships are all a bit strange” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). In particular, the 
aforementioned concerns about which organisations donors prefer to partner with have 
serious implications not only on local NGO funding, but also on their relationships with 
their donors. One NGO was particularly troubled by donors’ current practices: 
I don’t like what I’m hearing about AusAID giving money to Australians to 
come in here and do what we are already doing. And I don’t like New Zealand 
spending money on consultants coming to do what we already know. There is a 
real misunderstanding that Fiji actually has a hell of a lot of people that are very 
capable of doing everything. And I think this is a deliberate undermining of that 
because they know Fiji is possibly the only country in the Pacific that turns 
around and says ‘stuff it’ (Interview 19, 22 June, 2010). 
 
Another NGO representative agreed: 
It sends out this message that “We don’t trust you with our money, you guys 
just swindled it away in the last ten years. So now we are going to give it to 
New Zealanders, because they are better at looking after money and they’ll 
come and supervise you people to do the job that you are already doing” 
(Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
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As donors move to channel their aid funding away from Fiji’s Government in protest of the 
latest coup, they have announced a commitment to supporting and strengthening Fiji’s civil 
society. Each of the donors believe that a resilient civil society is necessary for establishing 
a strong stable democratic foundation on which Fiji’s future can be built. Unfortunately, as 
a number of Fiji’s NGOs have pointed out, the attempts to strengthen Fiji’s civil society has 
been inconsistent and selective. Some NGOs believe they have greatly benefited by 
increased funding to their organisations as well as an increased leniency by donors to seek 
out NGOs with which to partner. On the other hand, a number of NGOs have highlighted 
the fact that not all donors have reacted with equal enthusiasm. Some NGOs believe the 
increased funding the donors have espoused has been politicised, and rather than 
empowering and building the capacity of Fiji’s NGOs, donors are funding their own 
consultants and domestic organisations. Beyond impacting the local NGOs’ current 
financial standing, the actions taken by the donors are actually impacting on the 
relationships with Fiji’s NGOs, which will be further explored in Chapter Eight. 
6.3.3 Seeking an Alternative 
 
In talking with the various stakeholders involved in Fiji’s aid and NGO community, one 
key finding was the revelation of the implications associated with the emergence of new 
and alternative donors. While the Fijian Government continues to establish new 
relationships with more non-traditional donors, a number of the NGOs interviewed, too, are 
looking for new alternative sources of funding. Few of these organisations pointed directly 
to reduced or sanctioned aid as the catalyst for their interest in diversifying their funding, 
however, the fact remains that many of the organisations are not willing to be over reliant 
on donors that the Fiji Government is quickly marginalising.  
 
Many of the NGOs interviewed already receive significant funding from donors outside the 
traditional bilateral context. Increasingly, they are seeking funding from alternative donors, 
in particular private, religious and women’s organisations such as Rotary, EED, Misereor, 
Bread for the World, Mama Cash, International Women’s Development Agency, as well as 
international and local corporate sponsors.  
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Diversifying funding sources is an attempt for many of the NGOs interviewed to both 
ensure their own sustainability in the future as well as to maintain a sense of independence. 
For one NGO, funding from one of their primary donors had recently lapsed with little 
reassurance from the donor that it would be renewed. As a result they now must seriously 
consider alternative fundraising opportunities, despite hesitancy among board members 
under the current political climate (Interview 18, 9 July, 2010). Two other NGOs had also 
experienced having their funding contracts cancelled mid-year, with little warning 
(Interview 5, 13 July, 2010; Interview 15, 7 July, 2010). In discussing future strategies for 
securing funding, another NGO representative explained that they “are thinking about 
expanding our donor numbers because it’s dangerous relying on a couple” (Interview 1, 15 
June, 2010). In addition to over reliance on any single donor being unsustainable, he also 
inferred that there are political implications for relying too closely on donors the 
Government views with increasing suspicion, in particular NZAID, who he noted 
“probably aren’t the right people to have in our books at the moment” (Interview 1, 15 
June, 2010). 
 
The move by NGOs to diversify their funding has definitely been exacerbated as the 
tensions between the donors and the Government continue to rise. For several 
organisations, partnering with NZAID in particular has become extremely frustrating both 
because of their political stance towards Fiji as well as the more recent structural changes to 
the aid agency. As one NGO told me, “New Zealand has been a waste of time for years” as 
they have “promised us stuff, and then never come through with it” (Interview 19, 22 June, 
2010). Another NGO expressed similar sentiments: 
NZAID is pretty dead. You just don’t get anything out of them. Every time you 
talk to them about something … ‘Oh, just been a change in government and we 
can’t talk to you about that.’ The change of government, whether it was their 
excuse, or the review of funding, it has lead to where you can’t get anything out 
of them, even for interesting projects, projects they should be really interested 
in. The immediate reaction you get is that it’s not the right time. So I’ve just 
given up. For the last six months I haven’t even approached them for anything 
(Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). 
 
With both Australia and New Zealand’s civil society funding programmes on hold, as one 
development consultant explained, “there’s no immediate promise of project funding” 
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(Interview 27, 27 September, 2010). Despite sanctioning its aid, the EU has maintained 
funding to NGOs through the EIDHR, although it only provides support to three or four 
NGOs per year (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010). Although Australia and New Zealand 
continue to fund capacity building workshops for NGOs this is deemed pointless without 
action. As one development practitioner expressed, “if I was an NGO I'd be asking, what is 
the point of building our capacity if we don't have the funding to do the work?” (Interview 
27, 27 September, 2010).  
 
Until recently, with neither the donor countries nor Fiji willing to back down, the 
Government of Fiji has sought to replace the suspended or reduced aid with assistance from 
its ‘Northern’ donors. “With Australia, New Zealand and the EU withdrawing funding,” as 
one development practitioner explained, “Fiji is opening up to new donors” (Interview 30, 
1 November, 2010). Unfortunately for Fiji’s NGO community, these new donors have a 
fundamentally different approach to development. One donor representative explained the 
inherent differences in the way China, for example, provides development assistance.  
China has a very completely [sic] different way of working with development 
country partners. It does not sign up to the same governance questions. We 
know that from experience from working in Africa that Chinese aid, through 
loans, is not [a] development grant particularly … [it] can continue under any 
circumstances (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010).  
 
As another donor representative explained, aid from China tends to include loans, aid in 
kind, as well as “tied aid” in the form of financial support for infrastructural, roading and 
energy projects for which China will supply their own labour and materials rather than 
sourcing them within Fiji (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010). Although this is not the place to 
argue which approach to development is more appropriate or indeed helpful for the 
recipient country, what can be noted is that the ‘Northern’ donors, which provide their 
assistance through loans, infrastructural development or aid in kind to the recipient 
government are less likely than donors such as Australia, New Zealand and the EU to 
support Fiji’s civil society. Donors like China and Japan, rarely if ever, provide funding to 
local NGOs. If Fiji does continue to push its traditional donors to the margins, it is 
understandable that local NGOs would want to ensure they have access to diverse and 
alternative sources of funding.   
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6.4 Summary 
 
For NGOs in Fiji, funding from Australia, New Zealand and the EU comes through a 
number of different instruments. In light of the most recent coup, each of these donors has 
made particular commitments to supporting Fiji’s civil society. After suspending its 
primary development assistance to Fiji, the EU has introduced a funding instrument that 
provides funding only to NGOs. Australia and New Zealand have also announced their 
renewed commitment to strengthening Fiji’s NGOs, however, both countries have since 
placed their civil society funding programmes under review with no temporary 
replacements. 
 
The NGOs interviewed were divided on whether they are at an advantage or disadvantage 
following donor suspension or reduction of bilateral aid.  For some of the NGOs it has 
meant more funding is available and thus they are able to implement more of their projects. 
Others, though, have noted that the rhetoric of donors is not reflected in the reality of 
support to Fiji’s NGO community. In addition to affecting current projects, some NGOs 
highlighted that the lack of communication and disorganisation among the donors is, more 
importantly, affecting the relationships between the NGOs and the donors. For several 
NGOs, this has highlighted the increasing need to diversify their funding sources, as the 
future of each of these donors as significant contributors to Fiji’s development is in 
question. As the following chapter will discuss, the affects of a sanctions regime on civil 
society, however, are not necessarily always financial. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE (IN)EFFICACY OF TARGETED SANCTIONS IN FIJI 
 
Smart sanctions are those that are adapted when circumstances change and the 
targeted states react. Thus, sanctions become part of a wider negotiating 
process between the international community of states and a targeted elite. A 
related issue is the time limit of sanctions; smart sanctions refer to the idea that 
sanctions should be periodically reviewed, and ended if ineffective. 
 
                                           Brzoska, 2003, p. 522
       
7.1 Introduction 
 
A defining aspect of smart sanctions is the ability to selectively target individuals without 
violating the human rights of innocent civilians. Perhaps even more importantly, however, 
is Brzoska’s (2003, p. 522) belief that the “relative smartness” of targeted sanctions is that 
they provide the sender with the flexibility to choose contextually appropriate measures as 
well as constantly reassess the evolving situation and react accordingly. In Fiji, however, 
the same sanctioning measures have been in place for more than four years, while few of 
the demands of the international community have been met. Increasingly people within and 
outside of Fiji are recognising that the sanctions have been relatively ineffective, and are in 
fact impacting a number of unintended targets. Where donors have the power to impose 
sanctions, they also have the responsibility to recognise and address these unexpected 
impacts.  
 
Despite donor efforts to shield innocent civilians in Fiji from the devastating impacts of 
economic or trade sanctions, limiting the impacts of smart sanctions to only the targeted 
individuals is extremely difficult. One example in Fiji of one of the sanctions increasingly 
being recognised as ineffective is the use of targeted travel restrictions. According to 
Tostenson and Bull (2002, p. 390), travel restrictions “fit well into the smart sanctions 
concept because they selectively target elite individuals” while “minimizing unintended 
humanitarian consequences.” While travel bans have both tangible and symbolic impact on 
the ruling elite and their immediate families, Tostenson and Bull (2002, p. 391) recognise 
 94 
that “innocent people could inadvertently be affected” which can compromise “the 
credibility of the entire exercise.”  
 
The media both overseas and within Fiji has exposed a number of cases in which sanctions 
have extended beyond the intended targets. This chapter presents several examples of the 
unexpected targets of the travel bans specifically within Fiji’s NGO community, further 
supporting Anderson’s (2001) assertion that, “no sanction targets one person.” The chapter 
concludes with a summary of comments from both donor agencies and NGOs regarding the 
inefficacy of targeted sanctions in achieving their objectives in Fiji.  
7.2 Unexpected Targets of Travel Bans  
 
Chapter Five detailed the smart sanctions Australia, New Zealand and the EU have applied 
to Fiji (see Table A.6 in Appendix I for a comprehensive breakdown). Among the measures 
taken, Australia and New Zealand in particular have chosen to impose travel bans targeting 
the “military, Government ministers, senior civil servants, Directors of statutory bodies, 
and Judges and Magistrates” (Gates, 2009) as well as the immediate family members of 
these individuals. Like other forms of smart sanctions, targeted travel restrictions are meant 
to “more effectively target and penalize … the political elites espousing policies and 
committing actions deemed reprehensible by the international community” (Tostensen & 
Bull, 2002, p. 373).  
 
While the move to ban the travel of military and senior government officials is widely 
understood and supported, there is a growing acknowledgement that the travel bans are 
affecting a number of unexpected targets. The media has highlighted a few such cases, 
including that of family court Judge Anjala Wati whose infant son was initially denied a 
visa to travel to New Zealand for emergency surgery (Field, 2009). Similarly, in 2007 a 
group of ten boys was banned from attending a scout jamboree in Christchurch (The Fiji 
Times, 2007). Australia and New Zealand also introduced new visa requirements after the 
2006 coup, which Walsh (2009) notes are “intrusive” and have led to “increased negative 
perceptions of ANZ [Australia/New Zealand].” He also argues that the negative rhetoric 
and imagery portrayed by all three countries, while not necessarily a sanction, has indeed 
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taken an economic toll on “ordinary people”, in particular those involved in Fiji’s tourism 
industry (Walsh, 2009). Lastly, Walsh (2009) argues that there is growing recognition that 
the travel bans have impeded Fiji’s government from recruiting non-military personnel for 
heads of government departments and public servant roles for fear being targeted by the 
travel bans. Consequently, the travel bans are further adding to the militarisation of Fiji’s 
civil service, which will be further discussed later.    
 
While there is increasing recognition of the impacts of sanctions, particularly the travel 
bans, on innocent civilians, there has been little to no discussion about the potential impacts 
on Fiji’s civil society community. This is of course reflective of the wider gap in sanctions 
and political conditionality studies which has rarely focused on the specific impacts of 
sanctions on NGOs.  
7.2.1 Travel Ban Case Studies 
 
Neither Australia nor New Zealand has directly targeted any NGO or civil society group 
among its lists of banned individuals or associations, although both AusAID and NZAID 
acknowledged the possibility for an individual representing an NGO to be captured by the 
bans due to familial relationships (Interview 20, 3 August, 2010; Interview 21, 29 June, 
2010). Where possible, exceptions can and have been made (Interview 20, 3 August, 2010). 
As one MFAT representative explained, “it is possible to make the application for an 
extension or to come off the list,” however, “it’s not an easy process” (Interview 25, 13 
October, 2010). A donor representative conceded that there have been some cases of 
individuals being “unintentionally affected” by the bans (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010). 
While the representative admitted that this has been “unfortunate”, he went on to say that, 
“there’s not much you can do about that” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010). In addition to 
familial ties to a targeted individual, one donor representative explained a separate reason 
why an NGO may be subjected to the travel restrictions: 
I think any organisation that is a part of the [Charter] process or [an] individual 
- the travel ban affects them or the funding, because they are working with the 
whole of Government. The illegal Government, as we see. Anyone involved in 
the process is banned from travel (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010). 
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The EU has not imposed European-wide travel restrictions, a representative from the 
European Delegation explained, as the decision to impose travel bans falls outside the 
scope of the Cotonou Agreement. The application of such measures, according to the 
representative, comes from “our member states’ discussions in the Council, so it is usually 
a member state push, because they control the immigration” (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010). 
 
Below I highlight five cases in which NGO staff have been directly affected by the travel 
bans. I also point to examples of the Fiji Government utilising the concept of travel bans 
against Fijian NGOs, echoing Robinson’s (1995) concern about the ability of recipient 
governments to retaliate against local NGOs.  
7.2.1.1 Case I 
 
In 2009, the NGO in this case hired a new director at a time when there had been high staff 
turnover throughout the organisation. The director was a previous employee of the military 
whose spouse was currently employed by the military. After taking over the role, the new 
director was meant to attend two to three important meetings in New Zealand, funded by 
NZAID through a NZNGO. The director notified the New Zealand High Commission 
(NZHC) of the familial links to the military hoping that being honest and upfront would 
increase the chances of the visa being granted. The NZHC notified the director that the 
chances of receiving a visa was low, but the director applied and paid the application fee 
hoping that travel on behalf of an NZAID supported NGO would be grounds for an 
exception. However, the visa was declined. As it was not appropriate to send other junior 
staff or board members, the director was instead forced to travel to Germany for similar 
meetings – a trip which costs on average approximately three times that of travel to New 
Zealand. Additionally, both the director and a second staff member were denied visas to 
attend a regional planning meeting in Australia, again due to familial ties (spouse and 
sibling, respectively) to the military forces (Interview 18, 9 July, 2010; Interview 29, 30 
June, 2010). 
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7.2.1.2 Case II 
 
In 2010, this NGO was given the opportunity to nominate an individual from one of their 
programmes to be sent to a conference being held in Auckland with funding from the Fiji 
Ministry of Youth. Unfortunately, the nominated individual was unable to attend. 
According to the NGO representative: 
His visa was delayed purposefully, we believe because his father is [a 
Government employee]. We thought that all that was clear. We received 
[confirmation] from Government to say that he was never an appointee of 
Government but was working - the youth's father. Still, nothing. The New 
Zealand High Commission responded purposefully late, and by that time the 
conference had finished (Interview 2, 15 June, 2010). 
7.2.1.3 Case III 
 
The relationship between Australia, New Zealand and Fiji was of some concern for this 
NGO. Among the issues causing concern was the travel bans. The director of the NGO 
spoke about how the travel bans were affecting NGOs in general and how they were sure to 
extend beyond their initial targets: 
There are a lot of people working amongst the NGOs and would like to have 
open travel so they can be communicating and networking with other partners 
around the world. For those who have travel bans it becomes a problem. 
Irrespective of independent NGO operation, we will get into difficult areas 
especially when you have relationships. And Fiji is a small country and you've 
got relationships ... or get married to anybody. Basically in Fiji you are 
probably related to every third person on the street. How could you then hold 
somebody who is working tirelessly and very openly for the benefit of the 
people to be exposed to the same ratings? (Interview 16, 5 July, 2010). 
 
The director told me how one of their staff members had been unable to obtain an 
Australian visa. According to the director, “there was a limitation because of relationships 
with persons in the military by marriage. They were travelling for official reasons – 
‘official conferences’” (Interview 16, 5 July, 2010). In general, the NGO has been able to 
work around the travel bans, that is, “unless we have to visit Australia … there are other 
routes available now, which facilitate. So I wouldn't rate it as a major problem for us. 
Except if we have to [be in Australia]" (Interview 16, 5 July, 2010). Fortunately for this 
NGO, the staff member banned from Australia is a New Zealand permanent resident, 
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although the director acknowledged that the staff member would likely otherwise be 
banned from travelling to New Zealand as well.  
7.2.1.4 Case IV 
 
As previously mentioned, both AusAID and NZAID acknowledged that exemptions to the 
travel bans can be made upon application. One NGO that I met provided an example of a 
travel ban exemption being granted on humanitarian grounds. Within this NGO, one staff 
member has been involved both in the Charter and is a government-appointed legal aid 
commissioner. In 2010 the staff member needed to apply for a visa to go to New Zealand, 
as a member of his immediate family was to undergo a serious operation. In the application 
the staff member acknowledged both his role with the Charter and government-appointed 
position. According to him: 
They came back immediately and said that they wouldn’t normally allow me at 
all, but for humanitarian reasons they would. But I was only allowed to go 
once; I’m not allowed to go back. I could stay up to three months. Now I can’t 
afford to stay up to three months – economically, work-wise. So it was a stupid 
thing. I asked if I could have a multiple entry visa so I could go now for the 
operation and then later if my [family member] needs me I could go back. But 
no – it was either I go now, but I can’t go back. So I went for two weeks. I 
couldn’t even stay in the end for the operation as it was delayed. I had no ability 
to apply to go back. I was told not to bother (Interview 19, 22 June, 2010).  
 
While the staff member acknowledged that he was grateful the humanitarian exception was 
granted, as he put it, “they had to make it as difficult as possible” (Interview 19, 22 June, 
2010). Although the NGO representative had not yet attempted to travel to Australia, he 
expected similar restrictions to be in place28.  
7.2.1.5 Case V 
 
Like the public servants who have declined roles in the government for fear that their 
family will be targeted by the travel bans, the director of this NGO chose to turn down a 
government-appointed commission position. The director told me that he initially accepted 
                                                 
28 I learned later that when the NGO representative’s family member passed away New Zealand did indeed 
grant another visa to return for the funeral, although the duration and conditions of the visa are unclear 
(Interview 28, 16 September, 2010). 
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the position, but then later chose to decline the appointment for fear of the ramifications for 
his family. He explained: 
The invitation came after nine months. In between I went to Australia and had 
an operation on my kidney… and I had to go back and forth. [A family 
member] who works for [another NGO] as a project manager … was travelling, 
another is working for [a regional airline]. If I had taken up that, the travel ban 
would’ve applied to all of these people. I politely said, I agreed to it nine 
months [ago] and I've had an operation. Health-wise, I’m not able to take that 
up. With that excuse I withdrew. Just before that someone else was appointed 
as chairman and everything was cut off. The poor guy resigned and didn’t take 
up that [position]. It would’ve affected [us], but we’ve avoided those things 
(Interview 3, 12 July, 2010). 
 
7.2.1.6 Retaliating with travel bans 
 
In 2009, Amnesty International published a report on human rights violations in Fiji, 
detailing a number of cases in which the Government has placed critics of the regime and 
human rights activists on travel bans (banning them from travelling outside of Fiji) 
(Amnesty International, 2009, p. 38). Similar bans on outward travel have also been placed 
on staff members from NGOs known to be supportive of sanctions or providing 
information to Australia and New Zealand. During my fieldwork, three NGOs were 
identified as having had staff members of their organisations placed on government-
imposed travel bans (Interview 15, 7 July, 2010; Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). One NGO 
representative explained how the Government was retaliating against local NGOs using 
travel bans: 
We’ve had travel bans imposed by the regime. They won’t let us fly out. For 
example, I was on a travel ban for six months, in the first period of the coup. 
One of my board members has been on a travel ban for a month. The travel ban 
has been imposed by the regime on us because they know we are the ones 
informing the High Commissions here and Wellington and Canberra. That’s 
been the biggest impact (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
 
Travel restrictions have directly affected each one of the above organisations. Many of 
these NGOs have been able to find ways around the travel bans, either applying for 
exceptions or avoiding travel to and through Australia and New Zealand. NGO budgets, 
likely predominately provided by the same countries, are small and the difference between 
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flying to Auckland versus Berlin is significant. These cases provide evidence that no matter 
how targeted the travel bans have been, their effects have reached beyond their intended 
targets. As evidenced by the very cases that have led to the creation of targeted smart 
sanctions, sender countries have a responsibility when imposing sanctions to periodically 
assess if their actions are indeed targeting the right individuals, acknowledge when they do 
not and make the appropriate changes if they are affecting unexpected targets.  
7.3 Perceptions on the (In)Efficacy of Targeted Sanctions in Fiji 
 
After more than four years in place, sanctions have made little headway in forcing a quick 
return to democracy. Since the imposition of sanctions, none of the demands of the 
international community have been met and Fiji has continued to set its own deadlines for 
replacing the constitution and holding elections. In Fiji, very few of those interviewed, 
including donor agency representatives, expressed faith in the sanctions.  
 
As the previous section discussed, the travel bans are affecting some unintended targets 
within Fiji. In particular, there has been an increasing realisation recently that the travel 
bans themselves are further aiding a militarisation of Fiji’s public service, which Yabaki 
(2011) explains:  
The sanctions imposed by Australia and New Zealand on civilians taking up 
positions within the current government have no doubt contributed to the high 
number of military appointments. The extension of travel bans to not only 
individuals but also their family members has acted as a significant deterrent 
from many qualified civilians applying to governmental roles. As military 
personnel and their families are, on the other hand, already subject to such 
sanctions, there is no further penalty applicable for them filling vacant civil 
service posts. 
  
For the first time, in March of this year, New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
acknowledged the contribution New Zealand’s sanctions have made to Fiji’s inability to 
recruit for senior positions. The Minister conceded that, “there’s a point where it’s going to 
be in our interests for them to be able to recruit heads of government departments that are 
not members of the military; that means at that point you have to look at the sanctions” 
(Trevett, 2011).  
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Although this sentiment is only recently receiving public acknowledgement, it was a 
common opinion held by a number of the NGOs interviewed. As one NGO representative 
noted, “57 per cent29 of key ministry positions are now held by military men”, which he 
argued was a direct impact of the travel bans (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). Another NGO 
representative agreed, insisting that the bans are delaying progressive change in Fiji: 
No one wants to sit on a board for the Interim Government because of the 
potential ramifications on them being able to visit people and places overseas. 
You end up with a lot of the boards being [filled] by people that could’ve been 
chaired by even better people. Those better people are holding back and 
refusing to serve because of what it will mean. It is holding back what could be 
happening better (Interview 8, 25 June, 2010). 
 
Many people in Fiji, and more recently in New Zealand and Australia (Hayward-Jones, 
2011), have come to recognise the inefficacy of the travel bans in encouraging positive 
changes for Fiji. In addition to affecting unintentional targets, the bans have inadvertently 
lead to a further militarisation of the civil service, which will likely serve only to make the 
transition to democracy more difficult.  
7.3.1 Donor Perceptions 
 
The donors themselves held varying opinions on the effectiveness of the sanctions. AusAID 
was adamant that the combination of sanctions from Australia, New Zealand, the EU, the 
Commonwealth and PIFS had been effective in maintaining pressure on the regime 
(Interview 20, 3 August, 2010). A representative from New Zealand MFAT reiterated 
confidence in the sanctions noting:  
One of the objectives of the sanctions was to make it as difficult as possible for 
the regime to achieve what it wanted to achieve, whatever that may have been. I 
think unquestionably it has made it very difficult. They have been unable to get 
people to serve in a lot of their public positions because people would rather 
come to New Zealand than to be banned (Interview 25, 13 October, 2010).  
 
Representatives from NZAID and the EU, however, were less convinced. One 
representative from NZAID conceded, “if you were going to say the original goal was to 
restore Fiji to democracy and have elections, then they have been ineffective in that sense” 
                                                 
29 More recently Yabaki (2011) has stated that “67 per cent of Fiji’s government ministries have military 
personnel in senior positions” which “represents known appointments only”. 
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(Interview 21, 29 June, 2010). A representative from the European Delegation, too, 
acknowledged the shortfalls of the sanctions, explaining that judgement of the success of 
the measures was dependent on what exactly one considered the original objectives. When 
asked if the sanctions appear to have been effective, the EU representative responded: 
If the objective was to bring elections forward, no, I don’t. If the objective is to 
isolate the current Government, I think the recent cancellation for the recent 
MSG [Melanesian Spearhead Group] Plus meeting might be an indication that 
there is continuing isolation of the Government. If the objective was to support 
Fiji to get back on track, I can’t really comment (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010). 
 
While representatives from New Zealand and the EU tried to remain positive about the 
impacts of the sanctions, their comments show an inherent recognition that their sanctions 
have been symbolic rather than instrumental. The NZAID representative was hopeful the 
sanctions “might have changed some other possible activities or things planned by the 
Government” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010) while the European Delegation representative 
was optimistic that the measures have “drawn attention to the population in Fiji as well as 
how the international community works and sees things [sic]” (Interview 23, 13 July, 
2010). However, the donors understood that the primary purpose of the sanctions has been 
to “send a signal to Fiji, rather than to impose any serious economic ramifications” 
(Interview 22, 12 October, 2010). The sanctions have been at best a “daily reminder” of the 
illegitimacy of the military regime (Interview 25, 13 October, 2010). As none of the donors 
could pinpoint specific ways in which the measures have brought about tangible change, 
their comments on the inefficiency of the sanctions reinforce Nossal’s (1991, 1994) 
assertion that sanctions imposed by middle powers serve simply as symbols rather than 
effective measures of statecraft.  
7.3.2 NGO Perceptions 
 
In the aftermath of the 2000 coup, prominent NGOs asked donor countries to carefully 
consider the ramifications of applying sanctions. Following the 2006 coup, however, the 
same NGOs actively lobbied donors and the international community to apply pressure to 
the interim regime (Anderson, 2001). Yet, more recently there has been “a growing 
consensus in the country that it has to change” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010).  
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Increasingly, NGOs are realising that the measures taken by the donors have been “too 
harsh and ineffective” (Interview 12, 2 July, 2010) as well as “counterproductive” and 
“isolating” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). Throughout Fiji, there is a growing realisation that 
punitive measures and disengagement has not worked. As one development practitioner 
involved with a number of NGOs explained, “the people aware of the sanctions … a lot of 
them have said that the sanctions don’t really work, [it] doesn’t impact much on this 
Government” (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). Another NGO representative pointed to the 
fact that there is little popular support remaining for the same methods that have so far 
failed to move Fiji forward:  
I would understand the Australia/New Zealand policy if there was resistance in 
the country to which there was support. Non-engagement in the debate is an 
indication that … if they were doing it and there was resistance, great. But the 
amount of people who have disengaged … frankly, we just need to move on 
(Interview 10, 15 July, 2010). 
 
Those organisations that had initially pushed for sanctions to be imposed instead are seeing 
the need for renewed engagement. As one NGO representative put it, “even people who 
have been very anti-government are saying it has to change” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). 
A representative from one NGO acknowledged that while they had originally advocated for 
sanctions, with time, their support has waned:   
When the coup first happened [in 2006], that’s exactly what we told them: pull 
all funding from the military. But now, the longer we are in it we realise, ok, 
you need to come back in again (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
 
The NGO representative pointed specifically to the impacts of the travel restrictions on 
unexpected targets, like the case of Judge Wati, noting, “it really did show that some 
people’s rights were being violated” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
 
For other NGOs, the scale and intensity of the measures was of particular concern. One 
NGO representative mentioned that the impacts of the sanctions have been “many, as 
bilateral aid has suffered and certain services funded by these partnerships [have suffered]” 
(Interview 4, 23 June, 2010). Particularly devastating, she noted, was the suspension of EU 
aid, which was “affecting potential development for rural development in the rural areas 
[sic] and hampered development for alternative livelihood projects which has been much of 
 104 
a need” (Interview 4, 23 June, 2010). Another NGO echoed these concerns regarding the 
scope of the sanctions, noting that it is particularly “ridiculous how broad they go” 
(Interview 1, 15 June, 2010).  
 
It should also be acknowledged that during the interviews, some organisations were 
hesitant to express their opinions on the effectiveness of the sanctions. When asked, one 
NGO told me, “probably I don't want to comment on that one as it may affect us directly as 
an organisation” (Interview 16, 5 July, 2010). For many NGOs, self-censorship has become 
a necessity (Interview 13, 6 July, 2010; Interview 29, 30 June, 2010) and a means of 
maintaining their relationships with the Government as well as their donors. The impacts 
on these relationships are explored further in the following chapter. 
7.4 Summary 
 
Regardless of how targeted the sanctions have been “on the perpetrators and beneficiaries 
of the coup” (NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT], 2010), as this chapter has 
shown, there have been a number of cases where individuals neither directly associated 
with nor in support of the coup have indeed been unintentionally targeted. Despite their 
family relations or willingness to cooperate with the Government, many of the individuals 
discussed in this chapter have been actively involved in working to move Fiji towards a 
better future and their experiences of the sanctions, however unintended, deserve 
recognition.  
 
As a number of the NGOs in Fiji have witnessed either first or second hand the unintended 
and unexpected outcomes of Australia, New Zealand and the EU’s sanctions, there is 
increasing recognition that the measures adopted by the donors have failed to contribute 
positively to rebuilding democracy in Fiji. Fortunately, some donors appear to recognise 
this growing consensus. While Australia and the EU appear less willing to shift their 
approach from stick to carrot, there are newly emerging signs from the United States and 
New Zealand that a more incentives-based approach is being considered (The National 
Business Review, 2010; Trevett, 2011). For the NGOs, what Fiji needs most now is for 
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donors to re-engage, promote credible dialogue and rebuild the relationships that have long 
lain fallow.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE IMPLICIT IMPACTS OF SANCTIONS ON RELATIONSHIPS 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Whereas the previous two chapters have covered the direct impacts sanctions have had on 
NGOs in Fiji, this final discussion chapter focuses on the more implicit impacts of 
sanctions on relationships between the different development actors. In normal aid 
environments, the power dynamics within donor-recipient relationships are affected by a 
number of factors (Lister, 2000; Overton & Storey, 2004; Whitfield, 2009). However, in 
fragile environments, such as under a sanctions regime, this imbalance of power is further 
exacerbated. While it is extremely difficult to point to cause and effect with sanctions and 
their impacts, this chapter attempts to give the NGOs interviewed a chance to express the 
ways in which they feel their relationships between their donors, the Fiji Government as 
well as other NGOs, and the dynamics therein, have been affected. 
8.2 Relationships between NGOs and Donors 
 
At a time when donor relations with Fiji’s Government has been increasingly strained, 
donors have proclaimed their commitment to engaging with and working through Fiji’s 
civil society. In his doctoral research on Fiji’s aid industry, Hodge (2009, p. 32) states that 
the “political instability in the country has further enhanced donor-NGO collaboration.” 
However, Hodge’s ‘enhanced collaboration’ between donors and NGOs has not necessarily 
been experienced by all NGOs in Fiji. For several NGOs, the political situation has not 
affected relationships with their donors (Interviews 2, 7, 11, 12, 16), whereas others 
believed that their relationships have been strengthened (Interviews 3, 4, 14, 13, 15). For 
these organisations, donor funding was not a problem, remaining either stable or increasing. 
 
Yet, another group of NGOs felt the sanctions and the donors’ stance toward the 
Government have negatively impacted their relationships (Interviews 1, 6, 8, 18, 19, 27, 
30). The NGOs identified ways in which they believed their relationships have been 
negatively affected, of which four examples are highlighted below. 
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8.2.1 Lacking Donor Capacity  
 
Chapter Seven examined the inadvertent impacts of travel restrictions imposed by Australia 
and New Zealand on NGO representatives. In addition to these unintended consequences, 
several NGO representatives remarked that the travel restrictions have had even further 
indirect impacts. In particular they highlighted that New Zealand’s management of the 
travel bans and sanctions is affecting their engagement with local NGOs. 
 
Following the 2006 coup, directors from different Ministries and Departments in 
Wellington produced an official list of individuals banned from travelling to or through 
New Zealand. The responsibility of managing that list as well as reviewing and processing 
visa applications and appeals belongs to the NZHC office in Suva, Fiji, an administratively 
intensive task. In addition to standard tasks of the NZHC, the added burden of “identifying 
all the members of statutory boards was quite time consuming” (Interview 25, 13 October, 
2010) and was worsened further by having to cope with a number of natural disasters. 
Moreover, the NZHC has also been affected by the loss of three High Commission staff 
members, each declared persona non grata30 by the military regime and expelled from the 
country. As one NZAID representative explained, the NZHC staff have suffered from “very 
limited capacity in this office,” which, he added, has meant that “a lot of the things that 
should’ve been moved forward weren’t able to” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010).  
 
As the NZHC has continued to grapple with the loss of its staff members and the ensuing 
increased workload, NGOs expressed that it has seriously impacted NZAID’s ability to 
maintain relationships with local NGOs. Some NGOs were understanding of the situation, 
acknowledging that the sanctions “did require a lot more assessment of the people of the 
High Commission” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010) and that staff were “absolutely overrun in 
workload” (Interview 8, 25 June, 2010). Regardless, the lack of capacity and 
                                                 
30 Persona non grata is a legal term that indicates a foreign diplomat is no longer welcome in the receiving 
state. Fiji expelled Michael Green, the NZ High Commissioner in June 2007, Caroline McDonald, the NZ 
Acting High Commissioner in December 2008 and Todd Cleaver, the Acting Head of Mission in November 
2009.  
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communication from the NZAID staff over the last few years, attributable at least in part to 
the sanctions, has contributed to “strained relationships” (Interview 8, 25 June, 2010). 
 
A representative from another NGO, however, was less forgiving. According to him, 
decreased communication from NZAID, perhaps also a consequence of the more recent 
structural changes, could still be a result of “the fact that they are so under-staffed” 
(Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). Regardless, he noted, “they just don’t seem to be engaging 
with people that well.” In particular, he noted, NGOs that are not currently funded by 
NZAID “don’t have any idea what they fund or do anymore” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). 
8.2.2 Donor Selectivity 
 
In fragile political environments, civil society is often placed under an increasing amount of 
pressure to provide social services in addition to their roles as advocacy organisations 
(Dowst, 2009). For Fiji, a developing country facing recurrent political instability, donor 
representatives expressed a lack of confidence in the capacities of local NGOs to address 
the mounting social and political pressures. Although the donors claimed they were 
focusing increasingly on local NGOs, they acknowledged that they “often give [NGOs] a 
role that I think is far too big for what they can actually do” (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010) 
and that they were concerned with the capacities of the NGOs to undertake the amount of 
work that was expected of them (Interview 25, 13 October, 2010).  
 
For many local NGOs, this lack of confidence has become apparent in the perceived 
increase in donor selectivity of NGO partners. One NGO representative told me that she 
knew that despite having partnered with as many as 47 organisations in the past, AusAID is 
currently  “rationalising it down to six” (Interview 11, 24 June, 2010)31. The perception is 
similar with NZAID. According to one development practitioner, NZAID supports fewer 
NGOs through the CSS programme than when it first began (Interview 27, 27 September, 
2010).  
 
                                                 
31 Based on information provided by AusAID, however, in 2009/10 the donor provided funding to 21 civil 
society groups in Fiji (AusAID, personal communication, 2010). 
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When asked how they felt the donors were selecting the NGOs to partner with, a number of 
NGOs felt it was based on the organisations’ political leanings. For one NGO, despite 
having maintained a good relationship with AusAID, the representative believed they had 
been “blacklisted” by NZAID (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). For another NGO 
representative, it was clear that "funds have definitely been put in places where people are 
saying the appropriate things” adding that she knew “that is why New Zealand has not been 
approving of us because we haven't said the right things" (Interview 19, 22 June, 2010). As 
one development practitioner involved with a number of NGOs remarked, “the donors have 
continued to fund NGOs which they think are either anti-government … or neutral. I think 
they have been careful not to fund NGOs that are obviously pro-Government” (Interview 
29, 30 June, 2010). Additionally, as previously mentioned in Chapter Six, several NGOs 
were concerned with what they saw as donors intentionally selecting their domestic 
consultants and NGOs over local NGOs in Fiji for funding.  
 
For donors in Fiji, practicing caution in their NGO partnerships has been an unfortunate but 
necessary aspect of the current sanctions regime. One NZAID representative explained how 
as a donor they have continued to work with the NGOs with whom they have already 
established relationships, but have been increasingly “careful when funding terms expire, 
whether [NZAID] should continue supporting that particular NGO because of their stance 
[with the Fiji Government]” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010). The NZAID representative 
explained the difficult position they are in: 
Because of the sanctions, we have to choose [with] which NGOs we work. If 
they are pro-Government, we cannot support them. If they are in the middle, 
where they work with Government in some areas, and they don’t where 
Government policies are contrary to their focuses, we have to be careful with 
those NGOs … because their leaders, too, are seen as pro-Government 
(Interview 21, 29 June, 2010).  
 
Under the current sanctions regime, the donors expressed a need to be increasingly 
selective with which NGOs they partner. Increasingly, they noted that funding decisions 
were based on a lack of confidence in local NGO capacities as well as political 
associations. Despite the rhetorical commitments to strengthening local NGOs, the donors’ 
 110 
lack of support and trust has instead damaged relationships between local organisations and 
the donors. 
8.2.3 Visible Power Dynamics  
 
Imposing sanctions on Fiji has revealed the inherent power imbalance that exists between 
Fiji and its donors. However, the unequal power dynamics are manifested further in the 
relationships between NGOs and the donors. For a number of NGOs, this inequality has 
become apparent in their fear of being over reliant on and at the mercy of donors, forcing 
them to practice increasing self-censorship with their donors (Interview 13, 6 July, 2010; 
Interview 29, 30 June, 2010).  
 
Chapter Six noted that the increasing concern about consistent donor funding coupled with 
NGOs’ own fears of being too dependent on any single source of funding has made the 
NGOs realise the importance of diversifying their funding. As one NGO representative 
explained, “if suddenly the New Zealand Government makes some changes, we rely on 
them for funding. If they suddenly pull the strings, the [Fiji] Government doesn’t have 
money to give us to do all these projects” (Interview 7, 29 June, 2010). Increasingly the 
NGOs noted that they were currently looking for new (Interview 29, 30 June), local 
(Interview 7, 29 June, 2010) and long term donors “outside Australia and New Zealand” 
(Interview 15, 7 July, 2010).  
 
Reliance on donor funding becomes a serious issue when donors use their relative power 
over an NGO coercively. For one NGO, this had been a real problem. According to a 
representative from the NGO, after a statement made to the media about the military regime 
was misrepresented, the NGO was promptly reminded by the donor who it is that provides 
their funding. As the NGO explained, donor threats are subtle; they “won’t say, ‘We’re 
going to take your money away unless you change your stance,’ but they will remind you 
that they are giving you money” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). This was not the only time 
this donor has threatened withdrawal of funding to one of the local NGOs, the NGO 
representative added. However, she acknowledged that while it is not a “widespread or 
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massive” practice, it is, unfortunately, “very dangerous at a time like this” (Interview, 1, 15 
June, 2010). 
 
With donors admitting that they are hesitant to continue supporting NGOs seen as “pro-
Government” or “in the middle” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010), it is of little surprise that 
NGOs have been unwilling to criticise or share their true impressions of the donors’ 
policies. Instead, as one NGO explained, “we do our own self-censorship because we don’t 
want to be cut off” (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). As a result of this unwillingness to 
challenge donor attitudes, another NGO representative claimed that donors are not getting 
“a proper message” from the NGO community:  
They [the donors] are not hearing a broader message because no one will 
provide it to them because they have money to offer. I think that is what some 
of this aid is causing … It is reinforcing their thinking and not allowing them to 
think broader (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010).   
 
Not all NGOs agreed, however. One NGO representative argued that they have not 
withheld any information from their donors, but rather, the problem lies with “how they 
[the donors] are using that information” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010).  
 
While NGOs are expected to act as voices of criticism toward the Government, the power 
imbalance inherent in the donor-NGO relationship actually disenfranchises many NGOs 
from critiquing donor policies and practices. Where NGOs may have partially agreed with 
Government principles or actions or disagreed with donor country principles and actions, 
the NGOs face considerable pressure to keep quiet for fear of upsetting their funders. 
Rather than creating a robust and engaging civil society community, the complications that 
have emerged in the relationships between donors and NGOs have only proven to widen 
the gap between the donors and the recipients rather than unifying them as equal partners in 
development. 
8.3 Relationships between NGOs and Government of Fiji 
 
In addition to affecting the relationships between NGOs and donors, the sanctions are also 
having unfortunate impacts on the relationships between NGOs and the Government. For 
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many NGOs, this has left them feeling as though both the Government and the donors were 
pulling them in opposite directions. As one NGO put it, “partnering with one seems like 
disloyalty to the other!” (Interview 4, 23 June, 2010). At least six NGOs claimed that their 
relationship with the Government was indeed affected by their relationship with their 
donors (Interviews 1, 4, 6, 8, 18, 29). Detailed below are a number of ways in which NGO-
Government relationships have suffered as a result of sanctions. 
8.3.1 Restrictions on Partnering with the Government of Fiji 
 
Although donors have placed no explicit restrictions on NGOs, there are signs that donors 
are implicitly censuring NGOs from working closely with the Government. In particular, 
three examples show how some NGOs have felt their freedom to work, partner or 
communicate with the Government has been compromised.  
 
The first NGO described feeling forced to alter one of their programmes because of its 
association with the Government. A representative from the NGO explained that 
recognising that their policy of not engaging with the military after the coup had left them 
with no “friends within the military” which now “makes it very difficult” (Interview 6, 5 
July, 2010) to continue their work, they had designed a programme that would provide 
human rights and gender training to the military. However, after discussing the proposal 
with a partner NGO overseas, they were advised to alter the project proposal. The 
representative explained: 
We’ve had to actually amend the training, so we’re not saying that we are doing 
any work with military specifically. What we’ve said is that we are going to 
work with key decision makers. So we’ve had to change the language of it. The 
reason being is because [the donor] pulled out all its funding for the military, 
and they don’t want to be funding anything to do with the military. Even though 
we’re the ones who got the money and we’d be training them and we’d be 
developing … they don’t want to do that (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010).  
 
A second NGO representative discussed the potentially conflicting commitments for 
overseas volunteers working with local NGOs. For the NGO representative, problems arose 
in the past while serving as a volunteer for Australian Volunteers International (AVI). 
According to him: 
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[AusAID] had very strict limits as to who AVI volunteers could talk to. When I 
was first here I was liaising directly with the Permanent Secretary, and the 
Country Manager at the time cleared that for me to do it. We got a new Country 
Manager and all of a sudden it’s not o.k. any more. So, fortunately by that time 
the Permanent Secretary I’d been dealing with had moved on and because I’d 
gotten to know other staff in the department I was doing more work with the 
Director than with the Permanent Secretary. That was allowable (Interview 8, 
25 June, 2010). 
 
He pointed out that while the restrictions did not impact his job to a great extent, one 
“really had to watch where you went and who you talked to. And you were definitely not 
allowed to have any contact with Ministers.” The NGO representative recalled, in 
particular, when Bainimarama visited the organisation, complicating his role as both NGO 
staff member and AVI volunteer (Interview 8, 25 June, 2010).  
 
For the third NGO, since the 2006 coup, the organisation’s relationship with the 
Government has at times come under speculation by donors. As a representative explained, 
the NGO has received queries from more than one donor about the level of engagement 
they have had with the Government, with particular suspicion regarding their Memorandum 
of Understanding with two key ministries, as to how this may affect the NGOs neutrality 
(Interview 18, 9 July, 2010).  
8.3.2 Rising Government Suspicions 
 
As donors have been increasingly suspicious of NGOs engaging with the Government, the 
Government, too, has been distrustful of NGOs connected with outspoken donors. More 
specifically, the Government has been “suspicious of NGOs that are funded by AusAID 
and NZAID” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). For a number of NGOs, particularly advocacy 
organisations, whether or not the NGO shares the donors’ views, Government perceptions 
are critical. As one NGO explained, for them, it was very important not to be “perceived to 
be too close to them [the donors]” as the NGO is “trying to engage with the Government” 
(Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). Being perceived as a “lackey” or the “arm” of Australia and 
New Zealand, the representative added, is a serious concern for them. 
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Where aid was redirected through NGOs in a regime targeted by sanctions, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, Robinson (1995) illustrated that some recipient governments have retaliated 
against local NGOs. The likelihood that the Fiji Government could introduce devastating 
legislation, interfering in NGO funding mechanisms was a real and potential concern for at 
least two NGOs. With the almost absolute power contained by the military since the 
abrogation of the Constitution in 2009, one NGO was worried the Government would 
introduce “a new decree that any funding that comes to an NGO has to go through them” 
(Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). Fiji’s NGOs are only too familiar with the power of the 
Government to deregister NGOs under the Charitable Trust Act, as has happened in the 
past, albeit under the previous democratically elected Government. For one NGO 
representative, the organisation had already begun consulting donors and other NGOs about 
ways to continue to receive funding should this happen again (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
Another NGO representative noted similar concerns, saying “I don’t know whether they 
[the Government] have any say in cutting off our funds, but that is a perception that we 
have” (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). Fiji has been under a relatively constant state of Public 
Emergency Regulations (PER) since the abrogation. The PERs require all groups wishing 
to host a meeting or workshop to apply to the Government for a permit (Yabaki, 2011). 
This has been a particular challenge for NGOs the Government believes to be conspiring 
with or providing information to Australia or New Zealand and they have experienced 
regular delays or outright refusals for permits. As one NGO representative explained, 
maintaining a good relationship with the Government is vital:  
We do a lot of grassroots [work]; we run workshops, a lot of activities that 
now require permits. After the abrogation and the introduction of the PER, we 
need to ask the government for permits every day. With the [donor] funds we 
run about 100 community education workshops a year, and for every one we 
need a permit. Everything we do needs a permit. If we are seen as just being a 
mouthpiece of Australia-New Zealand in the community they may very well 
stop our permits (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). 
 
This fear of Government’s interference in NGO funding, however, was more a concern for 
advocacy NGOs, which recognised the uniquely precarious situation in which they work. 
As one development practitioner explained, “if you are an NGO that does social work or 
development, you don’t worry. You’re serving the community quietly, no involvement in 
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political issues” (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). The work of advocacy NGOs, however, is 
inherently political. As one NGO representative explained:  
If we’re an advocacy NGO we are more prominently in the political arena, 
that’s why [another NGO] is worried and so are we. If they see us as being too 
dependent on Australia and New Zealand then we are strident in terms of anti-
government [sic], then they can easily accuse us of being influenced (Interview 
29, 30 June, 2010). 
 
Another NGO representative agreed, noting that they are “accused constantly by the regime 
that we are pushing the New Zealand-Australia agenda” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). For 
NGOs doing both advocacy and service provision, it would seem advantageous to stress 
their former role over the latter. For one such NGO, the representative explained that they 
have chosen to shape their organisational strategy for future funding around this concern, 
with a distinct intention “to remain apolitical so there is no alignment to political issues” 
(Interview 16, 5 July, 2010).  
8.3.3 Re-building Relationships 
 
Increasingly NGOs are recognising that the stances taken by the donors are keeping them 
from engaging in credible dialogue with the Government. Instead of encouraging and 
enabling progress, donor sanctions have further isolated the Government. As one NGO 
representative noted, every time a donor attacks Fiji in the media, and vice versa, “it creates 
a bad atmosphere” and NGOs have to wait through a “settling down period before we can 
begin to engage” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). Regardless of how relatively symbolic it is, 
in reality, the sanctions regime in Fiji “creates bad blood here and creates more trouble for 
NGOs actually funded by these donors” (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010). Many of the NGOs 
and development practitioners interviewed agreed that it is time to move beyond the 
confines of policies that have encouraged disengagement and begin to re-build 
relationships.  
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Attempts to engage with the Government have taken a number of forms. One NGO 
attended consultations with the Government for the Universal Periodic Review32 (Interview 
1, 15 June, 2010); other NGOs have engaged in a number of processes promoting dialogue 
with the Government and other stakeholders. As previously mentioned, some NGOs have 
been involved in the Charter Process, although a number of organisations do not recognise 
the legitimacy of the Charter. A representative from one NGO that has chosen to take part 
in the Charter explained his reason for supporting the process as a form of engagement: 
As peace builders we are part of the process, we don’t stand outside. We work 
with the oppressors and the oppressed. For us, one of the most important things 
about being involved in the Charter is ensuring that there is a voice for 
marginalised people (Interview 19, 22 June, 2010). 
 
Importantly, the alternative dialogue processes are providing a space for formerly anti-
Government NGOs to engage in a way they feel has not been co-opted by the Government. 
According to a development practitioner, one NGO in particular that has been extremely 
anti-Government in the past “kept asking themselves, ‘Are we, by doing this [not 
engaging], are we becoming part of the problem?’” (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). Those 
NGOs that have been wary of engagement are now recognising that by not being involved 
in a process of dialogue, they are less likely to be able to “guide and influence” the 
Government (Interview 1, 15 June, 2010).  
 
Support from donors for engagement and dialogue varies. AusAID’s dialogue with the 
Government, a representative claimed, has been ongoing (Interview 20, 3 August, 2010). 
The European Delegation representative stated that the EU is very interested in engaging 
with the current government to bring elections forward, however, they “just don’t have the 
dialogue” which they blamed on “general difficulty” (Interview 23, 13 July, 2010). 
Dialogue between New Zealand and Fiji has been mostly limited to ministerial visits and 
the maintenance of a High Commission office. When asked if New Zealand has been 
involved with a particular alternative dialogue processes, the representative responded, “I 
don’t know anything about it” (Interviews 21, 29 June, 2010). A development practitioner, 
however, argued that the donor is indeed aware of the aforementioned dialogue process but 
                                                 
32 The Universal Periodic Review is a state-driven process that involves reviewing the human rights records 
of all UN Member States every four years.   
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“at the moment they are forbidden to support anything that would look like they are giving 
funding to the Government” as supporting the dialogue process “might be seen to be 
breaking their own sanctions” (Interview 27, 27 September, 2010). Importantly, though, 
interviews with several NGOs revealed that at least one donor has been covertly 
contributing to one of the alternative dialogue processes. 
 
In a time of instability and increased suspicion, NGOs are recognising the importance of 
maintaining or re-building relationships with the Government. Unfortunately, for a number 
of NGOs, donors are constraining NGO-Government relations both through implicit 
restrictions placed on NGOs as well as by rising Government suspicions toward NGOs 
receiving donor funding. In attempts to reengage with the Government, NGOs have 
initiated grassroots dialogue processes with uneven donor support. For many NGOs, donors 
appear to be putting their own concerns about maintaining symbolic sanctions ahead of 
engaging in a genuine process of dialogue to rebuild the deteriorated relationships with 
Government.  
8.4 Relationships Amongst NGOs 
 
The current environment in Fiji highlights the particular importance of inter-organisational 
as well as inter-personal relationships. Currently Fiji’s NGOs are finding it either 
advantageous or even necessary to exploit their relationships with other NGOs, both locally 
and overseas, as well as with particular individuals in the sector. 
8.4.1 Local NGO (Dis)Unity 
 
The split in Fiji’s NGO community that resulted following the 2006 coup (Naidu, 2007b; 
Yabaki, 2007), although diminished, remains as local NGOs compete for the increasingly 
selective donor funding. As one NZAID representative noted, while some NGOs receive a 
significant amount of donor support, others struggle, which has created “rivalry amongst 
the NGOs” (Interview 21, 29 June, 2010) as well as increased suspicion.  
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For several NGOs, heightened suspicion has been a result of increased donor selectivity in 
their funding decisions. Bolstered funding to NGOs that are “saying the appropriate things” 
(Interview 19, 22 June, 2010) has not gone unnoticed. For one NGO, when their funding 
quickly escalated in the wake of the coup, people in the community believed that their 
increased funding was a result of funding to other projects being pulled. The redirected 
funding, the representative explained, created “tension” and “animosity” between them and 
other NGOs and “meant that work that should’ve gone quite smoothly kind of dragged out 
a bit” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). In the end, it made it much more difficult for that NGO to 
work with their colleagues.  
 
Organisations receiving sustained and significant financial support from donors are a 
particular cause for suspicion among local NGOs. In addition to being financially secure, 
when those NGOs are also introverted and difficult to deal with, they make rebuilding the 
unity of the NGO community a constant challenge. One NGO in particular, according to a 
development practitioner, is well known for being “aloof”, not “mix[ing] with other NGOs” 
and being in general, “very difficult to engage” (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). The NGOs 
unwillingness to engage with other local organisations only further magnifies distrust 
within the NGO community. 
8.4.2 The Benefits of Overseas NGO Partners 
 
Although a number of the donors in Fiji have begun providing direct funding to local 
NGOs, partnerships with overseas NGOs was still extremely important, perhaps even more 
so currently. Partnerships with northern NGOs are extremely valuable for a number of 
reasons, although two particular reasons were highlighted. According to the NGOs, 
partnering with overseas NGOs provided increased access to both funding and information. 
Establishing partnerships with overseas NGOs has meant, for some NGOs, more steady 
flows of funding. For one NGO, their partnership with a NZNGO was particularly 
beneficial when changes to the New Zealand aid programme were announced. A 
representative from the NGO explained: 
One of the positive things for us this year, because we have [NZNGO] as our 
partner in New Zealand, and they get the funds from NZAID, they were able to 
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assess about two years ago if the situation was going to come to a head. So last 
year they applied for more funding. They applied for two years of funding and 
as a result of that, that has buffered us for an extra year (Interview 6, 5 July, 
2010). 
 
Had they not been in an established partnership with the NZNGO, they could have faced 
similar problems with their NZAID funding, similar to other NGOs, including “funding 
that was supposed to have ended in December this year, on the first of July they were told 
that it is no longer available” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
 
Partnership with a European NGO was seen not as a benefit for accessing EU funding, but 
rather a prerequisite. Among the 19 NGOs interviewed, only one organisation was known 
to be currently receiving EU funding. While that NGO recognised that they are the only 
local organisation receiving EU funding, they acknowledged that they “get that through 
[their overseas NGO] partners”33. For local NGOs not in an established partnership with a 
European NGO, the “conditions” and “forms” involved in applying for funding are so time 
consuming that “a lot of NGOs have given up” (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). A 
representative from another NGO agreed, noting that applying for EU funding “requires a 
level of expertise” they associate with being in a partnership with a European NGO 
(Interview 19, 22 June, 2010). Local NGOs trying to build those relationships with 
European NGOs have found it particularly challenging to do so since the European Centre 
on Pacific of Pacific Issues (ECSIEP) closed in 2007 (Interview 29, 30 June, 2010). 
 
In addition to having greater access to funding sources, relationships with overseas NGOs 
also provide local NGOs with greater access to information, earlier than other 
organisations. For example, NGOs in partnerships with Australian and New Zealand NGOs 
were more familiar with the changes to New Zealand’s aid programme since 2008. As one 
NGO representative noted, “before [NZAID] told me, I also had correspondence from 
[AusNGO] from a press release before it came out here” (Interview 2, 15 June, 2010). 
Another NGO explained how they, too, have benefitted from shared information from a 
partner NGO:  
                                                 
33 The interview code for this NGO has been withheld to maintain confidentiality. 
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I think that is one of the benefits of the partnership with [NZNGO]. We are not 
in New Zealand. There are so many changes going on at MFAT that we can’t 
keep up with. Really, you need someone to be based there, and we don’t. That 
is why I think we will continue to work with [NZNGO], that gives us sort of an 
edge (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
 
The NGO discussed in section 8.3.1 that felt forced to amend their programme proposal 
expressed that it was precisely because of their partnership with an overseas NGO that they 
were consulted in advance on how to word and amend the proposal to be more “sensitive or 
palatable to the [donor country] Government” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). For the NGO, an 
overseas NGO partner acts as “middle person mediating these changes and informing 
[them] how to move forward” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010), which is a very important benefit 
to receiving their funding through an overseas NGO, rather than from the donor directly.  
8.4.3 The Importance of Inter-Personal Relationships 
 
As Fiji’s political impasse continues to take a toll on official relationships between the 
NGOs and donors, interpersonal relationships have taken on an important role in 
maintaining open lines of communication between donors and the NGOs. Where official 
relationships have suffered, maintaining familiar and relatable professional or social 
relationships with donors has been the most effective means of staying up-to-date with the 
donors.  
 
As previously discussed, the NZHC office has faced significant issues regarding capacity. 
Despite these challenges, for NGOs, the staff continuity and familiarity has been critical for 
maintaining a relationship with the donor. The ability to communicate with the same person 
over time, as one NGO highlighted, was extremely important:  
I’ve always had a great relationship with [donor staff member 1]. I could ring 
him at any time and talk about anything. He went out of his way to do extra for 
me. Since they changed their focus, for example, I never even got to meet 
[donor staff member 2], but because I’ve got a good relationship with [donor 
staff member 3] who stays here there’s that bit of continuity (Interview 11, 24 
June, 2010). 
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Equally important for some NGOs is the ability to relate culturally and professionally to 
donor staff. For one NGO representative, this specifically meant seeing more Pacific 
Islanders in donor field offices. One donor, the representative explained, employed very 
few Pacific Islanders, and for her this contributed to a strained relationship. The 
representative explained how she “couldn’t really relate to them. And it was actually quite 
difficult explaining things to them” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). Over time, the 
representative admitted, this donor has hired more local staff. For her, seeing “people who 
look like you when you go up there to talk to them about your project” has meant that she 
feels like the staff will be able to relate to her organisation’s needs and concerns. This has 
also meant dealing with donor staff with a background in and understanding of the NGO 
sector (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). 
 
Like any other sector, personal relationships are formed both during as well as after 
working hours. For some NGOs, social occasions provided a valuable opportunity to 
network and gain information from donors, their staff and other organisations. Talking 
about one donor staff member, one NGO representative exclaimed, “Thank god we saw 
each other socially, because we were able to talk. Otherwise, you’re right, we never 
actually would know what was going on there” (Interview 6, 5 July, 2010). However, other 
organisations, either out of principle or lack of time, do not take part in this type or 
relationship building. Expressing his disdain at the necessity of such relationship building, 
a representative from another NGO proffered up a possible reason for being out of touch 
with some donors: “Maybe part of it is because I don’t do the cocktail rounds, I don’t do 
the selling. So we miss a certain conversation” (Interview 19, 22 June, 2010). 
 
It could likely be argued that small aid environments tend to be extremely competitive as 
there are fewer resources, while the number of NGOs, globally, has grown rapidly. For 
NGOs in Fiji, perceived donor selectivity based on political leanings and activities has led 
to increasing suspicion among NGOs. With communication between donors and NGOs 
lagging, NGOs are forced to rely on their partnerships with overseas NGOs as well as 
personal relationships. Rather than encouraging collaboration during a period of insecurity, 
donors are further widening a gap that already exists among several local NGOs in Fiji.  
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8.5 Summary 
 
In times of crisis, relationships are tested. For Fiji’s NGOs, beyond the impacts on funding 
and through the travel bans, sanctions have affected the relationships between NGOs and 
their donors, the Government and other NGOs. There is no particular pattern in how the 
various NGOs have been affected. Rather what is important is the recognition that sanctions 
have both explicit as well as implicit implications for NGOs. They can provide some NGOs 
with increased donor funding, thus strengthening their relationship with that donor. 
However, they can also heighten government suspicion as well as that of other NGOs, 
proving potentially devastating for NGOs in an unstable environment. Despite the difficulty 
involved in assessing the impacts of sanctions on relationships, donors have an obligation 
to acknowledge that sanctions have impacts that reach beyond their initial intentions.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
How do we change? You will not talk to me if you come in and I give you a slap 
on your face. You won’t even look at me. But if I talk to you and tell you nicely 
that those things you did were not nice, you will listen to me and probably 
change your ways. You will not bad mouth me. That is the logic we are using. 
            
           Interview 3, 12 July, 2010 
9.1 Introduction 
 
For six weeks in 2010 I had the opportunity to meet and speak with a number of people 
throughout Fiji to discuss how sanctions imposed by Australia, New Zealand and the 
European Union have directly and indirectly affected the local NGO community. This 
thesis has presented the results of this research. It has aimed to address sanctions through 
the lens of aid and development, rather than through a lens of international relations or 
political science. In order to contextualise the links between sanctions and NGOs the first 
part of the thesis examined the literature surrounding aid and conditionality, the evolution 
of sanctions over time and the role of civil society and NGOs in development, focusing 
specifically on fragile or failing environments.  
 
The second part of the thesis localised the aforementioned debates, focusing specifically on 
Fiji. This section provided background information on Fiji’s political and aid history and 
included a discussion on the history of Fiji’s civil society, examining the role both global 
and local shifts have had in shaping this community today. The third and final part of this 
thesis presented the results of interviews conducted with 30 participants, representing local 
NGOs, donor agencies from Australia, New Zealand and the European Union as well as 
development practitioners involved in or familiar with Fiji’s aid and NGO sectors. This 
section summarised participants’ views and experiences of the impacts that sanctions have 
had on NGOs’ funding, their freedom to travel and their relationships with their various 
partners. 
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In this concluding chapter I discuss some of the limitations identified during my research 
and provide some suggestions for future research. Most importantly, though, this chapter 
attempts to tie together the results presented in Chapters Six through Eight with the greater 
theoretical and academic debates on conditioned aid, sanctions and the importance of 
“relationship building as a development end rather than just a means” (Overton & Storey, 
2004). 
9.2 Limitations and Further Research Possibilities 
 
This research has aimed to include a wide variety of representatives from both Fiji and the 
donor countries. Despite these efforts, the results of the analysis were nevertheless limited 
to the comments made by the relatively small group of local NGOs that took part in the 
research. Based on Mohanty’s (2008, p. v) directory of civil society organisations, there are 
approximately 650 non-state actors in Fiji. The 19 NGOs interviewed for the purpose of 
this thesis thus represented a very small and select proportion of Fiji’s wider civil society 
and NGO community. The organisations that took part were primarily well known NGOs 
and were either currently or previously in an active partnership with the Australian, New 
Zealand or European donor agencies. While some were located outside the capital city, the 
majority were based in Suva. The methods of identification used excluded a large number 
of other NGOs, community based and grassroots organisations, particularly those not 
regularly counted in the ‘aid chain’. Despite their absence from this research, I recognise 
these organisations as extremely important members of Fiji’s civil society and development 
sector.  
 
It is important here to recognise again my positionality as a vulagi, a foreigner, in Fiji as a 
potential limitation. My role as an outsider may have potentially constrained my access to 
some participants as well as my understanding of cultural nuances. It is equally important, 
though, to recognise that it may be because of my outsider status that I was able to access 
some participants. Civil society, including NGOs, is a very Western concept, and as such, 
most of those interviewed were likely educated in a Western style educational institution or 
are educated ex-patriots. Many of them would have had experience with researchers before 
or they themselves have conducted research.  
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In addition to expanding this research to include the impacts on other NGOs as well as 
community-based and grassroots organisations, a few suggestions for future research can be 
garnered from this research. Foremost, the findings acknowledge my assertion that further 
research on the impacts of sanctions on civil society is warranted. There exists a significant 
gap in the contemporary sanctions literature ignoring the role of and impacts on civil 
society organisations under a sanctions regime.  
 
My final suggestion for further research emerged from an issue highlighted by almost all 
NGOs interviewed. Following the election of a National-led government in New Zealand, a 
number of changes have been made to New Zealand’s aid programme. For a number of 
NGOs in Fiji, these changes have had significant implications for them. The most important 
change has been a shift in the overall focus of the New Zealand Aid Programme (NZAP – 
formerly NZAID) from ‘poverty alleviation’ to ‘sustainable economic growth’. Since the 
changes, at least two NGOs interviewed have had long term funding agreements cancelled 
with little notice (Interviews 5, 13 July, 2010; Interview 15, 7 July, 2010). Other NGOs 
expressed considerable concern about how the changes will affect both the focus of their 
future activities as well as their respect for the NZAP as a forward-thinking aid agency. An 
evaluation of how New Zealand’s wider policy changes are affecting the operations of 
NGOs in Fiji is required, as at times they appeared to overshadow the effects of sanctions. 
In general, a greater understanding is needed on how domestic policy changes within a 
donor country can and does impact development NGOs in aid recipient countries. 
9.3 A Review of the Impacts of Sanctions on NGOs in Fiji 
 
The main findings of this thesis were that sanctions have indeed had serious and unintended 
impacts on Fiji’s NGO community. These impacts have been experienced both directly as 
well as indirectly. While NGOs are divided as to whether or not the community as a whole 
is benefitting or suffering, a number of NGOs noted that they are increasingly seeking to 
diversify their donor pool, looking for alternative sources of funding. Despite donors’ 
claims of reorienting the aid programmes toward civil society organisations, some NGOs 
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have had their funding cut as a result of donors recalling funding to particular sectors, such 
as law and justice. 
 
Although in some cases donors have restricted large portions of their aid programmes, 
sanctions imposed by donors in Fiji have been primarily non-financial and admittedly 
symbolic. As targeted, smart sanctions, they have included a range of alternative punitive 
measures such as travel restrictions, arms embargoes, the suspension of ministerial contact, 
bans on sporting team visits, travel warnings as well as several public statements regarding 
donors’ retention of sanctions on Fiji. For NGOs in Fiji, the travel restrictions have been 
more than simply a symbolic gesture of the donor countries’ disapproval; several NGO 
staff members have, however inadvertently, been captured by the travel bans imposed by 
Australia and New Zealand.  
 
More implicitly, though, the sanctions are having indirect impacts on the relationships 
between the NGOs and their donors, the Government of Fiji and with other NGOs. While 
some NGOs believed that their relationships with their donors have been strengthened, a 
number of organisations acknowledged that in the last few years, relationships with their 
donors have become estranged. For some donors this has been a result of lacking capacity 
in their field offices, for others it is a result of the difficulty associated with applying for 
and receiving funding under the limited funding schemes available to NGOs. Despite 
Australia, New Zealand and the EU’s supposed embrace of civil society as a key partner in 
development in the current environment, the strained relationships has served as a further 
push for a number of NGOs to actively pursuing alternative funding sources.  
 
The resultant strained relationships stem from Fijian NGOs recognising a needs for change 
in the policies of disengagement, which they perceive donors to be ignoring. For the NGOs, 
Fiji is their home, their country and, for the time being, their Government. They do not 
have the option of withdrawing their staff, severing contact with the Government or, sadly 
under the current administration, issuing critical public statements about the Government. 
In fact, those NGOs most closely aligned with these donors have experienced such 
heightened suspicion from the Government that a number of organisations are actively 
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downplaying their associations with these donors. Suspicion and tension among NGOs, too, 
has increased, as a number of NGOs see organisations receiving bolstered levels of funding 
coincidentally voicing the sentiments of their donors, while others attempting to engage 
with the Government feel they have been ‘blacklisted’ by donors. 
 
It is important to note that the impacts have not been solely detrimental. A few NGOs have 
indeed managed to sustain or increase their funding levels from their donors, which they 
believed has in turn strengthened their relationships with their donors. Additionally, for 
many of the local organisations, adversity has served as a catalyst for cooperation in a 
community previously starkly divided between those supporting and those refusing to 
engage with the interim Government. Whereas the donors have suspended high-level 
ministerial contact, a number of NGOs have come together for the sake of open dialogue in 
an attempt to move beyond the mentality of disengagement. 
9.4 Why Include NGOs in the Sanctions Debates? 
 
Sanctions are a tool of political conditionality often used in fragile or failing states, or states 
in which the ruling group are committing actions the international community deem 
unacceptable. Over time the motivations and methods of sanctions have evolved. As much 
of the literature has pointed out, sanctions are often ineffective in achieving their intended 
objective (Doxey, 1971; Pape, 1997) and have relied inherently on making innocent 
civilians suffer to the point they demand reform (Galtung, 1967; Weiss, et al., 1997). This 
realisation has been the driving force behind the development of more targeted smart 
sanctions.  
 
Influenced by the emergence of neoliberal thinking, NGOs in the past were ascribed 
particularly significant roles as service providers. More recently though, with a growing 
focus in development on good governance and aid effectiveness, NGOs are increasingly 
taking a backseat to central governments as central partners in development. This 
paradigmatic shift in development has helped to shape the role of civil society and NGOs as 
the complementary and ‘alternative’ channel for aid provision, primarily when a 
government is considered unfit to manage its own development (Leader & Colenso, 2005; 
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OECD, 2009; Robinson, 1994). In the long term, however, NGOs are still viewed by 
donors as “a less-than-optimal solution” for service provision (OECD, 2008b, p. 34). It is 
only in times of fragility or state instability that NGOs take on a role as the donor’s primary 
partner in development.  
 
The wider academic and policy literature on aid recognises the role NGOs play in 
development, especially in times of state fragility. There exists, however, a gap particularly 
in the sanctions literature regarding the impacts of sanctions on NGOs. While NGOs are 
acknowledged as valuable development partners when a government is no longer a credible 
conduit for development assistance, little research has been conducted on exactly how 
NGOs experience sanctions. Although some recognition emerged in the late 1990s 
regarding the impacts of aid conditionality and sanctions on NGOs (Robinson, 1995; 
Weiss, et al., 1997), this discussion has yet to be updated.  
 
What this research contributes to the wider examination of the implications of sanctions is 
that NGOs face both explicit and implicit impacts under a sanctions regime. More 
importantly, though, these impacts are uneven, unintended and often unacknowledged. In 
theory, sanctions, even smart ones, may intend to strengthen the ties between donors and 
local civil society actors, however, in practice, these relations are not marked by long term 
respect. Instead, under a sanctions regime, donors can and often do utilise these 
relationships for political purposes. This recognition challenges the role of donors as 
reliable and genuine partners for development. 
9.5 Final Remarks 
 
This thesis began as an endeavour to uncover the tangible impacts sanctions can have on a 
community often viewed as simply an alternative to normal development interaction. What 
I discovered, however, was that these impacts might not always be tangible or immediately 
apparent. The impacts of sanctions can begin as subtle and selective, however, the severity 
grows unintentionally beyond its original boundaries. While smarter sanctions are 
unquestionably more humanitarian than conventional sanctions, it remains that a 
comprehensive understanding of the impacts of sanctions has yet to be fully studied. It is 
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important that the community seen as the alternative partner in development in times of 
instability be safeguarded against the unwarranted and unintentional repercussions of 
sanctions as policies of statecraft. 
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Figure A.1 - ODA/GNI in 2009 
 
 
  Source: OECD, 2010 
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Figure A.2 ODA to Fiji, all commitments (Current USD millions), 1970 – 2009 
 
 
Source: oecd.stats.org, 2011 
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Table A.1 - Total Bilateral Aid to Fiji, Current Prices in US$ millions, 1960-2009 
 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.1 0.12 1.53 1.79 0.85 1.2 0.66 2.36 4.53 4.14 3.59 
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.1 
Korea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
New Zealand .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.96 1.79 1.53 4.29 7.25 
United Kingdom 1.08 0.98 10.81 4.39 3.39 4.3 3.9 2.52 4.11 6.5 5.64 7.77 4.71 8.26 6.61 7.23 8.48 
United States .. .. .. .. .. 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.51 .. .. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EU Institutions .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.15 0.69 
Taiwan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Australia 5.1 8.67 10.34 11.2 11.57 15.56 9.57 9.94 10.03 13.75 11.32 19.76 18.68 19.37 20.54 24.61 15.15 
France .. .. .. 0.15 0.29 0.28 0.2 0.48 .. 0.6 1.93 10.21 2.17 2.57 1.65 1.35 1.17 
Japan 0.26 0.64 0.52 3.23 2.09 3.21 2.05 3.44 8.15 10.98 10.34 9.07 7.54 9 8.23 16.26 20.3 
Korea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.01 .. 0.19 0.23 0.24 
New Zealand 3.88 4.09 5.76 4.12 3.43 2.95 3.51 3.39 3.39 2.27 3.82 1.81 2.68 6.19 2.8 5.84 7.34 
United Kingdom 8.79 8.94 7.28 9.53 8.08 3.14 2.91 1.67 1.81 1.57 0.87 0.48 1.75 2.08 2.74 1.97 2.24 
United States 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 
EU Institutions 1.71 0.38 3.15 2.26 6.76 2.35 6.41 4.31 3.6 6.8 1.4 2.7 1.7 2.9 1.39 5.25 6.64 
Taiwan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.07 0.17 0.45 1.19 0.82 0.86 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
Australia 15.77 13.97 12.54 13.9 11.16 11.01 10.71 8.52 8.64 12.93 15.77 20.46 21.87 18.61 18.31 20.07  
France 1.35 0.82 1.21 1.03 0.56 1.15 0.69 0.61 0.75 0.83 1.72 1.02 1.29 1.11 0.97 -0.68  
Japan 11.21 13.87 18.59 16.94 19.23 20.87 15.07 12.73 18.74 24.79 14.15 12.59 7.98 5.75 6.31 23.23  
Korea 0.32 0.52 0.71 0.8 0.33 0.35 0.23 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.42 0.33 1.13 1.45 1.8 1.25  
New Zealand 3.31 6.63 6.64 5.41 4.41 4.75 2.06 1.83 2.8 2.7 2.76 3.47 5.92 3.64 3.85 3.33  
United Kingdom -0.15 1.15 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 0.64 0.75 0.58  
United States 1 2 1 1 0.21 .. .. 0.01 0.1 0.93 1.62 0.94 1.34 1.21 1.27 1.94  
EU Institutions 1.75 -0.76 2.9 2.26 -0.85 -7.2 -2.8 -1.26 -0.77 4.01 21.88 19.77 8.96 10.74 6.03 12.8  
Taiwan 0.78 0.88 1 .. 0.02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  
Source: OECD, 2011 
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Table A.2 Aid by Donors, 1996-2010, F$ million 
 
Donor 
1996 
Actual  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2009 
Revised 
2010 
Budget 
Australia 15.20 15.00 15.20 11.40 4.00 4.56 6.80 12.50 12.50 16.90 17.43 21.88 20.90 16.30 21.70 
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
China 0.50 0.50 0.00 17.50 2.75 6.25 2.75 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.41 17.85 17.30 11.80 9.30 
EU 20.50 11.30 1.10 2.30 2.20 3.31 12.84 22.20 22.20 27.82 8.39 24.00 17.40 25.90 20.30 
France 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Japan 7.50 6.20 6.30 1.10 3.20 4.00 4.80 8.20 8.20 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00 3.00 
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.30 0.40 
New Zealand 5.10 5.10 5.10 2.60 0.09 0.62 0.86 0.40 0.40 1.90 2.61 0.83 2.90 1.70 9.60 
UNDP 1.20 0.90 1.20 0.10 0.25 2.12 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.80 1.40 1.20 0.60 
Others 2.70 2.50 2.10 0.30 0.80 0.80 1.60 2.59 2.59 2.40 6.75 2.07 4.30 3.90 8.90 
Total 54.70 43.40 33.80 35.30 13.60 22.14 30.35 45.94 45.94 50.44 36.60 67.43 64.20 77.10 73.80 
Comprising                
Cash 7.30 9.60 2.64 1.70 1.10 0.46 0.27 1.97 3.40 4.38 6.40 3.5 12.60 5.40 8.90 
Aid in Kind 47.40 33.80 31.16 33.60 12.50 21.68 30.08 43.97 42.54 46.06 30.20 63.93 51.60 71.70 64.90 
Source: Ministry of Finance and National Planning Supplement to the Budget Address: 1996 – 2010 
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Table A.3  United States Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) Fiji, CY2004-2009 
 
Agency Appropriation Symbol and Name Source CY2004 CY2005 
Department of Commerce     
 13x1450 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Operations, Research and Facilities COA DOC National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration   
    Department of Commerce Sub-Total   
Department of Health and Human Services     
 75x0943 Disease Control, Research, and Training, Centers for Disease Control CDI CDC Global Immunization Program   
    Department of Health and Human Services Sub-Total   
Department of Justice      
 15x0700 Salaries and Expenses, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives DOJ DOJ Department of Justice   
    Department of Justice Sub-Total   
Department of State      
 72x1037 Economic Support Fund SAP State East Asia and Pacific 100  
 72x1037 Economic Support Fund SDH State Democracy and Human Rights 50  
 72x1037 Economic Support Fund SOE State Oceans, Environment and Science   
 19x0209 Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Department of State SAF State Ambassador Fund   
 11x1022 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement SGT State - Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons   
    Department of State Sub-Total 150  
Department of the Interior     
 14x1652 Multinational Species Conservation Fund, United States Fish and Wildlife Service IFW Interior Fish and Wildlife Service   
    Department of the Interior Sub-Total   
Peace Corps      
 11x0100 Peace Corps PCO Peace Corps 1,439 944 
    Peace Corps Sub-Total 1,439 944 
U.S. Agency for International Development     
 72x1035 International Disaster and Famine Assistance UEI USAID Phoenix (EIS) Data 25  
    U.S. Agency for International Development Sub-Total 25  
  ODA Total   1,614 944 
Source: USAID, 2010 
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Table A.4 Aggregate View of Australian ODA through NGOs in Fiji, 1992 – 2004 
 
  1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
ANCP   $315,433 $210,335 $224,503 $131,234 $57,340  $85,648 $57,131 $29,407 $171,752 $164,181 
Country 
Program 
Aust 
NGOs 
$154,400 $279,400 $150,000 $14,000 $208,000 $188,920 $2,954  $517,940 $9,903 $631,045  
 
Non-Aust 
NGOs 
 $81,864 $789,332 $365,769 $610,748 $107,851  $316,313 $733,367 $725,169   
Regional 
Program 
   $295,000     $400,139     
DAP 
Aust 
NGOs 
   $10,266        $50,819 
 
Non-Aust 
NGOs 
 $159,993 $159,997 $149,000 $15,525 $112,981  $18,636 $20,309 $9,370 $133,083  
Emergency/ 
Humanitarian 
Relief 
Aust 
NGOs 
$16,400  $2,368          
 
Non-Aust 
NGOs 
$50,000          $696,196  
WID SGS 
Aust 
NGOs 
  $40,000          
 
Non-Aust 
NGOs 
            
Volunteer 
Programs 
     $304,999 $301,583     $342,167 $1,043,400 
PAIDS  $20,000 $30,032 $18,705   $20,000     $9,675  
TOTAL  $240,800 $866,722 $1,665,737 $763,538 $1,270,506 $788,675 $2,954 $820,736 $1,328,747 $773,849 $1,983,918 $1,258,400 
Source: AusAID-NGO Cooperation Statistics, 1992-2004 
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Table A.5  Total NZ ODA to Fiji, Amount and Percentage to Fijian NGOs, 2001-2010 ($NZ '000) 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 TOTAL 
Amount directly to Fiji 
CSOs/NGOs 486.73 560.18 664.60 659.43 
1,275.1
5 594.78 
1,374.6
5 759.04 
1,721.9
5 8,096.51 
 16.6% 21.3% 29.9% 28.7% 15.7% 16.5% 43.5% 15.5% 29.8% 22.7% 
           
Head of Mission Fund 15.36 8.69 8.16 13.80 19.57 1.40 39.09 20.62 7.68 134.37 
Te Kakano Fund 350.74 402.38 250.21 116.88 953.7 - 196.80 37.66 - 2,308.37 
Total NZ ODA  2,934.62 
2,631.7
3 
2,224.6
2 
2,301.6
6 
8,127.8
8 
3,599.4
9 
3,159.0
9 
4,895.2
2 
5,787.2
6 
35,661.5
7 
Source: NZAID, personal communication, 2010 
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Table A.6 Sanctions Measures and Mechanisms by Country 
 
 
Australia
+
 
 
Autonomous 
Sanctions Bill 
 
 
 Travel Restrictions against coup-leaders and high profile supporters, 
interim government Ministers, ranking Fiji Military (RFMF) officers, 
and to their families 
 Travel Restrictions against other RFMF members, interim government-
appointed senior public servants, and to other interim government 
appointees including to the judiciary, but not to their families 
 Arms embargo 
 Suspension of ministerial contact with members of the interim 
Government 
 
Source: Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010 
 
New Zealand
‡
 
 
Cabinet Decision 
 
 
 Cessation of Ministerial level contact with Fiji, except for dialogue or 
mediation purposes; 
 Bans on travel to, or transit through, New Zealand by all RFMF 
personnel, persons appointed to the post-coup administration, prominent 
coup supporters, and the families of people in these categories; 
 Exclusion of Fiji from countries eligible to participate in the new 
regional work scheme for the Pacific; 
 Exclusion of Fijians from participation in other seasonal work schemes; 
 Suspension of Fiji’s eligibility for Pacific Access Category immigration 
ballots; 
 Immediate cessation of all training, exercises, and study for RFMF 
personnel in New Zealand, with a requirement to leave the country 
forthwith; 
 Bans on visits by Fiji sports teams, except where international and legal 
obligations required; 
 A freeze on new development assistance initiatives with the government 
in Fiji and a review of current activities; 
 Reviews of specific assistance programmes (e.g. to the Elections 
Office); 
 Discontinuation of new study and training awards; and 
 Efforts to bring pressure on the coup-makers through regional and 
international organisations. 
 
Source: Interview 25, 13 October, 2010 
 
European Union
*
 
 
Article 96; Cotonou 
Agreement 
 
 
 Suspension of 9th and 10th EDF funded projects 
 Suspension of Sugar Protocol 
 
 
Source: Council of the European Union, 2007; Interview 23, 13 July, 2010 
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APPENDIX II – ETHICS FORMS 
 
 
NGO Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title of project:  The Impact of Aid Sanctions on a Developing Country’s Civil Society: a case study of Fiji 
 
Ni sa bula vinaka. My name is Morgan Hanks and I am a Master of Development Studies student at Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand. As part of my degree I am writing a thesis on the impact of aid sanctions on civil society 
organisations in Fiji.  
 
I would like to invite you, as a representative of a Fijian NGO, to participate in an interview in which you will be able to 
share your experiences and stories of how any fluctuations in funding due to sanctions being imposed on Fiji’s aid have 
impacted your organisation. I am interested in both the direct and indirect ways this has affected your organisation’s work. 
I am also interested in what methods your organisation has chosen to adapt to the current political atmosphere in Fiji’s 
development sector. 
 
The discussion we have will be structured around questions I have prepared in relation to this topic. 
 
Victoria University requires all students conducting research with people to undergo ethics assessment and approval. As 
part of this process there are several things that you need to be aware of before you consent to participate in this research: 
  
 With your permission I will tape interviews. Written and electronically recorded material made during the interview 
will be safely stored and will only be seen by my supervisor and myself. The researcher will take all necessary steps to 
keep interview information safe during time in the field. 
 
 All interview materials will be destroyed upon completion of the thesis. 
 
 It will be your decision as to whether you and your organisation will be identified or will remain confidential in the 
published thesis.  
 
 As a participant, you do not have to answer all questions. 
 
 If you agree to take part in the interview you are free to withdraw at any stage without having to give a reason. 
 
 You are free to withdraw any information you have provided before data collection and analysis of the research is 
complete on 1 December 2010. 
 
 Following our discussions you will have an opportunity to review the information that you provided prior to it being 
used in the published thesis.  
 
 
Upon completion of my thesis, a copy will be lodged in the Victoria University library and a summary of findings will be 
made available to you, if this is of interest. The research may also be published in academic or professional journals 
and/or disseminated at academic or professional conferences as the opportunity arises. 
 
I hope you will agree to participate in this research and I look forward to speaking with you soon. 
 
 
Vinaka Vakalevu, 
 
 
Morgan Hanks        Professor John Overton (Supervisor) 
hanksmorg@myvuw.ac.nz     John.Overton@vuw.ac.nz 
Fiji mobile: 912.1738 
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Donor Agency Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title of project:  The Impact of Aid Sanctions on a Developing Country’s Civil Society: a case study of Fiji 
 
My name is Morgan Hanks and I am a Master of Development Studies student at Victoria University of Wellington, New 
Zealand. As part of my degree I am writing a thesis on the impact of aid sanctions on civil society organisations in Fiji. I 
will be conducting interviews with representatives of Fijian NGOs to understand their views and experiences on how 
sanctions imposed on Fiji’s aid have affected their organisation. I am also interested in what methods these organisations 
have chosen to adapt to the current political atmosphere in Fiji’s development sector. 
 
In order to provide a comparison I would also like to talk to you about the same issues as well as your donor agency’s 
reactions following the coups and its relationships with Fijian NGOs. The discussion we have will be structured around 
questions I have prepared in relation to this topic. 
 
Victoria University requires all students conducting research with people to undergo ethics assessment and approval. As 
part of this process there are several things that you need to be aware of before you consent to participate in this research: 
  
 You will be one of only a few people that I interview from donor agencies. Nothing you say will be attributed to you 
personally, however I will list the roles of those I interview. Therefore I cannot guarantee you will remain confidential 
despite the fact that I will not use your name.  
 
 With your permission I will tape interviews. Written and electronically recorded material made during the interview 
will be safely stored and will only be seen by my supervisor and myself. The researcher will take all necessary steps to 
keep interview information safe during time in the field. 
 
 All interview materials will be destroyed upon completion of the thesis. 
 
 It will be your decision as to whether you and your organisation will be identified or will remain confidential in the 
published thesis.  
 
 As a participant, you do not have to answer all questions. 
 
 If you agree to take part in the interview you are free to withdraw at any stage without having to give a reason. 
 
 You are free to withdraw any information you have provided before data collection and analysis of the research in 
complete on 1 December 2010. 
 
 Following our discussions you will have an opportunity to review the information that you provided prior to it being 
used in the published thesis.  
 
Upon completion of my thesis, a copy will be lodged in the Victoria University library and a summary of findings will be 
made available to you, if this is of interest. The research may also be published in academic or professional journals 
and/or disseminated at academic or professional conferences as the opportunity arises. 
 
I hope you will agree to participate in this research and I look forward to speaking with you soon. 
 
 
 
Thank you, 
 
 
Morgan Hanks       Professor John Overton (Supervisor) 
hanksmorg@myvuw.ac.nz    John.Overton@vuw.ac.nz 
Fiji mobile: 912.1738 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title of project:  The Impact of Aid Sanctions on a Developing Country’s Civil Society: a case study of Fiji 
 
Ni sa bula vinaka. My name is Morgan Hanks and I am a Master of Development Studies student at Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand. As part of my degree I am writing a thesis on the impact of aid sanctions on civil society 
organisations in Fiji.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in an interview in which you will be able to share your experiences and stories of 
how any fluctuations in funding due to sanctions being imposed on Fiji’s aid have impacted local civil society 
organisations. I am interested in both the direct and indirect ways this has affected local CSO’s work. I am also interested 
in what methods these organisations have chosen to adapt to the current political atmosphere in Fiji’s development sector. 
 
The discussion we have will be structured around questions I have prepared in relation to this topic. 
 
Victoria University requires all students conducting research with people to undergo ethics assessment and approval. As 
part of this process there are several things that you need to be aware of before you consent to participate in this research: 
  
 With your permission I will tape interviews. Written and electronically recorded material made during the interview 
will be safely stored and will only be seen by my supervisor and myself. The researcher will take all necessary steps to 
keep interview information safe during time in the field. 
 
 All interview materials will be destroyed upon completion of the thesis. 
 
 It will be your decision as to whether you and your organisation will be identified or will remain confidential in the 
published thesis.  
 
 As a participant, you do not have to answer all questions. 
 
 If you agree to take part in the interview you are free to withdraw at any stage without having to give a reason. 
 
 You are free to withdraw any information you have provided before data collection and analysis of the research is 
complete on 1 December 2010. 
 
 Following our discussions you will have an opportunity to review the information that you provided prior to it being 
used in the published thesis.  
 
 
Upon completion of my thesis, a copy will be lodged in the Victoria University library and a summary of findings will be 
made available to you, if this is of interest. The research may also be published in academic or professional journals 
and/or disseminated at academic or professional conferences as the opportunity arises. 
 
I hope you will agree to participate in this research and I look forward to speaking with you soon. 
 
 
Vinaka Vakalevu, 
 
 
Morgan Hanks        Professor John Overton (Supervisor) 
hanksmorg@myvuw.ac.nz     John.Overton@vuw.ac.nz 
Fiji mobile: 912.1738 
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Consent to Participation in Research 
 
Title of project:  The Impact of Aid Sanctions on a Developing Country’s Civil Society: a case study of 
Fiji 
 
Researcher:   Morgan Hanks, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria 
University of Wellington 
 
 
I have read the Participant Information Sheet and understand the purpose of this research project.  
 
I understand the interview will be electronically recorded and any notes or recorded material from interviews 
will be destroyed at the end of the research process. 
 
I understand that all information I provide will be safely stored accessed only by the researcher and research 
supervisor. 
 
I understand I will have an opportunity to see a summary of the interview. 
 
I understand I may withdraw myself, and any information I have provided, from this research project without 
explanation at any time before 1 December 2010. 
 
I understand the results of this research will be included in a thesis and may be used for publication in 
academic or professional journals, and for dissemination at academic or professional conferences. 
 
I agree to take part in this research.  
 
 
Please tick as appropriate:  
 
I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is completed.  
 
 
 I consent to my name being used when my comments or opinions are used in this research.  
or  
I request that my name be omitted and a pseudonym assigned by the researcher be used if my 
comments or opinions are included in this research. 
 
 
I consent to the name of the organisation I work for being used in this research. 
or  
I request the name of the organisation I work for to be omitted from this research. 
 
 
Name:           Date:       
 
Organisation:          Email:      
 
 
Signed:        
 
 
 
